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Abstract 
Alcohol use disorder (AUD) is a widespread mental disease denoted by chronic alcohol 
use despite significant negative consequences for a person’s life. It affected more than 14 
million persons in Europe alone and accounted for more than 5% of deaths worldwide in 
2011-2012. Understanding the psychological and neurobiological mechanisms driving the 
development and maintenance of pathological alcohol use is key to conceptualizing new 
programs for prevention and therapy of AUD. There has been a variety of etiological models 
trying to describe and relate these mechanisms. Lately, the view of AUD as a disorder of 
learning and decision making has received much support proposing dual systems to be at 
work in AUD – one system being deliberate, forward-planning, and goal-directed and the 
other one reflexive, automatic, and habitual. Both systems supposedly work in parallel in a 
framework of value-based decision making and their balance can be flexibly adjusted in 
healthy agents, while a progressive imbalance favoring habitual over goal-directed choice 
strategies is assumed in AUD. This imbalance has been theoretically associated to neural 
adaptations to chronic alcohol use in corticostriatal pathways involved in reward processing, 
especially in ventral striatum. However, these theoretical models are grounded strongly on 
animal research while empirical research in the human domain remains rather sparse and 
inconclusive. Furthermore, alterations in value-based decision-making processes and their 
neural implementation might not only result from prolonged alcohol misuse but may also 
represent premorbid interindividual differences posing a risk factor for the development of 
AUD. 
Therefore, I here present three studies investigating the relation of alcohol use with the 
balance between goal-directed and habitual decision systems and with parameters modulating 
option valuation processes of these systems, namely delay, risk, and valence of option 
outcomes. To separate the investigation of these decision processes as predisposing risk for or 
consequence of alcohol use, two samples were examined: one sample of 201 eighteen-year-
old men being neither abstinent from nor dependent on alcohol as well as one sample of 114 
AUD patients in detoxification treatment and 98 control participants matched for age, sex, 
educational background, and smoking status. Both samples had a baseline assessment of 
several behavioral tasks, questionnaires, and neuropsychological testing and were followed-up 
over one year to examine drinking trajectories in the sample of young men and relapse in 
detoxified patients. The behavioral tasks included a sequential choice task using model-free 
and model-based reinforcement learning as operationalization of habitual and goal-directed 
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decision making, respectively, during functional magnetic resonance imaging and four tasks 
probing participants’ delay discounting, probability discounting for gains and losses, and loss 
aversion.  
Study 1 presents the cross-sectional analysis of the sequential choice task in relation to 
baseline drinking behavior of the young-adult sample. These analyses did not reveal an 
association between non-pathological alcohol use and habitual and goal-directed control on 
neither a behavioral nor neural level except for one exploratory finding of increased BOLD 
responses to model-free habitual learning signals in participants with earlier onset of drinking. 
Study 2 examined the same task in AUD patients compared to control participants showing no 
difference in behavioral control or neural correlates between those groups. However, 
prospectively relapsing AUD patients showed lower BOLD responses associated to model-
based goal-directed control than abstaining patients and control participants. Additionally, the 
interaction of goal-directed control and positive expectancies of alcohol effects discriminated 
subsequently relapsing and abstaining patients revealing an increased risk of relapse for those 
patients who showed higher levels of goal-directed control and low alcohol expectancies or 
low levels of goal-directedness and high expectancies. Study 3 examined modulating features 
of goal-directed and habitual option valuation – delay, risk, and valence of options – in 
association to alcohol use in the young-adult sample and AUD status in the sample of patients 
and matched control participants on a cross-sectional as well as longitudinal level. This study 
revealed no relation of delay, risk, and loss aversion with current alcohol use and 
consumption one year later in the young men. In contrast, AUD patients showed 
systematically more impulsive choice behavior than control participants in all four tasks: a 
higher preference for immediate rewards, more risky choices when facing gains and less when 
facing losses, and lower loss aversion. Furthermore, a general tendency to overestimate the 
probability of uncertain losses could predict relapse risk over the following year in AUD 
patients. 
Taken together, these results do not support the hypothesis that mechanisms of value-
based decision making might be predisposing risk factors for alcohol consumption. The 
findings for patients already suffering from AUD are mixed: while choice biases regarding 
delays, risks, and valence of option outcomes seem to be altered systematically in AUD, there 
was no indication of an imbalance of habitual and goal-directed control. These findings 
challenge the assumption of a generalized outcome-unspecific shift of behavioral control from 
goal-directed to habitual strategies during the development of AUD and point towards several 
possible future avenues of research to modify or extend the theoretical model.  
3 
 
Chapter 1. Perspectives on alcohol use disorder 
My thesis investigates cognitive accounts of alcohol use disorder and mechanisms of 
learning, decision making, and behavioral control associated with alcohol use. In this chapter, 
I introduce the concept of alcohol use disorders including its size and burden for human 
society. Furthermore, I give an overview on psychological perspectives on alcohol use, 
especially regarding value-based decision-making processes and dual-system approaches of 
goal-directed and habitual control. Finally, I explain a neurobiological perspective on alcohol 
use disorders, where I focus in particular on reward-processing and its relation to behavioral 
control.  
 
1.1 The size of alcohol use disorder  
1.1.1 Terminology of alcohol-use related disorders 
There are several terms regarding risky, harmful, or pathological alcohol use found in 
the literature, e.g. alcoholism, alcohol abuse or misuse, alcohol dependence, alcohol 
addiction, and alcohol use disorder. Accompanying this variety of terms is an ongoing debate 
about the definitions, relations, similarities, and differences between these concepts (Robinson 
& Berridge, 1993; Volkow & Baler, 2014). Moreover, key organizations in researching 
alcohol use like the World Health Organization (WHO), American Psychiatric Association 
(APA), or the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism take into account 
psychological effects of the terms to avoid stigmatization of affected persons. For this reason, 
there has been a recent change in nomenclature in the latest edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
While the previous edition distinguished between the diagnoses alcohol abuse and alcohol 
dependence to classify persons with milder and more severe patterns of alcohol consumption, 
respectively, the latest edition of the DSM subsumes both diagnoses under the term alcohol 
use disorder (AUD). The authors of the DSM-5 define the following criteria for AUD:  
 
A problematic pattern of alcohol use leading to clinically significant impairment or distress, 
as manifested by at least two of the following, occurring within a 12-month period: 
A. Alcohol is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period than was intended. 
B. There is a persistent desire or unsuccessful efforts to cut down or control alcohol use. 
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C. A great deal of time is spent in activities necessary to obtain alcohol, use alcohol, or 
recover from its effects. 
D. Craving, or a strong desire or urge to use alcohol 
E. Recurrent alcohol use resulting in a failure to fulfill major role obligations at work, 
school, or home. 
F. Continued alcohol use despite having persistent or recurrent social or interpersonal 
problems caused or exacerbated by the effects of alcohol. 
G. Important social, occupational, or recreational activities are given up or reduced because 
of alcohol use. 
H. Recurrent alcohol use in situations in which it is physically hazardous. 
I. Alcohol use is continued despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent physical 
or psychological problem that is likely to have been caused or exacerbated by alcohol. 
J. Tolerance, as defined by either of the following: 
a. A need for markedly increased amounts of alcohol to achieve intoxication or 
desired effect. 
b. A markedly diminished effect with continued use of the same amount of alcohol. 
K. Withdrawal, as manifested by either of the following: 
a. The characteristic withdrawal syndrome for alcohol. 
b. Alcohol (or a closely related substance, such as a benzodiazepine) is taken to 
relieve or avoid withdrawal symptoms. 
 
This list comprises all seven symptoms constituting the previously used diagnosis of 
alcohol dependence (A-C, G, I-K), three of four symptoms of the previous diagnosis of 
alcohol abuse (E, F, H), and the additional symptom of craving (D). Meeting at least two of 
these criteria in the same 12-month interval, one can be diagnosed with AUD. The number of 
fulfilled criteria determines the severity of AUD, from mild (2-3 symptoms) over moderate 
(4-5) to severe (6+). With this list of symptoms, AUD includes all syndromes being referred 
to as alcohol addiction, abuse and dependence and refers to physiological as well as 
psychological phenomena related to pathological alcohol use.  
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1.1.2 Size and burden of alcohol consumption and alcohol use disorders 
Alcohol use disorders have been estimated to be the fourth most prevalent mental 
disorder in Europe in 2011 affecting 3.4% of the population aged 15 years or older 
corresponding to 14.6 million persons (referring to the DSM-IV diagnosis of alcohol 
dependence; Wittchen et al., 2011)1. In the USA, the 12-month and lifetime prevalence 
estimates for an AUD (based on DSM-5) were 13.9% and 29.1%, respectively, in 2012-2013 
(Grant et al., 2015). However, it is not only when suffering from AUD that alcohol 
consumption poses a health risk. Alcohol intake can already have detrimental effects on 
health when being consumed at low to moderate levels.  
In 2014, the WHO published the “Global status report on alcohol and health” providing 
information about the global and local levels of alcohol consumption and its health 
consequences (World Health Organization, 2014). According to this report, the average 
human had consumed 6.2 l of pure alcohol in 2010 resulting in an average intake of 13.5 g 
alcohol per day, while 61.7% of the very same population were abstinent from alcohol in the 
past year (World Health Organization, 2014). But levels of alcohol use and abstention vary 
greatly by geographical and cultural region; for example, inhabitants of the WHO European 
Region (ranging from Iceland and Portugal in the West to the Russian Federation and 
Kyrgyzstan in the East) had an average per capita alcohol consumption of 10.9 l in 2010. 
Although this region is inhabited by only 14.7% of the world’s population, it accounts for 
25.7% of the globally consumed alcohol. Meanwhile, the per capita alcohol consumption in 
the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region was 0.7 l, a result of the very high abstention rate of 
94.6% in the past 12 months (World Health Organization, 2014).  
Another report on “Public health successes and missed opportunities” demonstrated the 
“Trends in alcohol consumption and attributable mortality in the WHO European Region” 
from 1990 to 2014 (World Health Organization, 2016). This publication reported that the 
alcohol consumption per capita in the European region has slightly decreased over the past 25 
years (-10.8%, from 12.0 l pure alcohol per capita in 1990 to 10.7 l in 2014). Shrinking the 
focus on central-western countries of the European Union  reveals an even stronger decrease 
(-21.7%, from 14.3 l in 1990 to 11.2 l in 2014). However, alcohol consumption in Europe is 
still the highest compared to all other WHO regions and it poses a serious threat to the well-
being of our society. 
                                                 
1 Please note that all epidemiological information about alcohol consumption, disease burden, and prevalence in 
this section regard the population aged 15 years or older if not stated otherwise. 
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Consumption of alcohol is one of the top five risk factors for disease, disability, and 
death and has shown to be causal for over 200 disease and injury conditions (World Health 
Organization, 2014). In 2012, alcohol use accounted for 5.9% of all deaths worldwide 
amounting to 3.3 million fatalities (World Health Organization, 2014). Therefore, alcohol 
consumption is “one of the most important risk factors for disease” (World Health 
Organization, 2016; p.1). Harmful alcohol use has been shown to be causal for liver cirrhosis, 
various types of cancer, cardiovascular diseases, and intentional and unintentional injuries 
(World Health Organization, 2016). In Germany, 6.2% of the population between 18 and 64 
years of age suffered from some clinical disorder attributed to alcohol consumption in 2006, 
corresponding to more than 3 million affected persons (Kraus, Piontek, Pabst, & Bühringer, 
2011). Clinical disorders attributable to alcohol have led to 334,000 hospitalizations in 
Germany in 2008 (Kraus et al., 2011). The harmful potential of alcohol consumption is 
composed of three characteristics: the quality of consumed beverages, the volume and the 
pattern of consumption (World Health Organization, 2014). First, the quality of the consumed 
alcoholic beverages primarily plays a role if consuming informally or illegally produced 
drinks, as those have an increased probability of being contaminated with methanol, toxic 
metals or ethyl carbamate (Rehm, Kanteres, & Lachenmeier, 2010; World Health 
Organization, 2014). Second, the volume of consumed alcohol is mostly positively associated 
with the risk for those diseases that are caused (at least in part) by alcohol (International 
Agency for Research on Cancer & World Health Organization, 2010). For example, the 
relative risk for cancer of the oral cavity is increased by 76% with a daily consumption of 25 
g alcohol, which corresponds to two small bottles (330 ml) of regular beer (4.8 Vol% alcohol) 
compared to abstinence from alcohol, and increases to being more than six-fold with an 
average daily intake of 100 g alcohol (Bagnardi, Blangiardo, Vecchia, & Corrao, 2001). 
Third, heavy episodic drinking (HED), defined by consuming at least 60 g alcohol per 
drinking occasion at least once per month, is associated with detrimental health consequences 
even if the person has a low average alcohol intake. HED occurred in 16.5% of the population 
of the WHO European Region, but has a higher prevalence of 31.2% in the subgroup of 15- to 
19-year-olds (World Health Organization, 2014). 
This shows the relevance of age as an important covariate in describing the risk of 
alcohol consumption. Children, adolescents, and the elderly are generally subject to increased 
harm by the same amount of alcohol consumed than any other age group (World Health 
Organization, 2014). Another important factor of influence on alcohol use is the sex as 
females generally show increased rates of abstention from alcohol, decreased per capita 
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consumption, decreased rates of HED (International Agency for Research on Cancer & World 
Health Organization, 2010; World Health Organization, 2014) and decreased risk of suffering 
from AUD (Wittchen et al., 2011). A third important risk factor for harmful alcohol use is a 
family history of AUD (World Health Organization, 2014). Having a parent suffering from 
AUD increases the lifetime risk of developing AUD four- to eight-fold (Zimmermann, 
Blomeyer, Laucht, & Mann, 2007), which together with twin and adoption studies has led to 
the estimation of complex genetic factors accounting for 40-60% of the risk to develop AUD 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013; Schuckit, 2009; Zimmermann et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, per capita consumption of alcohol, prevalence of current drinking, and HED 
were correlated with the economic wealth of a country with higher rates of consumption being 
found in higher income countries (World Health Organization, 2014). Last, there is also an 
association between socioeconomic status (SES) and alcohol consumption. Studies have 
found that higher SES corresponds to smaller abstention rates, more drinking occasions, and 
more drinkers with low-risk consumption patterns, whereas persons of lower SES may drink 
less but still have higher rates of harmful consequences of drinking (International Agency for 
Research on Cancer & World Health Organization, 2010; World Health Organization, 2014). 
This seeming contradiction might be resolved with the notion that members of low SES 
groups lack the social and economic resources to avoid aversive consequences of alcohol use 
(World Health Organization, 2014), have a higher prevalence of HED, or more often drink 
alcohol in rather unsafe or violent environments (World Health Organization, 2010). 
Due to its detrimental effects on health and its addiction potential, alcohol consumption 
also has an economic burden for societies. In 2012, 5.1% of the global burden of disease and 
injury was associated with alcohol use and its consequences (World Health Organization, 
2014). This was measured in disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). Alcohol-related DALYs 
represent the years of life that are lost due to premature death or living with a disability in 
consequence of alcohol use. In Germany, alcohol-related DALYs were estimated to amount to 
392,000 years in 2004 (Kraus et al., 2011). Global estimates of the leading risk factors for 
DALYs see alcohol use on third place accounting for 4.5% of world-wide DALYs in 2004 
corresponding to 69 million years of healthy life lost due to premature death or living in 
disability (World Health Organization, 2009). The direct (e.g. costs occurring due to 
hospitalization and treatment, unemployment and welfare systems, or encounters with the 
police and justice system) and indirect (e.g. lost economic productivity caused by 
unemployment, decreased individual work force, or absenteeism) social and economic costs 
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of alcohol use were estimated to sum up to 125 billion Euros in the EU in 2003 or 233.5 
billion US Dollars in the USA in 2006 (World Health Organization, 2014).  
In summary, alcohol consumption is a risk factor for the diminishment of individual and 
societal well-being. The period of late adolescence and young adulthood is associated with 
increased HED, especially in young men, which in turn is associated with more severe 
drinking trajectories and adverse health outcomes due to alcohol consumption. Though 
alcohol consumption has slightly decreased in many regions of the world in the past decades, 
above all in the western industrialized countries, the global burden of alcohol use and its 
harmful consequences is by no means lifted from our shoulders. This makes it all the more 
important to understand the mechanisms of the development and maintenance of AUD, 
because only detailed knowledge of its etiology can guide us in developing well-functioning 
programs for prevention and therapy of AUD. 
 
1.2 Cognitive psychological perspectives on alcohol use disorder 
1.2.1 A unified framework for addiction 
As we have seen in the previous section, alcohol use and its related disorders are a 
serious threat to societies and a burden for the global community. But many researchers have 
accepted the challenge of trying to understand the development and maintenance of AUD. In 
the last decades, numerous theories have been proposed concerning substance use disorders 
(SUDs). These theories often treated all substances of abuse equally, presumably because 
there are many similarities between their respective effects on a behavioral and neural-circuit 
level. Most influential in the past decades were theories of incentive sensitization (Robinson 
& Berridge, 1993), impulsivity (Ainslie, 1992, as cited in Redish, Jensen, & Johnson, 2008), 
opponent processes (Koob & Le Moal, 1997; Solomon & Corbit, 1973), neural adaptations 
(Volkow, Fowler, & Wang, 2003), non-compensable dopamine (Di Chiara, 1999; Redish, 
2004), and an imbalance between dual systems (Bechara, 2005; Bickel et al., 2007; Robbins 
& Everitt, 1999; Tiffany, 1990). All of those have proven to explain some but not all features 
of SUDs (Redish et al., 2008). Redish, Jensen, and Johnson (2008) delivered a critical review 
of previous etiology models of SUDs and attempted to unify them into one overarching theory 
– the unified framework for addiction (UFA). These authors defined SUDs as a spectrum 
disorder and postulated that all previous theories had the commonality of proposing some 
influence on the processing of values or costs associated with the seeking and taking of drugs. 
In their view and in line with many of the previous approaches, SUDs can be classified as 
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disorders of decision making (Redish, 2004; Redish et al., 2008). This means that people 
suffering from SUDs repeatedly make suboptimal choices – they decide to use a drug of abuse 
despite the known negative long-term consequences of this choice. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that affected persons willingly ignore the costs of substance use. Rather, the 
evaluation of choice options at hand is altered or the action selection process based on this 
evaluation goes awry (Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). Furthermore, Redish, Jensen, 
and Johnson (2008) revealed an underlying structural commonality: all of the previous, 
influential theories about SUD etiology could be conciliated in a model of two separate yet 
interacting systems – one being “a flexible, cognitive, planning” and the other “a rigid, 
automatic, habit-based system” (Redish et al., 2008; p. 418). These two systems or variations 
of them have a long history in psychology, as they are supposedly the same as the ones 
proposed by various past dual system accounts, e.g. cognitive map vs. route systems in the 
animal navigation (e.g. O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978), declarative vs. procedural (e.g. N. J. Cohen 
& Squire, 1980; Redish, 1999) or explicit vs. implicit learning systems in the human learning 
(e.g. Schacter, 1987), and controlled vs. automatic processes in the behavioral control 
literature (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Apart from its application 
in the UFA, dual-system accounts proposing a cognitive goal-directed and an automatic 
habitual mechanism have received much attention in the past years in learning and decision-
making research (see section 1.2.3). In response to the critique of their peers, Redish, Jensen, 
and Johnson (2008) expanded their framework to include a Pavlovian/affective system. This 
system acts through an initial emotional response, which then triggers a “pre-wired” 
Pavlovian conditioned behavioral response. 
In their seminal work, Redish, Jensen, and Johnson (2008) suggested ten vulnerability 
factors or failure points in decision-making processes, which lead to suboptimal decisions and 
actions and, consequently, to the development of SUDs. These factors include among other 
things the overvaluation of the expected value of an outcome, changes in the homeostatic set 
point or in learning processes, inhibition of the planning system favoring habitual decision 
making, and over-fast discounting processes. As they proposed multiple vulnerabilities, which 
could co-exist or interact, the authors of the UFA also suggested that there are multiple 
pathways to SUDs and, hence, various addiction syndromes (Ahmed, 2008). This complexity 
made certain that every person suffering from SUDs could be found in the UFA with her 
individual pattern of maladaptive decision-making.  
Various scientists from the field of addiction research responded to the proposed UFA 
commending or criticizing it and proposing changes or extensions (e.g. Bickel & Yi, 2008; 
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Chambers, 2008; Goudie, Field, & Cole, 2008; Hart & Krauss, 2008; Moal, 2008; Ostlund & 
Balleine, 2008). Some of them suggested trying to narrow it down even further: interactions 
between vulnerabilities in the UFA should be identified, which could lead to certain clinical 
features of addiction; single vulnerabilities should be examined further to check whether they 
are historically grown as different constructs but meaning the same or at least very close 
constructs; and processes should be weighted in order to find those being more relevant than 
others for development, maintenance, and treatment of SUDs (Bickel & Yi, 2008; Goudie et 
al., 2008). Moreover, Redish, Jensen, and Johnson (2008) argue for the UFA almost 
exclusively from a neurophysiological point of view – most failure points are based on the 
pharmacological mechanisms and neurobiological adaptions consequent to drug consumption. 
Meanwhile, certain aspects being associated with the etiology of SUDs were missing in the 
UFA, for example neurodevelopmental dynamics (Ahmed, 2008) and the influence of social 
and sociocultural (Boden, 2008; Hart & Krauss, 2008; Lende, 2008), affective (Kiviniemi & 
Bevins, 2008; Moal, 2008), environmental (Neal & Wood, 2008), and psychological factors 
(Neal & Wood, 2008; Ostlund & Balleine, 2008; Sarnecki, Traynor, & Clune, 2008; Wiers, 
Havermans, Deutsch, & Stacy, 2008).  
However, by and large, Redish, Jensen, and Johnson (2008) were commended for their 
important work trying to take the loose threads of various models for SUD etiology and to 
unite them in one framework, but clearly there are still many gaps in our knowledge about 
altered choice in SUDs to be filled. All the vulnerability factors proposed in the UFA are 
failures in decision-making based on subjective values and costs of choice options. In order to 
investigate the possible vulnerabilities further, a more detailed model of decision-making 
mechanisms in general is needed. Therefore, I will introduce a theoretical framework of 
value-based decision making next.  
 
1.2.2 Value-based decision making 
Theories of value-based decision making (VBDM) consider the processes involved in 
the gathering and integration of information to choose between possible actions in a given 
state and acting according to the result of this process by any agent – be it animal, human, or 
(artificially intelligent) machine 2. Five basic processes have been suggested to be comprised 
                                                 
2 This process model is assumed to be valid in animals as well as humans and has also been used in machine 
learning and artificial intelligence research. Due to this universality, I will use the abstract term agent in the 
forthcoming descriptions. 
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in VBDM (Rangel et al., 2008), which are closely connected and build a circular model of 
behavioral control (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Framework of value-based decision making (based on Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008, Figure 1). 
 
According to this framework, each decision-making process begins with computing a 
representation of the choice problem (state representation). This includes all internal (e.g. 
hunger, thirst, boredom) and external variables (e.g. temperature, threat, surroundings) 
comprising the current state and, in addition, all imaginable actions in this state. This first 
process is neither well investigated nor understood regarding its computational and 
neurobiological foundations and many questions about it await answering, for example, how 
actions get chosen to be represented or ignored and how the necessary interplay between 
perception and memory retrieval works (Rangel et al., 2008).  
Whatever the mechanisms behind this first process, the agent then computes a value for 
each option based on this state representation (option valuation). This is the process of most 
interest in current lines of research. Note that the computed values in this step refer not to the 
incentive value of the expected outcome but to the choice option itself, that is, a state-action 
pair. As there are several modulating features of options, for example the delay until receipt of 
the outcome and the current motivational state of the agent, the option value does not have to 
correspond to the incentive value of the respective outcome. For example, the same piece of 
pie has a certain relatively stable incentive value for the same agent, but the option to buy it 
can be valued very differently depending on whether one is hungry or sated, rich or poor, on 
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diet or underweight. In this second step of the VBDM process, one can differentiate at least 
three different valuation systems, being Pavlovian, habitual, and goal-directed. The Pavlovian 
system is based on “pre-wired”, innate, archaic responses to specific stimuli like approaching 
appetitive (e.g. food) and withdrawing from aversive stimuli (e.g. predators). Thus, the 
behavioral repertoire of the Pavlovian system is very limited (Rangel et al., 2008). In contrast 
to the innate responses of the Pavlovian system, the habitual system has learned the values of 
stimulus-response associations through operant or instrumental conditioning, that is, through 
trial-and-error learning, the comparison of expected and received outcomes, and the 
consequent repetition of reinforced behavior (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005). In consequence, 
state-action pairs that have often led to a rewarding experience are attributed with a relatively 
high value in the habitual system. These “habit values” need many experiential repetitions to 
approximate the real-world long-term values of stimulus-response associations, above all with 
complex behaviors, but once learned they can be retrieved directly. This immediacy of the 
value allocation is the greatest advantage of the habit valuation system. Unfortunately, the 
habit system can only assign values to previously experienced options and relies on 
generalization from known stimulus-response pairs when encountering new states (Rangel et 
al., 2008). This can lead to failures in value allocation and, hence, in behavioral control when 
an option is incorrectly valued and consequently erroneously chosen. The third proposed 
system in the option valuation process, the goal-directed system, is based on a model of the 
state space, that is, a map-like representation of the world with all thinkable actions transiting 
the agent from the current state to the next ones. This system computes values by forward 
planning, mental simulation, and calculating beneficial action trajectories through the state 
space with its knowledge of action-outcome contingencies, transition probabilities between 
states, and incentive values of outcomes. These “goal values” are computed on demand and 
can flexibly adapt to all features of the state representation (not only the previously 
encountered like the habit system’s values), but their calculation is computationally 
expensive, effortful, and time-demanding (Daw et al., 2005; Gershman & Daw, 2017).  
Furthermore, there are some known attributes in the state representation modulating the 
processes of the valuation systems. Risk, uncertainty, ambiguity, and delay of option 
outcomes, and social contexts can influence the valuation processes that are the basis for 
action selection. These influences are best understood within the goal-directed system as this 
can be examined in humans easiest, while it is still unclear whether and how these situational 
facets relate to Pavlovian and habit valuation (Rangel et al., 2008). In the context of risk and 
delay, the assumptions of Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) have often been 
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confirmed. This theory states that delays diminish the value of outcomes hyperbolically as 
does a probabilistic compared to a definitive receipt of rewards (see section 1.2.3.4 and 
Chapter 4/Study 3). Furthermore, Prospect Theory proposes that the valence has an influence 
on valuation processes. Thus, negative-valence outcomes are weighed stronger than positive-
valence outcomes of the same absolute value (termed loss aversion, see section 1.2.3.4 and 
Chapter 4/Study 3). 
The allocated values of this second process are then passed on to the next process and 
are the basis for the selection and execution of one action (action selection). How exactly the 
values of various options are integrated to select one for execution is still under investigation. 
Daw, Niv, and Dayan (2005) suggested the selection to be based on the relative certainty of 
the underlying valuation systems, which has found some empirical consolidation (Lee, 
Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2014). Another approach is to build a weighted sum of the different 
values from the valuation systems for the same options and feed this into a function that also 
takes into account human’s tendency to perseverate under some circumstances (e.g. 
exploitation behavior in stable environments) and to seek out novel options under other 
condition (e.g. exploration behavior in unstable environments; e.g. J. D. Cohen, McClure, & 
Yu, 2007; Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006). So far, many aspects of action 
selection have not been investigated, yet, like how this process handles conflict between 
values for the same option from different valuation systems, whether there is a hierarchy of 
the different systems, and how the selection process is implemented in the brain (Rangel et 
al., 2008).  
After execution of the chosen action, the outcome of this action is being evaluated 
regarding its desirability or actually perceived incentive value (outcome evaluation). This 
evaluation is used to update the first three processes (learning) to improve behavior when 
facing the same or similar states in the future. The learning process has been suggested to 
involve reinforcement learning, that is, updating state values by the perceived outcome of an 
action, thereby increasing the probability of selecting actions that led to positive experiences 
in the past and decreasing the probability of choosing options with aversive consequences (see 
section 1.2.3.2).  
Failures could theoretically arise in each of the VBDM processes and be associated with 
disorders of decision making like AUD, but most research so far focused on the valuation 
process (Rangel et al., 2008; Redish, 2004). Hence, the valuation systems might go wrong in 
assigning values for actions regarding alcohol use. Oftentimes, it is assumed that the habit 
system consistently overvalues choice options involving alcohol consumption in AUD, but it 
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is also possible for the goal-directed valuation system to underestimate the long-term harms of 
consumption and, thus, compute a subjectively heightened value for drinking (e.g. Redish, 
2004). If the option values to consume alcohol are subjectively increased, the chance to 
choose this course of action is also elevated (as it is a general assumption underlying human 
behavior control theories that we choose the option with the highest subjective value most of 
the time). However, it is also possible that certain options are systematically ignored and not 
even represented as possible action trajectories at the beginning of the VBDM process. For 
example, it could just not occur to a person suffering from AUD to pour away an opened 
bottle of liquor or to not attend a family birthday party, where the temptation to drink might 
be high. In addition, the action-selection process might be corrupted in AUD systematically 
selecting the alcohol-associated option when the values of the option to drink and the option 
to abstain are in conflict but equally high.  
Still, the valuation process of VBDM is the best understood and especially the interplay 
between goal-directed and habitual valuation systems has been of great interest for research 
on decision-making processes in general. In the last 20 years, the idea of those two opposing 
systems was adopted to clinical research and sparked investigations into their possible role in 
the development and maintenance of several mental disorders. However, as Rangel, Camerer, 
and Montague (2008) have put it, the five proposed processes of VBDM are not rigid. Their 
model is just one possible taxonomy trying to organize the decision-making process and, thus, 
aid in structuring and linking research from neuroeconomics, psychology, psychiatry, and 
cognitive neuroscience. This is important to keep in mind when revisiting literature on this 
topic as many researchers did not restrict goal-directed and habitual systems to the process of 
option valuation like proposed by Rangel, Camerer, and Montague (2008). Instead, they often 
assumed these two systems to each comprise separate state representations, valuation and 
updating rules, and to compete with one another for supremacy in action control. Until today, 
there is no consensus in the scientific community about how many decision-making systems 
exist and how the various sub-processes are implemented and interact despite a tremendous 
amount of research on this topic as I will outline in the following section. Solving these issues 
will be an important avenue of future research and some computational approaches used in 
the more recent investigations hold promise to bring us closer to a better understanding of the 
interplay of goal-directed and habitual systems involved in VBDM.  
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1.2.3 Goal-directed and habitual systems 
The dual-system account of a flexible, executive or cognitive system opposed to an 
automatic habitual one put forward by Redish, Jensen, and Johnson (2008) has a long history 
in psychology with a strong focus on animal models of behavior until the end of the last 
century. Even theories as old as Tolman’s (1948) cognitive maps in rat navigation research 
can be re-interpreted with this framework: rats put in a maze learned a comprehensive map of 
the maze and were able to flexibly adjust their behavior when paths were changed or the 
whole maze rotated except for the food box and some global orientation cues in the room, 
where the maze had been set up. But with overtraining or too strong motivational or 
frustrating states (e.g. by being very hungry during training), the cognitive maps supposedly 
narrowed down and became “strip-like” often only storing a single, simple path to the goal 
(Tolman, 1948). This description bears strong resemblance to an elaborated, cognitive, goal-
directed system building a map of the world one lives in becoming a habitual stimulus-
response or state-action sequence after many repetitions seen in later rodent and human 
experiments of behavioral control (e.g. Adams, 1982; Dickinson, 1985; Tricomi, Balleine, & 
O’Doherty, 2009).  
Based on experimental and theoretical work in rodent models of learning and behavioral 
control, Dickinson (1985) described a system being more reflexive and based on stimulus-
response patterns and another (“teleological”) system that plans action in a purposeful, goal-
directed manner. Nine years later, Dickinson and Balleine (1994) proposed two criteria for the 
definition of goal-directed behavior: (i) the instrumental criterion, that is, a goal-directed 
action has to be mediated by the representation of the contingency between action and 
outcome and (ii) the goal criterion, that is, the outcome has to have an incentive value for the 
agent and, therefore, poses a desirable goal state. These criteria imply that an agent needs 
instrumental learning to memorize the contingencies between actions and outcomes on the 
one hand and incentive learning to estimate the value of an outcome on the other.  
Instrumental learning has been an area under research for a century starting with pioneer 
work by Thorndike (1911) and many more (e.g. Grindley, 1932; Miller & Konorski, 1969; 
Skinner, 1938). It is defined by the necessity of an action or response to receive an outcome 
(Koch, 2008). In the first instantiations of instrumental learning by Thorndike, the outcome 
was assumed to reinforce the stimulus-response association that led to its receipt but was not 
itself a part of the learned entity. Furthermore, all learned instrumental behavior was assumed 
to be elicited by external stimuli. But Skinner (1938) opposed this view. He defined another 
class of instrumental behavior called operant behavior besides these stimulus-response 
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associations (which he called respondent behavior). Operant behavior is instrumental in 
earning an outcome but not elicited by an external stimulus. Here, one can see the first 
differentiation between two ways of behavioral control: externally triggered stimulus-
response patterns and behavior guided by internal action-outcome associations reminiscent of 
modern accounts of habitual and goal-directed control, respectively. 
Incentive learning is the answer to the question, why some entities can pose a desired 
goal for an individual. Tolman (1949) called this cathexis – the connection of a positive or 
negative goal object to a positive or negative drive, respectively. If a hungry being, for 
example, faces and consumes a certain type of delicious food for the first time, it will 
immediately associate this food type with a pleasurable reduction of hunger. Thereby, this 
type of food has acquired positive incentive value for the creature. The process of incentive 
learning is an essential prerequisite of instrumental learning as it provides valuable reinforcers 
of behavior. But it is also crucial for one of the two classic animal experiments demonstrating 
goal-directed behavior, devaluation paradigms.  
In outcome devaluation experiments, an agent learns a stimulus-response-outcome 
association. After learning, the outcome is devalued either through satiation or by new, this 
time negative, incentive learning. In the latter case, the valued outcome is paired with a strong 
unpleasant experience, for example an injection of lithium chloride resulting in acute malaise, 
and, thereby, the agent experiences a great decrease in incentive value of this outcome. The 
other classic paradigm for the demonstration of goal-directed behavior is contingency 
degradation, where the contingency between action and outcome is being manipulated after 
learning, for example by giving non-contingent doses of the outcome. Both paradigms include 
testing the instrumental behavior rates of animals after these manipulations. The final test of 
response rates is conducted in extinction, because supposedly no new learning occurs when 
holding back the outcome (or response rates just slowly decrease over time depending on the 
previous stability of learned behavior). Seeing a strong decrease in instrumental responding 
after outcome devaluation or contingency degradation is a sign that this behavior was 
characterized by the goal and instrumental criterion and, thus, goal-directed by definition.  
Studies employing contingency degradation or outcome devaluation have also revealed 
that instrumental behavior can get impervious to these manipulations under certain 
circumstances. Extensive training is one of these circumstances (e.g. in rats: Adams, 1982; 
Dickinson, 1985; in humans: Tricomi et al., 2009). Over-training is supposed to lead to a 
representational dissociation of the stimulus-response association from the outcome value, 
that is, behavior is executed in the form of automatic responses to external stimuli 
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independent from the current value of the outcome of this response. Behavior that is governed 
this way is called habitual. In other words, numerous repetitions of the same behavior lead to 
a shift from initially goal-directed to habitual control. This shift is the heart piece of a current 
theory on the development of SUDs (Everitt & Robbins, 2016).  
 
1.2.3.1 Goal-directed and habitual decision making in association to alcohol dependence 
Everitt and Robbins (2005, 2013, 2016; Robbins & Everitt, 1999) proposed a learning-
based theory of the development and maintenance of and relapse to SUDs. In their account, 
drug consumption is an intentional and goal-directed process at first. After repeated drug 
intake, the consumption pattern can gradually shift from goal-directed to habitual control. 
This idea of a transitional process of first voluntary, controlled to later automatic behavior in 
alcohol (ab-)use was partly based on a review by Tiffany who stated that drug usage becomes 
an automatic “drug-use action plan” through “consistent practice” (Tiffany, 1990; pp. 154-
155). The transition is supposed to be facilitated by the sustained reinforcing effects of drugs 
of abuse, which are probably mediated by dopaminergically innervated cortico-striatal loops 
(see section 1.3).  
The learning theory account of addiction by Everitt and Robbins is mostly based on 
rodent studies examining effects of outcome devaluation and contingency degradation and 
gave rise to extended research. Following their claim, researchers showed that using drugs of 
abuse as rewards in repeated instrumental learning scenarios led to resistance against outcome 
devaluation more rapidly or stronger than using natural rewards like food or sugar water (e.g. 
Clemens, Castino, Cornish, Goodchild, & Holmes, 2014; Corbit, Nie, & Janak, 2012; 
Dickinson, Wood, & Smith, 2002; Miles, Everitt, & Dickinson, 2003; Nordquist et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, it has been shown that alcohol and amphetamines facilitate habitual responding 
instead of goal-directed behavior towards natural rewards even when given before and 
independent from the instrumental task (Corbit et al., 2012; Nelson & Killcross, 2006). This 
was interpreted as drugs’ general ability to enhance the transition of behavioral control from 
goal-directed to habitual regardless of the type of reinforcer. Yet, this rich line of animal 
research has focused strongly on reward-seeking behavior and not examined habitual drug 
intake specifically (McKim, Shnitko, Robinson, & Boettiger, 2016). Though Everitt and 
Robbins’ learning theory of addiction assumes the same mechanisms to be at work in human 
beings suffering from SUDs, empirical investigations with human subjects remain sparse.  
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Figure 2 Schematic representation of the shift from initially goal-directed substance us to automatic, habitual drug intake 
(based on Everitt & Robbins, 2016). 
 
Sjoerds et al. (2013) examined the effect of outcome devaluation in a slips-of-action 
task (S. de Wit, Corlett, Aitken, Dickinson, & Fletcher, 2009; S. de Wit, Niry, Wariyar, 
Aitken, & Dickinson, 2007) in detoxified AUD patients compared to healthy control 
participants. They found decreased accuracy in AUD patients after devaluation for all trial 
types, where the assumption of a shift from goal-directed to habitual control would have 
predicted specific deficits in two out of three trial types. This is in line with findings of rodent 
experiments by Halbout, Liu, and Ostlund (2016) showing that the previously shown shift to 
habitual responding was not apparent anymore when they used a more complex behavioral 
task than the studies before. These findings may weaken the evidence for the proposed model 
by Everitt and Robbins (2005, 2016), at least for AUD, but cannot refute it. Yet, they indicate 
that the relationship between alcohol consumption and behavioral control may be more 
complicated than can be examined with classic devaluation or degradation tasks – especially 
in human beings. Though, we do not know this for certain, yet, as a study like the one by 
Sjoerds et al. (2013) has not been repeated to date. 
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1.2.3.2 Model-free and model-based reinforcement learning 
Instead of trying to translate the investigation with devaluation and degradation 
paradigms in animal models to the human domain (Sjoerds et al., 2013), some SUD 
researchers turned towards another class of experimental paradigms. This shift of paradigm 
also addressed a fundamental shortcoming of devaluation and degradation tasks. Behavior 
that did not fulfill the instrumental and goal criterion of goal-directed behavior was assumed 
to be habitual by default. This accounts for the previously mentioned experiments not leaving 
room for alternative interpretations: response rates were either susceptible to the decrement of 
outcome value or contingency between response and outcome, that is goal-directed, or they 
were not and, thus, habitual. But there were no experimental paradigms to examine a possible 
“middle way” between or interaction of these systems. This changed when research on goal-
directed and habitual control was brought together with reinforcement learning (RL) models 
from computational learning theories.  
Reinforcement learning systems comprise four key elements: a policy, a reward signal, 
a value function, and (optionally) a model of the environment (Sutton & Barto, 1998). A 
policy maps or stores the preference to execute certain actions in certain states. The reward 
signal can be imagined as a single number that represents the amount or magnitude of 
reinforcing outcome an agent has received in each time step. This information is used to 
compute a value function, which represents the desirability of reaching a certain state and 
acting on a certain policy from this state onwards. While the reward signal stands for the 
immediate reinforcement after reaching a state, the value function estimates the prospective, 
cumulative reinforcement in this state and the possibly following states. Last, the model (or 
so-called state space) comprises a tree- or net-like map of the current and all possible future 
states including the possible transitions between states via certain actions. 
In the RL literature, two modes of learning have been established: model-free and 
model-based RL (e.g. Dickinson & Balleine, 2002; Doya, 1999; O’Doherty, Cockburn, & 
Pauli, 2017). Daw, Niv, and Dayan (2005) suggested that model-free and model-based RL 
algorithms could be used to model habitual and goal-directed decision-making systems, 
respectively, as they share pivotal properties. Model-free RL (Barto, Sutton, & Anderson, 
1983; Rummery & Niranjan, 1994; Sutton & Barto, 1998) learns by trial-and-error and uses 
reward prediction errors (RPEs) as teaching signals in order to update cached values of 
stimulus-response associations – or, in terms of RL, state-action pairs. RPEs arise from a 
comparison of expected and actually received outcomes after executing an action. Because of 
this updating scheme, model-free RL is only dependent on the previous reward history in this 
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specific state and, therefore, an ideal operationalization of habitual control. State-action pairs 
that have led to reward more often are more likely to be repeated, reminiscent of Thorndike’s 
(1911) Law of Effect. Model-based RL, on the contrary, works by building a map of the state 
space. It also integrates values for states according to the expected reward in that state and the 
sum of all possible future rewards (which might be learned by model-free RL; Daw, 
Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011). A model-based RL agent then searches its 
model of the state space for the most beneficial trajectory through it and executes the resultant 
policy. This dependence on a cognitive model of the world is strongly akin to the way the 
goal-directed system controls behavior. 
The basis for most RL models is Bellman’s equation (Bellman, 1957; cf. Gershman & 
Daw, 2017), which defines the value of a state-action pair (𝑄𝜋(𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡)) as the reward (𝑟𝑡) 
received by that action (𝑎𝑡) plus the time-discounted sum of all the possible following states 
(𝑄𝜋(𝑠𝑡+1|𝜋(𝑠𝑡+1)) weighted by the probability of reaching them (𝑃(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡)). In this 
equation, t denotes the current time step, s a state, a an action, γ the time-discounting 
parameter, Q the value for a state-action pair, P a probability, and π a policy.  
 
[1]  𝑄𝜋(𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡) = 𝑟𝑡 +  𝛾 ∑ 𝑃(𝑠𝑡+1|𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡)𝑠𝑡+1 𝑄𝜋(𝑠𝑡+1|𝜋(𝑠𝑡+1)) 
 
The concept of time discounting is not crucial for understanding here and will be 
introduced in section 1.2.3.4. Model-free and model-based RL can be seen as two different 
approaches to solve Bellman’s equation (Gershman & Daw, 2017). As model-based RL 
comprises a model of the state space and the associated rewards, it can calculate the right-
hand side of Bellman’s equation by planning of future trajectories, thereby trying to find the 
optimal policy maximizing future rewards. In contrast, model-free RL tries to estimate the 
left-hand side of the equation directly by past experience and stores the estimate in a memory 
cache to be updated each time the agent visits this state-action pair. The instantiation of 
model-free RL used in the presented studies was the so-called state-action-reward-state-action 
(SARSA) temporal difference (TD) learning algorithm proposed by Niranjan and Rummery 
(1994; see Appendix A.1.1). This recursive algorithm updates the current estimate of the 
state-action pair (𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡)) by the RPE (𝛿𝑡) that is weighted by a learning rate (𝛼). 
 
[2]  𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡) =  𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡) +  𝛼𝛿𝑡 
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As mentioned previously, the RPE represents the comparison between the expected 
reward (i.e. the value of the state-action pair after its last encounter; 𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡)) with the 
actually received reward (𝑟𝑡) and the time-discounted (𝛾) value of the next state-action pair 
(𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝑡+1, 𝑎𝑡+1)). 
 
[3] 𝛿𝑡 =  𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾 𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝑡+1, 𝑎𝑡+1)  −  𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝑡, 𝑎𝑡) 
 
When having experienced this state often enough (given that the environment and its 
reward structure are stable), the expected reward equals the sum of received reward and time-
discounted future-state value function and, thus, the RPE is zero. If the RPE is non-zero, the 
estimated value function of this state-action pair is updated. In contrast to these 
approximations of state-action values by the model-free system, the model-based RL system 
is assumed to directly build a model of the state space and uses this model to prospectively 
plan the most beneficial path through the tree-like model.  
Daw et al. (2011) designed a task that can model the balance between model-free and 
model-based RL (called the Two-Step task; see Figure 3). This sequential decision paradigm 
includes a probabilistic transition structure between states in each trial. Model-free and 
model-based RL state-action values can be differentiated, because the model-free system is 
oblivious of the transition probabilities and, therefore, ascribes a change of value to the wrong 
option under specific circumstances. Daw and colleagues also conceived a computational 
model of task behavior, which can be fit to the choices of each individual. This computational 
model uses the aforementioned equations for the model-free option values, calculates model-
based values by combining these model-free values with the transition probabilities between 
states (see Appendix A.1.1), and also combines both model-free and model-based option 
values to a net value of each state-action pair. In the combination, both types of option values 
are weighted by the parameter ω ranging from completely model-free (ω=0) to completely 
model-based (ω=1). This way of combining option values implies that model-free and model-
based valuation are the end points of one continuum and that behavioral control is commonly 
based on the integration of both modes of valuation. Crucially, this computational modeling 
approach outputs one parameter estimate of ω for each subject, thereby approximating the 
individual set point of the balance between model-free and model-based valuation modes in 
performing this task. This allows the examination of interindividual differences in this balance 
and their association with third variables like measures of alcohol consumption. 
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1.2.3.3 Model-free and model-based reinforcement learning in association to alcohol use 
As mentioned previously, some addiction research groups turned to this reinforcement-
learning paradigm to overcome the shortcomings of devaluation and degradation paradigms 
and to examine the relationship between alcohol use and the balance between model-free and 
model-based RL. Model-free and model-based RL are suggested to be proxies for habitual 
and goal-directed control, respectively, with the aim to examine the claim of Everitt and 
Robbins (2016) that AUD is associated with a shift from goal-directed to habitual control. 
Using Daw’s Two-Step task (Daw et al., 2011), these studies yielded mixed findings. With 
data of our pilot study, we compared AUD patients in detoxification with control participants 
matched for age and sex (Sebold et al., 2014). We found a decrement of model-based control 
in AUD patients, which disappeared after controlling for group differences in cognitive speed. 
In contrast, Voon et al. (2014) did not find differences in the balance between model-free and 
model-based control between AUD patients and healthy control subjects, but they did find a 
correlation between ω and the number of weeks abstinent in the patients with longer 
abstinence being associated with stronger model-based control. This correlation could explain 
the discrepancy to our finding in the pilot study (Sebold et al., 2014). AUD patients in Voon’s 
study were abstinent for two weeks to one year, while our pilot patients have been abstinent 
for two to 39 days. This could indicate that patients in Voon’s study were more model-based 
and, thus, more similar to healthy controls on average. Gillan et al. (2016) used a different 
approach sampling data from 1,413 subjects of the general population via an online 
assessment. They reported a small negative association between the degree of model-based 
control and self-reported alcohol use. Another study by Reiter et al. (2016) using the Two-
Step task found no difference in the balance between model-free and model-based control 
comparing healthy participants with and without family history of alcohol dependence.  
Overall, the current state of research is ambiguous about the association of alcohol use 
with goal-directed and habitual control in human subjects. There is no clear evidence for the 
proposed shift from goal-directed to habitual control during the development and maintenance 
of an AUD, but this theory could also not be clearly refuted, yet. It is possible that this shift 
only occurs in especially severe cases of AUD, develops after a long period of chronic alcohol 
abuse, or does not generalize to control in non-drug related behavior. Moreover, a general bias 
towards habitual behavior in AUD, if it exists, or a tendency to faster progress from goal-
directed to habitual control could also pose premorbid vulnerability factors for out-of-control 
alcohol use. It is one aim of this thesis to further elucidate this relationship (Studies 1 and 2).  
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Another important issue in investigating the association between VBDM and alcohol 
use is the aforementioned influence of features of the options like the delay between action 
and outcome or the uncertainty of the outcome (e.g. Rangel et al., 2008; Redish et al., 2008). 
These features have been shown to modulate the valuation of options (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) and this modulation shows interindividual differences and relative intraindividual 
stability (Green & Myerson, 2013). This gives rise to the question whether associations of 
alcohol use and VBDM are really driven by general tendencies to utilize more goal-directed 
or habitual control or by how the individual weights these modulating features. For example, 
a high subjective value for drinking alcohol in the current situation might be derived from a 
habitual bias of this valuation system towards alcohol as a direct consequence of many 
previous rewarding encounters with alcohol. Alternatively, this increased value could result 
from the discounting of negative long-term consequences of alcohol use, which in turn leads 
to an increased goal value of drinking. Thus, the individual weighting patterns of these 
specific option features might prove as important for the development and maintenance of 
AUD as the broader concepts of option valuation in VBDM.  
 
1.2.3.4 Modulators of goal-directed and habitual valuation systems 
As described previously, numerous features of the current options have to be taken into 
account during the valuation process in VBDM. These features include among other things 
the probability or uncertainty of the outcome, the delay until its receipt, the social context 
during decision making, and the effort to be exerted to gain the outcome. All those 
characteristics of the options modulate the valuation processes in the Pavlovian, habitual, and 
goal-directed system. How this modulation works is mostly not well understood, especially 
for the Pavlovian and habitual system, but some modulators have received more attention in 
research than others (Rangel et al., 2008), especially those which adhered to an impulsive 
phenotype often encountered while working in clinical settings. This phenotype showed 
certain general biases in weighting these modulating features termed impulsive choice 
tendencies (Green & Myerson, 2013). 
  Impulsivity is a very broad multi-faceted construct that is either representing “a 
failure to process information sufficiently or to control response output” (Dalley & Robbins, 
2017, p. 158). Wilcox et al. (2014) give an incomplete list of constructs or facets that had 
been put under the umbrella term impulsivity: “responding before instructions are given or 
completed, responding without considering all options, inability to refrain from responding to 
an inappropriate stimulus, acting without considering the full set of consequences and without 
 
 
24 
 
forethought or planning, risky decision making/risk taking, urgency (both positive and 
negative), impatience, carelessness, difficulty paying attention, novelty seeking, pleasure 
seeking, greater reward sensitivity, an underestimated sense of harm, lack of perseverance, 
impairments in time estimation, impairments in learning from negative consequences or 
punishment, and extroversion […] overvaluing short-term rewards and undervaluing greater 
long-term rewards, showing impairments in delaying gratification, and delay discounting” 
(Wilcox et al., 2014, pp. 2–3). There were several attempts to structure impulsivity’s 
subcomponents. One of them divided impulsivity into two areas: impulsive action and 
impulsive choice (Dalley & Robbins, 2017; Dalley & Roiser, 2012; Reynolds, Ortengren, 
Richards, & de Wit, 2006; Winstanley, Olausson, Taylor, & Jentsch, 2010). Impulsive action 
refers to behavior associated with decreased motor inhibition, whereas impulsive choice 
relates to decision-making tendencies based on biased evaluation processes. Impulsive 
choices often seem myopic, irrational, or just not properly thought through. Oftentimes, 
choice impulsivity is being operationalized by discounting processes as these can be easily 
studied and seem to be a part of many real-life decisions. 
One of the modulating features of options, which have been investigated extensively, is 
the delay until the receipt of an outcome. In general, agents show a tendency to discount 
delayed rewards not linearly with increasing delay but hyperbolically or hyperbola-like 
(Green & Myerson, 2004, 2013). Thus, they tend to prefer sooner smaller (e.g. 10 € 
immediately) over larger later rewards (e.g. 20 € received in four weeks). An impulsive 
choice tendency in delay discounting is marked by overweighting delays and being rather 
impatient/unable to wait for gratification and, therefore, higher discounting (Green & 
Myerson, 2013). 
Furthermore, the valence of options has an influence on choice behavior. This addresses 
the asymmetry in the valuation of rewards and punishments, that is, punishments or losses are 
not just being processed and weighted as inversed or negative rewards. Quite the opposite, 
punishments are often more salient and their absolute subjective value is commonly higher 
than that of a gain of the objectively same absolute value (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
making most humans on average rather loss averse. Hence, most human beings would not 
take a bet where they could either win or lose 10€ with a chance of 50% each. Instead, a gain 
in such a 50/50 gamble would have to be of a significantly higher value than the loss 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007). Like risk aversion, 
individual loss aversion is supposed to be rather stable but can be modified by acute 
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motivational states. Moreover, Ernst et al. (2014) have suggested that low loss aversion might 
be related to impulsivity. 
Another rather well-described modulating feature in the valuation process is the 
stochasticity of outcomes. Most decision problems entail the chance that the agent does not 
receive the anticipated or desired quality or quantity of the outcome. Commonly, the riskiness 
of an outcome reduces the subjective value of it stronger than would rationally be expected. 
Thus, the subjective value of receiving 100 € with a 40% probability would not equal 40 € for 
most persons but be reduced to an even lower value. This decrement of subjective value is 
called discounting. The general population has been shown to discount the value of 
probabilistic gains preferring smaller certain over larger uncertain rewards (e.g. preferring 40 
€ for sure over 100 € with a probability of 40%) and, thus, be rather risk averse in the gain 
domain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Showing less risk aversion than the general 
population, that is, underweighting risks and being rather risk-taking is deemed to be 
impulsive (Green & Myerson, 2013). 
Discounting of risky and delayed rewards has been addressed in one of Redish, Jensen, 
and Johnson’s (2008) vulnerabilities in the UFA, because research over the past decades had 
shown stable differences in discounting rates between patients suffering from SUDs and 
healthy comparison subjects. According to this line of research, SUD patients tend to show 
stronger discounting and, therefore, “overemphasize near-term rewards and underemphasize 
far-future costs” (Redish et al., 2008; p. 425), are more risk taking and impatient. On a 
broader scale, SUD patients have been shown to be more impulsive in several facets of 
impulsivity but the nature of the relationship between impulsivity and SUDs is still unclear 
(Dalley & Robbins, 2017; Winstanley et al., 2010). Impulsive choice tendencies might be a 
predisposing factor for the development of SUDs, but it may also result from prolonged 
substance use. Therefore, longitudinal and intervention approaches are needed to establish a 
model of causal relationships. Additionally, a big part of the previous research has 
investigated other substances than alcohol and assumed that the alterations would be 
equivalent over different substance classes. Although there have been attempts to validate this 
claim (see meta-analysis of delay discounting and various SUDs by MacKillop et al., 2011), 
further investigation into similarities and differences between modulators and substances is 
needed.  
In summary, there are several valuation and behavioral control systems supposed to be 
at work in decision-making in general, which might be altered in AUD. The differentiation 
between goal-directed and habitual control systems has delivered many valuable insights in 
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this regard in rodent models, but so far translational research in humans is sparse and 
inconclusive. Heretofore, the literature gives no clear account on whether goal-directed 
control is indeed diminished in AUD in favor of habitual strategies, how known modulating 
features of option valuation (i.e. delay, risk, and valence) are altered in AUD, and whether 
these possible changes may also precede the onset of AUD to pose a risk factor for its 
development.  
 
1.3 Neurobiological perspectives on alcohol use disorders 
Pathological alcohol use has causes and consequences on many levels besides the ones 
in VBDM reviewed in the previous section. The mechanisms in this psychological domain are 
also complemented, caused, or followed by various processes on a genetic, epigenetic, 
synaptic, neuronal, glial, and neural circuitry level. As describing all the previously studied 
neurobiological facets would exceed the scope of this thesis, I refer the interested reader to the 
review by Volkow and Baler (2014) who give an elaborated overview of addiction seen as a 
neurobiologically complex disorder. I will first focus on general reward processing related 
neural mechanisms as these are crucial to understand the neural underpinnings of VBDM (for 
extensive and excellent reviews about the neural underpinnings of reward processing and 
learning, see Haber & Behrens, 2014; Haber & Knutson, 2010; O’Doherty et al., 2017). Then, 
I will introduce the neural mechanisms underlying goal-directed and habitual systems and, 
finally, how the brain adapts to chronic alcohol use. 
 
1.3.1 Neural underpinnings of the reward circuit 
Processing of reward information takes place in a vast neural network comprising 
cortical and subcortical areas. Research in the past decades suggested that there is a loop 
structure underlying the reward circuit (Haber, 2016; Haber & Knutson, 2010). At the heart of 
this circuit are two midbrain regions containing dopaminergic neurons, the ventral tegmental 
area (VTA) and substantia nigra (SN). Research has shown that rewards elicit a short-latency 
burst of activation of certain neuron populations in SN and VTA (Schultz, 1986) which 
decreases proportional to the increase of the probability or “expectedness” of the reward until 
it is reduced to the mere baseline firing rate in completely expected rewards (Fiorillo, 2003). 
Interestingly, this phasic activation of dopaminergic midbrain neurons is depressed below the 
baseline firing rate at times when an expected reward fails to appear (Schultz, Dayan, & 
Montague, 1997). This result pattern from studies working with electrophysiological 
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recordings from monkey midbrain structures corresponds to the characteristics of RPEs. 
These learning signals driving model-free RL are reduced to zero when received rewards were 
completely expected, positive at surprising deliverance of rewards, and negative when 
expected rewards fail to appear. 
The reward information encoded in the activation patterns of dopaminergic midbrain 
neurons is then conveyed through afferent projections to the striatum. Here, the dopaminergic 
output from SN and VTA modulates the excitation of striatal neurons (Surmeier, Ding, Day, 
Wang, & Shen, 2007). Crucially, the connection between midbrain nuclei and striatum is not 
unidirectional. The striatum sends back projections to SN and VTA building a feed-forward 
loop structure. The nodes in these loops progress from medial to lateral parts of the midbrain 
and from ventromedial to dorsolateral regions of the striatum with each iteration (Haber & 
Knutson, 2010). 
The areas within the striatum do not only receive input from and send projections to 
midbrain nuclei, but are also convergence zones of the projections from several other brain 
areas (Haber & Behrens, 2014; Haber, Kim, Mailly, & Calzavara, 2006; Haber & Knutson, 
2010). This allows for information encoded in other brain regions to be integrated and 
incorporated into the reward-processing circuit. As far as we know, most important for this is 
the ventral striatum, a structure loosely defined as comprising nucleus accumbens (NAcc), 
ventromedial caudate, and rostroventral putamen (Haber & Knutson, 2010). In the ventral 
striatum, there are convergence zones of projections from orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). These three 
regions have often been implied to encode different aspects of anticipating, processing, and 
evaluating rewarding and punishing outcomes. The complex patterns of convergence in 
ventral striatum provide a possible anatomical substrate of integrating the different facets of 
reward information represented in the activation of those areas (Haber & Behrens, 2014; 
Haber et al., 2006; Haber & Knutson, 2010; Yin, Ostlund, & Balleine, 2008).  
Different OFC cell populations encode different features of an option, like the size, 
probability, and cost of an outcome (Haber & Knutson, 2010; Schoenbaum & Roesch, 2005) 
which makes the OFC a candidate area underlying the modulation of option valuation by 
these features. OFC receives both primary and highly processed sensory information input as 
well as connections from amygdala and the ACC (Haber & Behrens, 2014). Classic 
experimental tests of OFC functionality are reward devaluation and reversal learning tasks as 
agents with lesions to the OFC display difficulties in adapting previously learned associations 
to new value information. This has been accredited to OFC’s role in using perceptual 
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information about presented stimuli to evoke sensory representations of the outcome, which in 
turn can be evaluated and drive learning (Burke, Franz, Miller, & Schoenbaum, 2008; Haber 
& Behrens, 2014). As this deficit after OFC lesions is based on the coupling of sensory 
information of stimuli and outcomes, it disappears when actions instead of pure perceptual 
stimuli are associated with the outcomes (Haber & Behrens, 2014). 
While different features of an option are encoded by different OFC cell populations, 
there is one population of dACC cells coding for an integrated value signal combining all the 
properties of it, that is, dACC activation entails integrated action values in units independent 
from actual actions and outcomes (Haber & Behrens, 2014). Cell populations within dACC 
are also able to relate these action values to the cost of that action at decision points and, 
thereby, controlling the balance between exploration and exploitation (Haber & Behrens, 
2014).  
The caudal part of the vmPFC has strong connections to hypothalamus, amygdala, and 
ventral striatum, whereas the rostral part has connections mostly to the frontal pole, 
dorsolateral (dlPFC) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC; Haber & Behrens, 2014). 
Together, the vmPFC areas can compute and encode values of options, especially in the 
context of internal (motivational) states. This value computation can happen “on the fly”, that 
is, directly at choice points and possibly independent from previous experience with the 
current options. Humans’ ability to generalize from features of an option to similar but 
different options that have never been encountered before probably relies on this function of 
vmPFC, as well as the goal-directed valuation of current options. The ability of online value 
computations might be a unique feature of vmPFC in comparison to all other brain areas. 
These three regions – OFC, dACC, and vmPFC – compose the main cortical input to the 
ventral striatum and their information is combined with the information from DA midbrain 
nuclei, amygdala, hippocampus, and insula there. As this enriched reward information is then 
spiraled from the ventral to the dorsal striatum, action plans are invoked and, finally, 
executed. Whether these different processes take place serially, in parallel or as a combination 
of both is still an open question (Haber & Behrens, 2014) though the abovementioned 
convergence zones strongly advocate for at least partially parallel processing. 
VBDM entails processing of reward information at least in the option valuation and 
outcome evaluation stages, but most likely all processes in VBDM are associated with this 
vast reward-related network with a strong emphasis on ventral striatum, vmPFC and OFC. 
The next section will give an overview of our current knowledge about the neural 
implementation of goal-directed and habitual valuation and behavioral control.  
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1.3.2 Neural underpinning of goal-directed and habitual decision making 
Numerous studies have examined the neural correlates of habitual and goal-directed 
control systems in the past decades, mostly working with animal models and the classical 
experimental paradigms of outcome devaluation and contingency degradation. Findings in 
this regard showed that the behavioral effect of outcome devaluation and contingency 
degradation in extinction was abolished after lesions of the dorsomedial striatum, which is the 
rodent equivalent of the (posterior) caudate, whereas lesions of the dorsolateral striatum, 
corresponding to human (posterior) putamen, prevented instrumental behavior to become 
habitual after extended training (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Goodman & Packard, 2016; 
Graybiel, 2008; Voon, Reiter, Sebold, & Groman, 2017; Yin, Knowlton, & Balleine, 2006, 
2004; Yin, Ostlund, Knowlton, & Balleine, 2005; Yin & Knowlton, 2006; Zapata, Minney, & 
Shippenberg, 2010). In addition, lesions of NAcc shell did not result in changes of the 
sensitivity towards outcome values or contingencies and, hence, did not affect the 
performance of goal-directed or habitual responses, while lesions of NAcc core left sensitivity 
to contingency degradation intact but interfered with rats’ sensitivity to outcome devaluation 
(Corbit, Muir, & Balleine, 2001; Yin et al., 2008). These dissociable effects of lesions to 
various striatal regions suggest that NAcc may be involved in the acquisition but not 
performance of goal-directed and habitual behavior, while there seems to be a focus of control 
of goal-directed behavior in caudate and of habitual behavior in putamen (Graybiel, 2008; 
Yin, Ostlund, & Balleine, 2008).  
Furthermore, there is evidence for a shift of control from dorsomedial to dorsolateral 
striatum in rats and primates accompanying the behavioral shift from goal-directed to habitual 
control under certain circumstances, for example extended training (Haruno & Kawato, 2006; 
Tricomi et al., 2009; Yin et al., 2008). In addition to these findings regarding different areas 
of the striatum, there is empirical evidence for a role of prefrontal regions in goal-directed and 
habitual control. Findings here are less conclusive, but suggest a role of prelimbic cortex in 
goal-directed and infralimbic regions in habitual control (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; 
Graybiel, 2008; Voon et al., 2017). Unfortunately, it is still unclear, what the human analogue 
regions to those rodent prefrontal areas are. It has been suggested that, based on the pattern of 
thalamic input to these regions, prelimbic rodent cortex corresponds to the pregenual ACC 
(Brodmann area 32) and infralimbic cortex to human subgenual ACC (Brodmann area 25; 
Gass & Chandler, 2013). 
Translational neuroimaging research in humans corroborated findings from animal 
studies using equivalent paradigms. Valentin, Dickinson, and O’Doherty (2007) found 
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activation in OFC to encode option values during an outcome devaluation task using specific 
satiation that corresponded to the valuation scheme of a goal-directed controller. Tricomi, 
Balleine, and O’Doherty (2009) showed increasing task-related activation of posterior 
putamen with extended but not limited training in a similar devaluation task suggesting this 
area to be related to habitual control. Two more fMRI studies using the slips-of-action task 
(de Wit et al., 2007) have shown goal-directed behavioral control to be associated with 
increased activation in vmPFC (de Wit et al., 2009) and increased structural connectivity 
between caudate and vmPFC and decreased connectivity between posterior putamen and 
premotor cortex measured with diffusion tensor imaging (S. de Wit et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
Gläscher and colleagues could show that the model-based system relies on state 
representations being stored and updated in the intraparietal sulcus and dlPFC (Gläscher, 
Daw, Dayan, & O’Doherty, 2010). The cognitive map, which is based on these state 
representations and is assumed to underlie goal-directed control and model-based RL, seems 
to be represented in a network comprising the hippocampus, OFC, dlPFC, and posterior 
parietal cortex (O’Doherty, Cockburn, & Pauli, 2017). Moreover, Daw et al. (2011) showed 
blood-oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) responses in ventral striatum and vmPFC to be 
associated with model-free RPEs but to also comprise signatures of the model-based valuation 
system using the Two-Step task to investigate neural correlates of model-free and model-
based reinforcement learning. In addition, model-based control in the Two-Step task has been 
shown to be modulated by various manipulations: application of L-DOPA to healthy 
volunteers, which enhances dopamine levels systemically, enhanced model-based control 
(Wunderlich, Smittenaar, & Dolan, 2012); disrupting right dlPFC activation via transcranial 
magnetic stimulation reduced model-based control in favor of model-free behavior 
(Smittenaar, FitzGerald, Romei, Wright, & Dolan, 2013), but anodal transcranial direct 
current stimulation of the same prefrontal area did not change model-free and model-based 
control (Smittenaar, Prichard, FitzGerald, Diedrichsen, & Dolan, 2014).  
In summary, goal-directed behavioral control is assumed to be dependent on vmPFC 
and OFC in interaction with dorsomedial striatum (i.e. caudate; Everitt & Robbins, 2016), 
which fits well with OFC’s role in representing various facets or features of options and 
vmPFC’s role in the online integration of these to calculate subjective values (see section 
1.3.1). Caudate also integrates information from hippocampus, ACC, intraparietal sulcus, and 
dlPFC, which could give rise to the representation of the mental map of the state space goal-
directed control is based upon. In contrast, habitual behavior seems to be based on 
dorsolateral striatum (i.e. putamen) and possibly (pre-)motor cortical areas (Balleine & 
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O’Doherty, 2010; Everitt & Robbins, 2016; Yin et al., 2004). These findings map well onto 
the reward-processing circuits, where information from vmPFC, OFC, and ACC is combined 
in ventral striatum and conveyed to dorsal striatum via loops comprising midbrain nuclei. 
While goal-directed valuation depends on the integration of a vast amount of information, 
habitual valuation might circumvent this process and directly activate response 
representations being cached in dorsal striatum-motor cortex connections. 
Crucially, the numerous neural adaptations to chronic alcohol misuse affect among 
other things the dopaminergic innervation of striatal medium spiny neurons (Volkow & Baler, 
2014; Volkow, Wang, Tomasi, & Baler, 2013). These effects are assumed to drive the 
proposed shift from goal-directed to habitual alcohol use in AUD, because they “hijack” the 
normal dopaminergic signal cascade (Keramati & Gutkin, 2013). 
 
1.3.3 Striatal adaptations associated with chronic alcohol consumption 
Alcohol and other drugs of abuse have been shown to lead to long-lasting changes in the 
dopaminergic mechanisms in the midbrain and striatum. A long line of studies in the 1990s 
and 2000s have established that drugs of abuse have a direct or indirect enhancing effect on 
the phasic dopamine level released by VTA neurons (Volkow et al., 2002; Volkow, Fowler, 
Wang, Baler, & Telang, 2009; Volkow et al., 2013). In the striatum, where many of the 
dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain terminate, there are at least two main classes of 
medium spiny neurons – one is primarily equipped with excitatory D1 (dopamine) receptors, 
which have low dopamine affinity and enhance glutamatergic signaling, and the other class is 
primarily equipped with inhibitory D2 (dopamine) receptors, which have high affinity for 
dopamine and inhibit glutamatergic signaling (Surmeier et al., 2007; Volkow et al., 2013). 
Dopamine works here as a neuromodulator, that is, it influences ion channels in the dendritic 
membrane of the post-synaptic neuron and, thereby, modulates its excitability (Surmeier et 
al., 2007). Previous studies showed that repeated drug exposure leads to sensitization of D1 
receptors and decreased signaling of D2 receptors (through desensitization, reduction in 
number of receptors, or both; Hietala et al., 1994; Thompson, Martini, & Whistler, 2010; 
Tupala et al., 2003; Volkow et al., 1996, 2002; Volkow, Fowler, Wang, Swanson, & Telang, 
2007). This leads to an imbalance between the excitatory (presumably reinforcement-
mediating) direct D1-mediated pathway and the inhibitory (presumably punishment-
mediating) indirect D2-mediated pathway. Decreased D2 signaling and number of receptors is 
associated with impulsive behavior and decreased activity in OFC, ACC, and dlPFC (Volkow 
et al., 2006, 2013). Volkow and Baler (2014) elaborated this issue further: D2 receptors in 
 
 
32 
 
striatum are part of the inhibitory modulation of OFC, ACC, and dlPFC, which in turn are 
associated with salience attribution, inhibitory control and emotion regulation, and decision 
making, respectively. This might be the neural correlate of the increased motivational value of 
drugs of abuse and addicts’ often increased levels of impulsivity (Volkow & Baler, 2014). It 
can be speculated that this is a possible causal chain: chronic alcohol use leads to a decrease 
of striatal D2 signaling which leads to insufficient downregulation of prefrontal areas which 
in turn leads to impulsive, reward-driven, or habitual behavior. But this may be only one side 
of the story: Volkow and colleagues have shown that persons being not dependent on alcohol 
despite many alcohol-dependent relatives had a higher number of D2 receptors in striatum 
(Volkow et al., 2006). The authors interpreted this as a possible protective mechanism against 
developing AUD (Volkow et al., 2009). This suggests that the basic level of D2 receptors in 
striatum may be a predisposing genetic factor influencing the susceptibility for developing 
AUD besides its role during development and maintenance of AUD. 
These findings suggest the possibility that chronic alcohol abuse might lead behavioral 
control from being rather goal-directed to habitual through its influence on striatal dopamine 
function. At the same time, the initial level of dopamine receptors and their sensitivity before 
alcohol use might pose a risk factor for the emergence of AUD if being decreased or a 
protective factor if being increased for reasons of gene-environment interactions during 
development. Thus, in concert with the theoretical and empirical psychological work 
presented in section 1.2, it can be speculated that being at risk for the development of AUD 
before chronic alcohol use might be associated with a stronger tendency for habitual over 
goal-directed control due in part to the individual neurobiological setup of the striatum. As the 
same dopaminergic mechanism might account for trait-like impulsive choice biases, these 
biases might also precede AUD in at-risk individuals.  
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1.4 Synopsis and research questions 
Previous studies have repeatedly found corroboration of the proposed shift from goal-
directed to habitual control during (extended) training. This shift is accompanied by a neural-
activation shift from dorsomedial (caudate) to dorsolateral striatum (putamen) during 
behavioral control. In addition, the shift has been shown to advance even faster with drugs of 
abuse involved as outcome of the instrumental learning itself or just applied unrelated to the 
training. Adaptions of receptor sensitivity or quantity in striatum might be the neural 
mechanism behind the accelerated shift when drugs of abuse are involved. This relates to the 
assumption that chronic alcohol use in AUD is accompanied by a shift from goal-directed to 
habitual alcohol consumption and probably even a shift in general, alcohol-unrelated 
behavioral control towards automatic, habitual strategies. In addition, the influence of specific 
salient features of choice options, like the delay, risk, and valence of the associated outcomes, 
is presumed to be altered in AUD and may affect valuation and, therefore, behavioral control 
in VBDM. But evidence of these phenomena in humans is weaker than in rodents and 
monkeys and the question of cause or consequence of chronic alcohol use is still not 
sufficiently answered. Moreover, interindividual differences in the setup of neural reward-
processing circuits and their functionality give rise to the question whether alterations in 
VBDM might even precede the onset of pathological alcohol use and pose a risk factor for the 
development of AUD. 
The aim of this thesis is to further elucidate the associations between alcohol 
consumption and VBDM. For that purpose, two cohorts of participants were examined: first, a 
sample of 201 healthy 18-year-old male social drinkers to examine these associations before 
prolonged alcohol abuse could lead to severe neural and behavioral adaptations. In this 
sample, henceforth called Sample 1, the question whether changes in VBDM processes may 
precede the onset of pathological alcohol use and even predict non-pathological consumption 
was investigated. Second, a sample of 114 AUD patients and 98 matched control participants 
was examined to shed light on these relations in the pathological state. Furthermore, analyses 
comprised data from the baseline assessment (cross-sectional analyses) and the twelve-month 
follow-up interval (longitudinal analyses). Specifically, in the presented studies I want to add 
insights about the following questions: 
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I. Association of alcohol consumption with goal-directed and habitual behavioral control 
 
1. Is the balance between goal-directed and habitual control associated with 
alcohol consumption and its change within one year in young-adult social 
drinkers (Study 1/Chapter 2) and might, therefore, pose a predisposing risk 
factor for alcohol use per se and its escalation? 
 
2. Is the balance between goal-directed and habitual control associated with 
alcohol consumption and predictive of relapse rates in AUD patients (Study 
2/Chapter 3)? 
 
 
II. Association of alcohol consumption with the appraisal of modulating features of 
VBDM, that is, delay, risk, and valence  
 
3. Is the appraisal of known modulators of the valuation systems in VBDM (i.e. 
delay, risk, and valence) related to alcohol consumption and its change within 
one year in young-adult social-drinkers (Study 3/Chapter 4) and might, 
therefore, pose a predisposing risk factor for alcohol use per se and its 
escalation? 
 
4. Is the appraisal of known modulating features of option valuation in VBDM 
(i.e. delay, risk, and valence) related to alcohol consumption and predictive of 
relapse rates in AUD patients (Study 3/Chapter 4)? 
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Chapter 2. Study 1  
This chapter has been published as the following: Nebe, S., Kroemer, N. B., Schad, D. 
J., Bernhardt, N., Sebold, M., Müller, D. K., Scholl, L., Kuitunen-Paul, S., Heinz, A., Rapp, 
M. A., Huys, Q. J. M., & Smolka, M. N. (2017). No association of habitual and goal-directed 
control with alcohol consumption in young adults. Addiction Biology. ePub ahead of print. 
doi:10.1111/adb.12490 
 
2.1 Abstract 
Alcohol dependence is a mental disorder which has been associated with an imbalance 
in behavioral control favoring model-free habitual over model-based goal-directed strategies. 
It is as yet unknown, however, whether such an imbalance reflects a predisposing 
vulnerability or results as a consequence of repeated and/or excessive alcohol exposure. We, 
therefore, examined the association of alcohol consumption with model-based goal-directed 
and model-free habitual control in 188 eighteen-year-old social drinkers in a two-step 
sequential decision-making task while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) before prolonged alcohol misuse could have led to severe neurobiological adaptations. 
Behaviorally, participants showed a mixture of model-free and model-based decision-making 
as observed previously. Measures of impulsivity were positively related to alcohol 
consumption. In contrast, neither model-free nor model-based decision weights nor the 
tradeoff between them were associated with alcohol consumption. There were also no 
significant associations between alcohol consumption and neural correlates of model-free or 
model-based decision quantities in either ventral striatum or ventromedial prefrontal cortex. 
Exploratory whole-brain fMRI analyses with a lenient threshold revealed early onset of 
drinking to be associated with an enhanced representation of model-free reward prediction 
errors in the posterior putamen. These results suggest that an imbalance between model-based 
goal-directed and model-free habitual control might rather not be a trait marker of alcohol 
intake per se. 
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2.2 Introduction 
The underlying mechanisms of developing alcohol dependence are not fully resolved 
despite extensive research over the past decades (e.g. Huys, Deserno, Obermayer, 
Schlagenhauf, & Heinz, 2016; Redish et al., 2008). Among numerous theoretical approaches, 
a dual-systems account has been used to explain the development of alcohol dependence 
(Everitt & Robbins, 2013). In this account, alcohol consumption is assumed to be initially 
goal-directed, that is, characterized by knowledge of the contingency between an action (e.g. 
alcohol intake) and its consequence (e.g. relaxation, euphoria) and an incentive (motivational) 
value of this consequence. However, it has been argued that with successive repetitions 
alcohol consumption may first become stimulus-driven and dissociated from its actual 
consequences, referred to as habitual, and later on compulsive (Everitt & Robbins, 2013; 
Tiffany, 1990). In general, these dual-systems accounts hypothesize goal-directed and 
habitual control to concur and be implemented in separate but interacting and/or competing 
neural circuits (Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Huys, Tobler, Hasler, & Flagel, 2014).  
The standard approach to investigate goal-directed and habitual behavior experimentally 
is by using outcome-devaluation paradigms (e.g. Adams and Dickinson, 1981; de Wit et al, 
2007). Goal-directed control can adapt behavior to changes in the value of an outcome before 
experiencing the action-outcome association, whereas habitual control needs to experience the 
devalued outcome before being able to adapt. The distinction between goal-directed and 
habitual choices maps onto a theoretical distinction between prospective model-based and 
retrospective model- free valuation. The 2-Step task, a two-stage Markov decision problem 
(Daw et al, 2011), operationalizes this distinction and putatively allows the two components 
to be measured in humans (Daw et al., 2005; Dolan & Dayan, 2013; Friedel et al., 2014; 
Gillan, Otto, Phelps, & Daw, 2015).  
In model-free RL, subjective values for state-action pairs are updated by RPEs, which 
encode the difference between expected and received outcomes (Schultz & Dickinson, 2000; 
Sutton & Barto, 1998). This updating process happens when an action-outcome association is 
experienced and typically needs multiple repetitions to change state-action values and thereby 
action policies. Therefore, model-free RL shares its retrospective, inflexible, but 
computationally cheap nature with habitual behavioral control. In contrast, model-based RL 
builds an internal model of the environment and plans actions by searching the potential 
combinations of future actions and outcomes. Via changes to the model, it can flexibly adapt 
to changes in contingencies and values along the paths of the internal model. These qualities 
match the operant definition of goal-directed control. 
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Reward prediction errors result in a phasic activation of dopamine midbrain neurons 
(D’Ardenne, McClure, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Schultz, 1997) as well as dopamine-
innervated target areas such as the ventral striatum and vmPFC (Daw et al., 2011). Although 
these phasic signals conform to exacting detail with model-free theory predictions (for a 
review, see Huys et al, 2014), the RPE signals in vS also incorporate model-based valuations 
providing a path by which model-based predictions can be incorporated retrospectively into 
model-free predictions (Daw et al., 2011; Gershman, Markman, & Otto, 2014; Sadacca, 
Jones, & Schoenbaum, 2016).   
There are suggestions that the balance between habitual and goal-directed control might 
be shifted towards habitual behavior in alcohol dependent patients. (Sjoerds et al, 2013) used 
an outcome-devaluation task. Although there was no behavioral evidence for a shift (patients 
just performed worse in all conditions), there was a suggestive decreased activation in vmPFC 
and ventral striatum during putatively goal-directed and increased activation of the putamen 
during putatively habitual decisions in the patients. In the 2-Step task, Sebold et al. (2014) 
reported an impairment of model-based decision-making after losses in alcohol-dependent 
patients compared to healthy control participants. Gillan et al. (2016) also reported a decrease 
in model-based decision-making to be associated with Alcohol Use Disorder Identification 
Test (AUDIT) scores. However, Voon et al. (2014) found no difference between detoxified 
alcohol-dependent patients and healthy controls. Of note, all of these results test decision-
making without reference to the abused substance and as such speak to a generalized shift in 
decision-making rather than one limited to the setting of the substance (Everitt & Robbins, 
2013).  
Alterations in patients could either be a consequence of prolonged alcohol abuse and 
corresponding neurobiological adaptations (Heinz et al., 2009; Volkow, Fowler, Wang, & 
Swanson, 2004) or reflect a predisposition for aberrant decision-making preceding the 
development of hazardous drinking behavior. Another possible explanation combines both 
aspects: Aberrant decision-making may lead to early and numerous encounters with drugs of 
abuse, their high reward value leads to fast habitization of drug seeking and consumption 
including neurobiological adaptations in cortico-basal ganglia circuits. This might shift the 
balance further toward aberrant decision-making processes (cf. Sjoerds et al., 2013; Story, 
Vlaev, Seymour, Darzi, & Dolan, 2014).  
We aimed to investigate the association of model-based and model-free decision-
making with alcohol consumption before prolonged alcohol misuse could have led to severe 
neurobiological adaptations. Therefore, we sampled 18-year old social drinkers, assessed their 
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alcohol consumption, and had them perform the 2-Step task. We hypothesized that a shift 
towards model-free habitual and away from model-based goal-directed behavior and neural 
correlates thereof would be associated with greater alcohol consumption. In particular, we 
tested whether participants with (i) stronger model-free or (ii) weaker model-based control 
during 2-Step and (iii) stronger model-free RPE-related BOLD signals of ventral striatum and 
vmPFC or (iv) weaker model-based signatures there are associated with (1) greater alcohol 
consumption in general and, specifically, with (2) earlier onset of drinking, (3) higher average 
alcohol intake, (4) the presence of binge-drinking and more frequent and heavy binge-
drinking events, (5) higher scores on drinking-related questionnaires, and (6) elevated levels 
of blood markers for liver function and alcohol consumption. 
 
2.3 Material and methods 
2.3.1 Participants and procedure 
Two hundred one 18 year-old male social drinkers completed the first assessment of a 
longitudinal fMRI study (ClinicalTrials.gov identifier: NCT01744834). They were randomly 
sampled from the population of 18 year-old men of two German cities (Berlin, Dresden) by 
the respective local registration office. Subjects who responded to the invitation letter were 
screened via telephone. Exclusion criteria were a history of or current neurological or mental 
disorders (except for nicotine dependence and alcohol abuse), left-handedness, and 
contraindications for MRI. Participants had to have normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Women were not included because they show decreased rates of risky alcohol consumption 
compared to men (Pabst & Kraus, 2008). An additional inclusion criterion was for 
participants to have had at least two drinking occasions in the past three months.  
Participants came in twice. At the first appointment, they gave written informed consent 
and were interviewed using the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI; Jacobi et 
al., 2013; Wittchen & Pfister, 1997) to assess mental disorders according to the German 
version of the DSM-IV-TR (Saß, Wittchen, Zaudig, & Houben, 2003). Further, participants 
completed several questionnaires. They returned for the second appointment approximately 
nine days later (SD=16d) to complete the 2-Step task (Daw et al, 2011) during fMRI. Blood 
samples for analysis of alanine transaminase (ALT), aspartate transaminase (AST), gamma-
glutamyl transferase (γ-GT), and phosphatidylethanol (PEth) were drawn on the first (Berlin) 
or second (Dresden) appointment. This study was approved by local ethics committees of 
Technische Universität Dresden and Charité Universitätsmedizin Berlin.  
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Behavioral analyses are based on 188 subjects. Participants were excluded due to CIDI 
diagnosis of alcohol dependence (n=1), alcohol abstinence in the past year though stated 
otherwise during telephone screening (n=2), positive drug screening on the day of the fMRI 
assessment (n=7), and missing 2-Step data due to technical issues (n=3). Effect size estimates 
of previous studies regarding model-free/-based control and alcohol range from |d|=.06 (Voon 
et al, 2014) over |d|=.12 (Gillan et al, 2016) to |d|=.53 (Sebold et al, 2014) for which we would 
have a power to identify an association of (1-β)=.07 , (1-β)=.12, and (1-β)=.94, respectively 
(with N=188 and α=.05). To check whether exclusion criteria influenced results, all 
behavioral analyses were repeated with all available data (n=198). 
 
2.3.2 Measures of goal-directed and habitual behavioral control 
The Two-Step task consisted of 201 trials, each of which was composed of two 
subsequent binary choices (Figure 3). First-stage stimuli were always the same two grey 
boxes. Choice of one of them led with a probability of 70% (common transition) to one 
colored pair of 2nd-stage stimuli and with 30% (rare transition) to the other (vice versa for the 
alternative 1st-stage stimulus). Participants were informed about the transition structure and 
that transition probabilities stay fixed during the experiment. Each 2nd-stage stimulus led to 
reward (20 Cent) with a probability between 25% and 75%, which was slowly changing 
during the course of the experiment according to Gaussian random walks (the exact same 
random walks as in the original publication by Daw et al., 2011, were used). With this setup, 
participants had to constantly update the utilities of the 2nd-stage stimuli. Updating the values 
of 2nd-stage stimuli relies on model-free learning as there is no further transition to another 
state. Therefore, model-based and model-free control had the same 2nd-stage values but 
produced different values at the 1st stage. Choices at the 1st stage were modeled as a mixture 
of model-free and model-based control: model-free control increased the probability of 
repeating a choice at the 1st stage after being rewarded at the second stage regardless of the 
transition type of the respective trial; model-based control computes action values by 
weighting the values of possible future states with the probability to reach this state. Hence, 
model-based control is sensitive to which transition had occurred. Participants were paid out 
the collected rewards of a randomly chosen third of all trials and were told so before the 
experiment. 
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Figure 3. Upper panel: Temporal sequence of one trial of the Two-Step task starting with presentation of the two gray first-
stage stimuli followed by a response phase of maximum 2 seconds. Then second-stage stimuli were presented (either green or 
yellow pair), followed by another response phase, outcome presentation and finally an intertrial interval with an 
exponentially distributed jitter of 1–7 seconds. Lower panel: Schematic view of the design of the Two-Step task displaying the 
choices on the first stage (gray stimuli) and second stage (green and yellow stimuli); displayed below the second-stage 
stimuli are the corresponding winning probabilities of each second-stage stimulus and their change during the course of the 
201 trials of the experiment. 
 
Choice data were analyzed using hierarchical logistic mixed-effects regression 
implemented in the lme4 package (version 1.1-10; Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) 
in R (version 3.2.2; R Development Core Team, 2008). Repetition of 1st-level choice was 
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predicted by previous trial’s outcome (rewarded vs. unrewarded) and transition probability 
(common vs. rare). Both factors and their interaction were taken as random effects across 
subjects. A significant main effect of outcome indicated a model-free strategy, whereas a 
significant interaction of outcome and transition probability indicated model-based control 
(Daw et al, 2011). To test for associations with alcohol consumption, measures of drinking 
behavior were included as additional between-subject factors in the regression analysis. In 
addition, scores for model-free (MFscore) and model-based control (MBscore) were derived from 
the individual probabilities to repeat 1st-stage choice (stay probabilities). These scores are 
calculated according to the respective assumed choice pattern in model-free and model-based 
control [(MFscore = P(stay|rewarded common) + P(stay|rewarded rare) - P(stay|unrewarded 
common) - P(stay|unrewarded rare); MBscore = P(stay|rewarded common) - P(stay|rewarded 
rare) - P(stay|unrewarded common) + P(stay|unrewarded rare); Sebold et al, 2014].  
Furthermore, choice data were fitted by the computational model introduced by Daw et al. 
(2011), which assumes a hybrid controller using goal-directed and habitual choice strategies. 
In the model, goal-directed choices were accounted for by model-based RL, assuming correct 
weighting of expected outcomes with expected transition probabilities. The habitual learning 
system was implemented as model-free SARSA(λ) TD learning (Rummery & Niranjan, 
1994). Both systems were assumed to contribute to behavioral choice according to the relative 
weight parameter ω, which varies between fully model-free (ω=0) and fully model-based 
(ω=1) choice (see Appendix A.1.1 for details). There were six further parameters of choice 
behavior modeled, but due to our specific focus on goal-directed and habitual control, we did 
not analyze these here. We applied a logistic transformation to ω (creating ωlog) to adhere to 
normal distribution assumptions during model fitting and parametric statistical testing. 
Individual estimates of ωlog were used as indicator for the balance of model-free and model-
based control in addition to MFscore and MBscore. Model comparisons replicated the superiority 
of a hybrid controller over pure model-free and pure model-based strategies for the whole 
sample. Individually, 74% (n = 139) subjects showed model fits better than chance. 
 
2.3.3 Measure of alcohol consumption 
To characterize participants’ drinking behavior, we used information acquired with the 
CIDI (Jacobi et al, 2013; Wittchen and Pfister, 1997): age of 1st drink (i.e. drinking a whole 
alcoholic beverage), age of 1st time being drunk, estimated average alcohol consumption in 
past year (g alc/day), average alcohol consumption per drinking occasion in the past year (g 
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alc), age of 1st binge-drinking event, number of binge-drinking events lifetime, and average 
alcohol consumption per binge-drinking event in the past year (g alc). Binge-drinking was 
defined as the consumption of at least five drinks (≥ 60 g alc) on one occasion. To increase 
reliability of the single CIDI items as indicators of alcohol drinking behavior and to account 
for their high intercorrelations (see Table 1), we calculated a sum score (Drinkscore) from the 
z-scaled CIDI items with higher values indicating greater alcohol consumption (see SM1.2 for 
details). 74% of the sample (n = 139) reported at least one lifetime binge drinking episode. 
Binge-drinkers and non-bingers can be seen as two meaningful subgroups within our sample 
of social drinkers systematically differing in their alcohol consumption (Table S 5) and were, 
therefore, compared regarding measures of goal-directed and habitual control.  
Additionally, we used blood markers for alcohol intake and liver function (AST, ALT, 
γ-GT, PEth) and several questionnaires to characterize drinking behavior: the Alcohol 
Dependence Scale (ADS; Horn, Skinner, Warnberg, Foster, & the Alcoholism and Drug 
Addiction Research Foundation, 1984), Obsessive Compulsive Drinking Scale (OCDS-G; K. 
Mann & Ackermann, 2000), and adapted forms of the Family Tree Questionnaire (FTQ; R. E. 
Mann, Sobell, Sobell, & Pavan, 1985) and the alcohol-related section of the Family History 
Assessment Module (FHAM; Rice et al., 1995). Using FTQ and FHAM, participants were 
classified as family history positive if they had at least one first-degree alcohol-dependent 
relative fulfilling three or more lifetime DSM-IV-TR criteria or had any treatment of alcohol 
dependence. 3.7% of our sample were considered family-history positive. Due to this small 
proportion, family history was not included in our analyses. Drinkscore correlated highly 
significant with each other measure of alcohol consumption (Bonferroni corrected for 
multiple comparisons (105 tests), all ps < .0005) except for the blood markers AST, ALT, γ-
GT, and PEth (all ps > .045; Table 1). 
 
2.3.4 Behavioral statistical analyses 
To examine associations between the multiple measures of goal-directed and habitual 
behavioral control (ωlog, MFscore, MBscore) and of alcohol consumption (CIDI measures 
including Drinkscore, ADS sum score, OCDS-G sum score, and blood markers), we first 
performed a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with measures of drinking 
behavior (Drinkscore, ADS sum score, OCDS-G sum score, and blood markers) as dependent 
and measures of goal-directed/habitual behavioral control (ωlog, MFscore, MBscore) as 
independent variables. We used MANOVA because our multiple outcome measures 
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characterizing drinking behavior are intercorrelated and by using a multivariate approach we 
control the familywise error rate. This analysis was repeated with measures of impulsivity as 
independent variables. The Sum score of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale short form (BIS-15; 
Meule, Vögele, & Kübler, 2011) and the Impulsivity subscale of the Substance Use Risk 
Profile Scale (SURPS; Woicik, Stewart, Pihl, & Conrod, 2009) were also included in 
behavioral analyses. Thereby, we tested the association between measures of alcohol 
consumption and measures of impulsivity, which were previously related to alcohol 
dependence and onset of consumption (Jurk et al., 2015; Stanford et al., 2009). Testing the 
association of alcohol consumption and impulsivity was used as demonstration that our 
analytic approach was sensitive to detecting associations in our data. In addition, we select the 
best predictors of drinking behavior (operationalized with Drinkscore) with an elastic net 
analysis, performed with the glmnet package (version 2.0-2; J. Friedman, Hastie, & 
Tibshirani, 2010) implemented in R (see Appendix A.3.4). This type of analysis selects 
predictors in order to build a regression model explaining as much variance of the outcome as 
possible with the least necessary number of predictors. Measures of goal-directed/habitual 
control and impulsivity were entered as predictors to test whether one construct is superior to 
the other in predicting Drinkscore. Next, we used a correlational approach. Exact Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests implied violation of the assumption of normality for most measures of goal-
directed/habitual control and alcohol consumption (Table 2). Therefore, reported correlation 
coefficients are Spearman’s ρ, which was shown to have smaller alpha error rate and higher 
power than Pearson’s r in case of non-normal variables and large sample sizes (Bishara & 
Hittner, 2012). Last, we compared binge-drinkers and non-bingers and the four risk groups 
regarding WHO criteria of alcohol consumption (World Health Organization, 2000) in regard 
to their measures of goal-directed/habitual behavioral control. In response to comments of the 
reviewers, we additionally examined whether high self-reported impulsivity is associated with 
increased habitual or decreased goal-directed behavioral control and neural correlates thereof 
as reported recently (Deserno, Wilbertz, et al., 2015). Thus, we correlated self-report 
measures of impulsivity (BIS-15) with measures of habitual/goal-directed control and neural 
correlates thereof. 
All analyses regarding data distribution, correlations, and MANOVAs were performed 
with SPSS 23.0 (2015, IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows. Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.). 
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2.3.5 Functional magnetic resonance imaging data acquisition and analysis 
Imaging data were obtained using 3-Tesla whole-body MRI scanners (Magnetom Trio, 
Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a 12-channel head coil located at the 
Neuroimaging Center, Technische Universität Dresden, and the Charité Universitätsmedizin 
Berlin. For fMRI, a standard T2*-weighted echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR = 2410 
ms; TE = 25 ms; flip angle: 80°; voxel size:3 x 3 x 2 mm (1 mm gap); FOV:192 x 192 mm; 
in-plane resolution:64 x 64 pixels) was obtained comprising 42 transversal slices in 
descending order, orientated approximately 25° to the anterior commissure-posterior 
commissure line. Moreover, a structural T1-weighted magnetization-prepared rapid gradient 
echo (MPRAGE) image was obtained (TR = 1900 ms, TE = 2.52 ms, flip angle: 9°, voxel 
size:1 x 1 x 1 mm, FOV: 256 x 256 mm).  
FMRI preprocessing and data analyses were performed with Statistical Parametric 
Mapping software (SPM8; London, UK: Wellcome Department for Imaging Neuroscience) 
implemented in Nipype Version 0.9.2 (Gorgolewski et al., 2011) and Matlab R2014a (2014. 
Natick, MA: The MathWorks Inc.). Preprocessing included correction for differences in slice 
acquisition times with reference to the middle slice, motion correction via realignment of each 
slice to the first, correction for field inhomogeneities with a voxel displacement map 
computed from acquired field maps, coregistration of the mean EPI image to the individual 
MPRAGE image, segmentation and normalization of the individual MPRAGE image to 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space and applying these normalization parameters to 
the distortion-corrected EPI images, simultaneously resampling EPI images to 2 x 2 x 2 mm, 
and spatially smoothing the EPI images with a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-width-half-
maximum. During first-level analyses, a high-pass filter of 128 s width was applied.  
Model-based fMRI analyses are based on 146 subjects. Neuroradiologists screened each 
T1-weighted MPRAGE image for anatomical findings leading to exclusion of five 
participants. Additionally, participants were excluded due to missing field maps (n = 3), ghost 
artifacts in EPI after preprocessing (n = 4), non-remediable failure of coregistration (n = 2) or 
normalization (n = 7), and extensive motion during fMRI (n = 21; > 3 mm translation or 3° 
rotation volume-to-volume) resulting in a sample size of n = 146 for fMRI analyses. We 
computed RPEs for each participant. RPEs are non-zero at the onsets of 2nd-stage and 
outcome presentation (Daw et al, 2011). Therefore, we modeled BOLD signals at these time 
points by two parametric modulators obtained from the computational model. Model-free 
RPE (RPEMF) and model-based RPE time series were derived for both time points under the 
assumption of fully model-free (ω = 0) and fully model-based (ω = 1) control, respectively. 
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To capture unique trial-variance in RPEs associated with the model-based but not the model-
free system, we used the difference between model-free and model-based RPEs (RPEΔMB) as 
regressor. At the 2nd stage, there is no further transition to another stage and model-based 
learning reduces to pure model-free learning. That is why RPEΔMB is zero at outcome 
presentation. We set up individual fMRI statistics according to Daw et al. (2011; see 
Appendix A.2.1 for details). For repetition of their analyses, we validated the task setup with 
region of interest (ROI) analyses in anatomically defined masks of bilateral ventral striatum 
and vmPFC (Appendix A.2.2, Figure S 1); reported activations were deemed significant at 
pFWE<.05 for the peak voxel. To test our hypotheses that neural correlates of model-free and 
model-based control are associated with alcohol consumption, mean activation in the same 
ROIs were correlated with measures of drinking behavior (trading-off spatial resolution to 
reduce the number of tests performed). Additionally, exploratory whole-brain analyses were 
performed to test for associations outside the a priori defined ROIs. For these analyses, 
statistical thresholds were set to puncorr. < .001, k ≥ 50, and results were deemed significant 
with pFWE < .01 on cluster level. All fMRI analyses included a dichotomous variable for site 
of investigation as covariate to control for possible center effects. 
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Table 1. Intercorrelation of measures of alcohol consumption (n = 188). 
         
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Drink 
score 
Age of 1st 
drink 
Age of 1st 
time 
drunk 
 Estimated 
alcohol 
consumption 
in past year 
(g/day) 
Alcohol 
consumption 
in past year 
(g/drinking 
occasion) 
Age of 1st 
binge-
drinking 
episode 
Number 
of binge-
drinking 
episodes 
lifetime 
Alcohol 
consumption 
per binge-
drinking 
episode (g) 
ADS Sum 
Score 
OCDS-G 
Sum 
Score AST ALT γ-GT PEth 
1 1 -.500† -.617† .707† .713† -.422† .843† .756† .477† .274† -.036 .129 .082 .14 
2 
 
1 .538† -.187* -.121 .123 -.227** -.186* -.233** -.06 -.073 -.111 -.129 -.117 
3 
  
1 -.311† -.276† .300† -.282† -.286† -.317† -.144 -.036 -.115 -.042 -.037 
4 
   
1 .728† -.034 .669† .557† .384† .378† -.009 .026 .008 .375† 
5 
    
1 -.025 .695† .632† .420† .249† -.014 .011 -.043 .149 
6           1 -.362† .04 -.142 .046 .002 -.127 .037 .114 
7 
      
1 .646† .443† .302† -.027 .124 .046 .118 
8 
       
1 .405† .213** -.079 .043 .06 .132 
9 
        
1 .489† .018 -.049 -.088 .154 
10                   1 .096 .041 -.019 .162* 
11 
          
1 .566† .124 .079 
12 
           
1 .377† .049 
13 
            
1 .124 
14                           1 
Note: ADS = Alcohol Dependence Scale. ALT = alanine transaminase. AST = aspartate transaminase. Drinkscore = score of drinking behavior from CIDI measures of alcohol consumption. γ-GT = 
gamma-glutamyl transferase. OCDS-G = Obsessive Compulsive Drinking Scale. PEth = phosphatidylethanol. 
* p < .05 (two-tailed). ** p < .01 (two-tailed). † p < .001 (two-tailed). All correlations are Spearman’s ρ 
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2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Sample characteristics 
The sample consisted of 188 young male adults. Table 2 summarizes the distribution of 
sociodemographic information and relevant measures of goal-directed/habitual control and 
alcohol consumption. According to criteria for risk of alcohol consumption published by the 
WHO (World Health Organization, 2000) for comparative research purposes, this sample can 
be characterized as follows: regarding average consumption on a single drinking occasion in 
the past year, 21.8% fall into the low-risk (1-40 g alc), 31.9% in the medium-risk (41-60 g 
alc), 30.3% in the high-risk (61-100 g alc), and 16.0% in the very-high-risk category (101+ g 
alc); regarding average alcohol consumption per day in the past year, 96.8% have to be 
characterized as having low-risk (1-40 g alc), 2.1% as having medium-risk (41-60 g alc), and 
1.1% as having high-risk (61+ g alc) alcohol consumption. Eight participants (4.3%) fulfilled 
DSM IV-criteria of alcohol abuse. 73.9% reported at least one occasion of binge-drinking.  
Levels of blood markers were below the cut-off value for pathological levels in 91.5% (AST; 
cut-off 0.835 µKat/l), 93.1% (ALT; cut-off 0.835 µKat/l), and 100% (γ-GT; cut-off 1.002 
µKat/l) of the sample. PEth values were available for 158 participants only, because 
collection started three months after the start of 2-Step data collection. Of available PEth data, 
31.6% were negative (i.e. < 20 ng/ml) suggesting no or very low alcohol consumption in the 
preceding two weeks; in 46.8%, values were positive but too low to be exactly measurable 
(i.e. 20-100 ng/ml) indicating low alcohol intake. For these participants, PEth values were set 
to 10 and 60, respectively. Consequently, PEth was treated as ordinal data. Thirteen 
participants (8.2%) had PEth values > 210 ng/ml, which was suggested to be the threshold 
between moderate drinking and alcohol misuse (Wurst et al., 2015).  
Thirty participants (16%) reported to currently be regular smokers. Exact Mann-
Whitney U-tests showed no differences in measures of goal-directed/habitual control between 
smokers and non-smokers. Also, smoking status had no significant effect on the results of 
analyzing stay probabilities with the logistic regression. In addition, we compared participants 
with an individual better-than-chance model fit (n = 139) with the non-fitters regarding the 
measures of alcohol consumption with exact Mann-Whitney U-tests and found no significant 
differences. Furthermore, there were no significant correlations between individual log-
likelihoods and measures of alcohol consumption (all Spearman’s ρ < |.135|, all ps > .067) 
except for correlations with the three blood markers (AST: ρ = .156, p = .035; ALT: ρ = .174, 
p = .019; γ-GT: ρ = .168, p = .023). 
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Table 2. Demographic information, descriptive statistics of measures of goal-directed/habitual control and alcohol 
consumption of participants included in analyses (n = 188; see Table S 1 for these data of the complete sample). 
  n Min 1st quartile Mdn 3rd quartile Max 
Descriptive statistics of sample 
      
Age 188 18.07 18.24 18.33 18.50 18.93 
Years in school 187 4 11 12 12 15 
Measures of goal-directed/habitual 
control      
  
ω1 188 0.00 0.20 0.59 0.80 1.00 
MFscore 188 -0.42 -0.04 0.08 0.21 0.85 
MBscore 188 -0.34 0.06 0.24 0.49 1.21 
Measures of alcohol consumption           
 
CIDI measures 
      
Drinkscore 188 -8.21 -3.54 -0.35 1.61 17.52 
Age of 1st drink1 188 9 14 14 15 18 
Age of 1st time drunk1 180 10 15 16 17 18 
Estimated alcohol consumption in past 
year (g/day) 1 
188 0.00 3.21 6.43 15.43 112.50 
Alcohol consumption in past year 
(g/drinking occasion) 1 
188 18 45 54 90 342 
Age of 1st binge-drinking episode1 131 14 16 16 17 18 
Number of binge-drinking episodes 
lifetime1 
131 1 4 10 20 150 
Alcohol consumption per binge-
drinking episode (g) 1 
139 63 90 117 135 450 
Questionnaire measures             
ADS sum score1 181 0 2 4 7 30 
OCDS-G sum Score1 183 0 1 3 5 18 
Blood markers             
AST (µKat/l) 1 183 0.17 0.35 0.40 0.48 2.51 
ALT (µKat/l) 1 182 0.11 0.27 0.35 0.45 1.59 
γ-GT (µKat/l) 1 183 0.13 0.23 0.27 0.33 0.89 
PEth1 158 10 10 60 60 1180 
Measures of impulsivity             
BIS-15 sum score 185 18 27 30 34 45 
SURPS Impulsivity 1 186 5 9 10 11 17 
Note: ADS = Alcohol Dependence Scale. ALT = alanine transaminase. AST = aspartate transaminase. BIS-15 = Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale (short form). Drinkscore = score of drinking behavior from CIDI measures of alcohol consumption. γ-GT 
= gamma-glutamyl transferase. MBscore= score of model-based control. MFscore = score of model-free control. OCDS-G = 
Obsessive Compulsive Drinking Scale. ω = balance between model-free and model-based control. PEth = 
phosphatidylethanol. SURPS = Substance Use Risk Profile Scale.  
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2.4.2 Behavioral results 
First, we analyzed behavioral choice tendencies of participants to find evidence for 
model-free and model-based control. Therefore, we performed a logistic regression to analyze 
how previous trial’s transition type from 1st to 2nd stage (common vs. rare) and final outcome 
(reward vs. no reward) affected the probability to repeat the same choice at 1st stage in the 
current trial. Participants had a higher probability to repeat a 1st-stage choice after having been 
rewarded in the previous trial (significant main effect of outcome), which indicates model-
free control strategies. The probability to repeat a 1st-stage choice was also increased after 
rewarded trials with common transition and unrewarded trials with rare transition (significant 
interaction effect of outcome and transition type). This interaction effect indicates model-
based behavioral control. Additionally, this analysis yielded a significant main effect of 
transition with repetition probability being generally higher after common compared to rare 
transition trials (all ps < .001; see Appendix A.3.2 and Figure 5).  
Second, we investigated the relationship between measures of goal-directed/habitual 
control and alcohol consumption. Therefore, we first included Drinkscore as additional 
between-subjects factor in the logistic regression analysis of choice repetition. This yielded no 
significant effects of Drinkscore while preserving the aforementioned main and interaction 
effects (see Appendix A.3.2). Then, we used MANOVA with measures of goal-
directed/habitual control (ωlog, MFscore, MBscore) as independent and measures of alcohol 
consumption (Drinkscore, ADS sum score, OCDS-G sum score, AST, ALT, γ-GT, PEth) as 
dependent variables. MANOVA is a multivariate approach bypassing the multiple 
comparisons problem we face with our multitude of dependent and independent variables. 
This analysis yielded no significant associations of alcohol consumption measures with ωlog 
(F(7, 142) = 1.685, p = .117, ηp² = .077), MFscore (F(7, 142) = .646, p = .717, ηp² = .031), or 
MBscore (F(7, 142) = 1.491, p = .175, ηp² = .068). Next, we correlated measures of goal-
directed/habitual control (ωlog, MFscore, MBscore) with measures of alcohol consumption. The 
associations of main interest between Drinkscore and each measure of model-free/-based 
control did not reach significance (Table 3, Figure 5). Besides this, these analyses yielded a 
significant negative association of γ-GT with MBscore (Spearman’s ρ = -.160, p = .031; Table 
3). However, this finding does not survive Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (42 
tests). No further correlation on the behavioral level reached significance (all ps > .168).  
Since binge-drinkers and non-bingers can be seen as meaningful subgroups in this 
sample showing numerous differences in drinking behavior (Table S 5), we compared the 
measures of goal-directed/habitual control between these groups using Exact Mann-Whitney 
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U-tests. These analyses yielded no significant differences between binge-drinkers and non-
bingers with regard to ω, MFscore, or MBscore (all ps > .125; Table S 5). In addition, we 
compared measures of goal-directed/habitual control between the four risk groups regarding 
average consumption on a single drinking occasion in the past year (World Health 
Organization, 2000). Adding WHO risk group as a fixed between-subjects factor in the 
logistic regression of stay probabilities did not yield any significant effect of WHO risk group 
while preserving aforementioned main and interaction effects. Non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis 
Tests showed no differences between the WHO risk groups in ω, MFscore, or MBscore (all χ²(3) 
< 2.584, ps > .460). 
 
 
Figure 4. Scatterplots of Drinkscore with the three measures of goal-directed/habitual control: the score for model-free 
(MFscore) and model-based (MBscore) choice behavior stay probabilities and the balance parameter from the hybrid-controller 
computational model (ω). Note that for displaying purposes and better interpretability, ω is used instead of ωlog, but this does 
not influence the rank–order correlation. 
 
In contrast to model-free and model-based control, measures of impulsivity (BIS-15 
sum score, SURPS impulsivity subscale) showed the anticipated associations with drinking 
behavior. Correlational analyses yielded several significant results indicating that earlier and 
heavier alcohol consumption is associated with higher scores of impulsivity (Table 3). To 
directly compare the associations of measures of goal-directed/habitual control and 
impulsivity with measures of drinking behavior, we set up a MANOVA including both groups 
of predictors. This analysis corroborated previous results by revealing significant associations 
with measures of impulsivity but not goal-directed/habitual control (ωlog: (F(7, 139) = 1.954, 
p = .066, ηp² = .090); MFscore: (F(7, 139) = .779, p = .606, ηp² = .038); MBscore: (F(7, 139) = 
1.365, p = .225, ηp² = .064); BIS-15 sum score: F(7, 139) = 2.660, p = .013, ηp² = .118, 
SURPS impulsivity subscale: F(7, 139) = 2.518, p = .018, ηp² = .113). We then used an elastic 
net analysis (Friedman et al, 2010) to select the best predictors of Drinkscore among the 
measures of goal-directed/habitual control and impulsivity thereby directly comparing their 
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respective relation to participants’ drinking behavior.  This analysis corroborated the findings 
insofar as no measure of goal-directed/habitual control was selected as predictor but both 
measures of impulsivity were (see Appendix A.3.4).  
All behavioral analyses were repeated with all available data (n = 198) to check whether 
exclusion criteria influenced the results. Participants, which had previously been excluded had 
higher Drinkscore, ADS sum score, and OCDS-G sum score, and reported lower age of 1
st 
drink, 1st time drunk, and higher average alcohol consumption (Exact Mann-Whitney U-tests, 
all ps < .019). Nevertheless, results did not change with inclusion of these subjects. 
 
 
Figure 5. Upper panel: Stay probabilities in hypothetical cases of pure (a) model-free and (b) model-based control. (c) 
Observed stay probabilities in our sample resemble a mixture of model-free and model-based behavioral control with a 
tendency towards model-based control. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. Lower panel: Striatal BOLD 
correlates of (d) RPEMF and (e) RPEΔMB and (f) their conjunction. Displayed at pFWE < .05; 4.64 < t < 12.5; whole brain 
analyses. 
 
2.4.3 Functional magnetic resonance imaging results 
With fMRI data, we first tested the main effects of interest, namely BOLD correlates of 
RPEMF and RPEΔMB. Separate one-sample t-tests of fMRI contrasts for RPEMF and RPEΔMB 
were performed as ROI as well as exploratory whole-brain analyses. In addition, we tested the 
conjunction null hypothesis (Nichols, Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 2005) of RPEMF 
and RPEΔMB being correlated with the BOLD responses in the same regions. BOLD responses 
in ventral striatum and vmPFC were associated with RPEMF as well as RPEΔMB at pFWE<.05 
(Figure 5 and Table S 7-9). This replicates the finding of the original study that there are 
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signatures of MB evaluation in the ventral striatal BOLD response to RPEs, the “signal most 
associated with model free RL” (Daw et al, 2011). 
Finally, we tested whether alcohol consumption is associated with neural 
representations of RPEMF and RPEΔMB. We first correlated measures of alcohol consumption 
with extracted mean activation in ventral striatum and vmPFC ROIs. This analysis revealed 
significant associations of BOLD responses to RPEMF in ventral striatum with age of 1
st drink 
(ρ = -.184, p = .026) and in vmPFC with OCDS-G sum score (ρ = .182, p = .031; Table 3). 
Similar to the significant correlation of γ-GT and MBscore on the behavioral level, these 
correlations did not survive Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (28 tests). A 
MANOVA with measures of drinking behavior as dependent and mean extracted ROI 
activation as independent variables yielded no significant results (all Fs(7,108) < .865, all ps 
> .537, all ηp²s < .053). Next, exploratory whole-brain regression analyses were performed 
testing the relationships of RPEMF and RPEΔMB with drinking measures. A negative 
association between BOLD responses to RPEMF and age of 1
st drink was revealed in a cluster 
in left putamen, pallidum, and insula (t(1,143) = 4.017, k = 608; Figure 4 and Table S10), 
which corresponds to r = .319 in the peak voxel of this cluster. This cluster also involves 
voxels, which are included in our mask of ventral striatum explaining the significant 
correlation of BOLD responses to RPEMF in ventral striatum with age of 1
st drink. No further 
measure of alcohol consumption showed an association with BOLD responses to RPEMF or 
RPEΔMB. 
 
 
Figure 6. Negative association between BOLD response to RPEMF and age of first drink. Displayed at puncorr. < .001; 3.15 < t 
< 5; whole brain analyses. 
 
Next, we compared neural representations of RPEMF and RPEΔMB between binge-
drinkers and non-bingers. Exact Mann-Whitney U-tests comparing extracted mean ROI 
activations in RPEMF and RPEΔMB contrasts in ventral striatum and vmPFC yielded no 
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significant differences between binge-drinkers and non-bingers (all ps > .414; Table S 11). 
Additionally, no significant differences were observed in exploratory whole-brain two-sample 
t-tests comparing BOLD responses to RPEMF and RPEΔMB, respectively, between binge-
drinkers and non-bingers. 
 
Table 3. Results of correlations between measures of alcohol consumption and behavioral measures of goal-
directed/habitual control, mean extracted ROI BOLD responses to RPEMF and RPEΔMB and measures of impulsivity. 
  
ω 
M
F
sc
or
e 
M
B
sc
or
e   RPEMF   RPEΔMB   BIS-15   SURPS 
    vS vmPFC   vS vmPFC 
 
SUM   IMP 
Drinkscore -.067 .000 -.004  
-.019 .014 
 
-.058 -.023   .256†  .246† 
Age of 1st drink -.011 .042 .057 
 
-.184* -.143 
 
-.063 -.008 
 
-.125 
 
-.263† 
Age of 1st time drunk .066 .052 .048 
 
-.044 -.011 
 
-.040 .059 
 
-.182* 
 
-.155* 
Estimated alcohol 
consumption in past 
year (g/day) 
-.070 -.071 .038 
 
-.101 .021 
 
-.105 -.048 
 
.088 
 
.116 
Alcohol consumption 
in past year 
(g/drinking occasion)  
-.026 -.081 .101 
 
-.087 -.006 
 
-.038 -.018 
 
.133 
 
.081 
Age of 1st binge-
drinking episode 
.098 -.033 .019 
 
.075 .040 
 
.076 .047 
 
-.156 
 
-.126 
Number of binge-
drinking episodes 
lifetime 
-.033 .038 .044 
 
.001 .047 
 
-.090 -.035 
 
.232** 
 
.179* 
Alcohol consumption 
per binge-drinking 
episode (g)  
-.064 .096 -.018   -.015 .048   .035 .059 
  
.210**   .245† 
ADS sum score -.061 .007 .029 
 
.006 .115 
 
-.040 -.099 
 
.211** 
 
.298† 
OCDS-G sum score .000 -.011 .031   .088 .182*   .021 .073 
 
.223**   .228** 
AST .015 .015 -.047 
 
-.025 .059 
 
-.008 -.042   .039  .165* 
ALT -.072 .061 -.080 
 
.003 .029 
 
.010 .030 
 
-.018 
 
.159* 
γ-GT -.066 -.011 -.160* 
 
-.074 -.089 
 
-.075 -.005 
 
-.205** 
 
-.092 
PEth .041 -.048 .052   -.091 -.016   -.019 .005   -.150   .005 
Note: All correlations are Spearman’s ρ. ADS = Alcohol Dependence Scale. ALT = alanine transaminase. AST = aspartate 
transaminase. BIS-15 = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (short form) with SUM = Sum score. Drinkscore = score of drinking 
behavior from CIDI measures of alcohol consumption. γ-GT = gamma-glutamyl transferase. MBscore = score of model-based 
control. MFscore = score of model-free control. OCDS-G = Obsessive Compulsive Drinking Scale. ω = balance between 
model-free and model-based control. PEth = phosphatidylethanol. SURPS = Substance Use Risk Profile Scale with IMP = 
Impulsivity subscale. vS, ventral striatum. vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex.  
* p < .05 (two-tailed); ** p < .01 (two-tailed); † p < .001 (two-tailed). 
 
In addition, we examined the relation between measures of impulsivity and goal-
directed/habitual control. There has been evidence that high impulsive subjects have a “subtle 
accentuation of model-free control” on a behavioral level and reduced lateral pre-
/orbitofrontal model-based signals during 2-Step (Deserno, Wilbertz, et al., 2015, p. 5). In our 
sample, we found no significant associations between BIS-15 subscales or Sum score with λ, 
ω, MFscore, MBscore, as well as neural correlates of model-free and model-based control in 
ventral striatum and vmPFC ROIs (see Table S 6 for results of correlations) or 10mm-spheres 
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around the three peaks in lateral pre-/orbitofrontal cortex reported in Deserno, Wilbertz, et al. 
(2015). 
 
2.5 Discussion 
We investigated the association between goal-directed and habitual behavioral control 
during a RL task and alcohol consumption in healthy social-drinking young adults. The 
overall finding of our study is that there were no significant associations of measures of goal-
directed or habitual control and alcohol consumption. On the behavioral level, there were no 
significant associations between stronger habitual or weaker goal-directed control with (1) 
greater alcohol consumption in general, (2) earlier onset of drinking, (3) higher average 
alcohol intake, (4) the presence of binge-drinking and more frequent and heavy binge-
drinking events, (5) higher scores on drinking-related questionnaires, or (6) elevated levels of 
blood markers for liver function and alcohol consumption, except for a small correlation 
between model-based behavior and gamma-glutamyl transferase. On the neural level, stronger 
representation of model-free RPE in ventral striatum and vmPFC and weaker model-based 
signatures in these representations were also not significantly associated with measures of 
alcohol consumption. However, both ROI and exploratory whole-brain analyses revealed that 
participants, who reported earlier onset of drinking, showed a stronger correspondence 
between BOLD signals in the putamen and RPEMF.  
We found that on a behavioral level greater alcohol consumption at age 18 was not 
associated with stronger model-free habitual or weaker model-based goal-directed behavior. 
This suggests that favoring habitual over goal-directed control during decision making might 
not be a predisposing vulnerability factor for alcohol consumption per se. However, 
generalization is limited since we deliberately excluded subjects with rare drinking patterns 
amongst young men, namely complete alcohol abstinence or early alcohol dependence. We 
did this in order to avoid ceiling and floor effects in alcohol consumption over time, to 
increase the variety of possible drinking trajectories during the follow-up interval, and to not 
include participants who already had severe neuroadaptations due to pathological alcohol 
intake. Therefore, although this sample is appropriate to investigate drinking trajectories 
longitudinally, variance in alcohol consumption at the cross-sectional level is limited by 
design. This might have contributed to the lack of associations reported here. Repeating the 
behavioral analyses with the subjects excluded due to positive drug screenings or extreme 
alcohol consumption patterns increased variance in alcohol consumption but failed to alter the 
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results. Furthermore, despite the limited variance in drinking behavior, we did find a robust 
association of alcohol consumption with impulsivity. Impulsivity has often been associated 
with substance abuse and is thought to increase liability for addiction (Dalley, Everitt, & 
Robbins, 2011; Redish et al., 2008). It, therefore, seems unlikely that the current null results 
with respect to learning variables are due to a lack of variance in alcohol consumption. It 
certainly suggests that the relation between alcohol consumption and the degree of goal-
directed/habitual behavioral control is negligible in comparison to the relation with 
impulsivity.  
Another group has recently also investigated the association between goal-
directed/habitual control and alcohol consumption. Investigating a large sample of 1413 
participants with an internet-based online version the Two-Step task, Gillan et al. (2016) 
reported a negative association between AUDIT scores and model-based control. At first 
glance, our null finding in this regard seems to be in contrast to their result, but the association 
found in their sample was rather small and the sample size in our study is too low to detect 
associations of this magnitude. So, the results of Gillan et al.’s (2016; |d|=.12) and our study 
point to a weak association. Howsoever, web-based assessments seem to be a valuable 
approach to reach more participants and should be used in future studies to complement face-
to-face assessments.  
Two further studies used the Two-Step task in cohorts of alcohol-dependent patients 
after cessation of alcohol use and control groups. One of them found a significantly lower 
magnitude of model-based control in patients compared to control participants (Sebold et al., 
2014), while the other did not (Voon et al., 2014). This discrepancy can partly be resolved: 
first, the difference between alcohol-dependent patients and control participants in Sebold et 
al. (2014) was not significant when controlling for processing speed, in which these groups 
differed significantly. Second, alcohol-dependent patients in Sebold et al.’s (2014) study were 
abstinent for about two weeks while patients in Voon et al. (2014) were abstinent from 
alcohol for two weeks to one year and revealed a correlation of longer duration of abstinence 
with more model-based control. Taken together, an imbalance in goal-directed/habitual 
control does not seem to increase liability for alcohol dependence substantially. If goal-
directed control as measured with the Two-Step task is indeed reduced in alcohol dependent 
subjects, this might rather emerge during the course of prolonged, excessive alcohol use and, 
like other cognitive alterations, might be reversible after cessation of alcohol consumption.  
As a side issue, we examined the relation between impulsivity and behavioral control 
during the Two-Step task and found no evidence of a behavioral or neural association. Both 
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impulsivity and the balance between goal-directed and habitual control have been proposed as 
possible vulnerability factors for addiction (Redish et al., 2008) and were hypothesized to 
interact (Story et al., 2014; Deserno, Wilbertz, et al., 2015). Nevertheless, our data do not 
support this hypothesis. However, rejecting this hypothesis in general on the basis of our 
results would be premature. Impulsivity is a broad, multi-facetted construct and research on 
finer levels of abstraction is warranted to investigate this issue further. Possibly, high motor 
impulsivity might lead to often favoring fast habit-like actions over slowly forward-planned 
actions or high delay discounting might lead to more frequent choices of temporally proximal 
rewards leading to faster habitization of actions due to more frequent reinforcements (Story et 
al., 2014). 
The association of the neural representation of model-free RPEs with onset of drinking 
was predominantly localized in the posterior putamen, an area previously related to the 
representation of values learned by model-free RL (Lee et al., 2014; Wunderlich, Dayan, & 
Dolan, 2012), habit learning, and control of habitual behavior in healthy (Tricomi et al, 2009) 
and alcohol-dependent subjects (Sjoerds et al, 2013). The putamen receives extensive input 
from the dopaminergic midbrain nuclei (Haber and Knutson, 2010), whose output (Schultz, 
1997) and BOLD response (D’Ardenne, Lohrenz, Bartley, & Montague, 2013) have been 
shown to represent RPEs and be causal for learning (Steinberg et al., 2013). However, this 
enhanced representation of model-free error signals did not translate into stronger model-free 
habitual behavioral control during the Two-Step task. This might indicate a compensatory 
mechanism by which subjects with early onset achieve the same balance between model-free 
and model-based control despite stronger neural representation of MF values. This could work 
via down-regulation of functional connectivity between posterior putamen and vmPFC, where 
model-free and model-based values are thought to be integrated (Lee et al, 2014). 
Alternatively, a change of the neural representation of model-free values might precede a 
measurable change of model-free behavioral control. The longitudinal design of this study 
will address this question. In addition, this finding will have to be replicated in future studies 
– just like the association of OCDS-G scores with the mean BOLD response to RPEMF in 
vmPFC – to decrease the risk of interpreting a false positive finding. 
Interestingly, acute alcohol administration has been shown to reduce goal-directed 
control in a devaluation task (Hogarth, Attwood, Bate, & Munafò, 2012). This could lead to 
habitual control taking over in acute alcohol intoxication and, thereby, increase the probability 
of choosing previously rewarded actions such as consuming even more alcohol. This provides 
a possible explanation for out-of-control binge-drinking. Hence, in terms of searching for 
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predictors of alcohol consumption at this age, individual volatility or state-dependence of the 
balance between both control systems under acute alcohol may yield better predictive 
properties for drinking patterns. 
There are limitations of this study: First, due to our exclusion criteria this sample is not 
representative for the whole population of young adults. This reduces generalizability of our 
results. Second, we examined participants after they started drinking alcohol rather than 
before. Both factors preclude us from conclusively ruling out aberrant decision making as a 
predisposing risk factor of hazardous alcohol use, though our results strongly suggest that any 
present association might be negligible.  
In summary, we investigated the relationship of goal-directed and habitual control and 
alcohol drinking behavior in young adult social drinkers. Results did not confirm our 
hypothesis that an imbalance between goal-directed and habitual control favoring habitual 
behavior was associated with greater alcohol consumption on a cross-sectional level. These 
results favor the view that a transition from goal-directed to habitual control as proposed by 
theoretical work (Everitt & Robbins, 2013) occurs during later steps on the path to an alcohol 
use disorder rather than being a trait marker for alcohol use per se. 
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Chapter 3. Study 2  
This chapter has been published as the following: Sebold, M., Nebe, S., Garbusow, M., 
Schad, D. J., Beck, A., Kuitunen-Paul, S., Sommer, C., Neu, P., Zimmermann, U. S., Rapp, 
M. A., Smolka, M. N., Huys, Q. J. M., Schlagenhauf, F., & Heinz, A. (2017). When habits are 
dangerous - Alcohol expectancies and habitual decision-making predict relapse in alcohol 
dependence. Biological Psychiatry. ePub ahead of print. 
 
3.1 Abstract 
Background: Addiction is supposedly characterized by a shift from goal-directed to 
habitual decision making, thus facilitating automatic drug intake. The two-step task allows 
distinguishing between these mechanisms by computationally modeling goal-directed and 
habitual behavior as model-based and model-free control. In addicted patients, decision 
making may also strongly depend upon drug-associated expectations. Therefore, we 
investigated model-based versus model-free decision making and its neural correlates as well 
as alcohol expectancies in alcohol-dependent patients and healthy controls and assessed 
treatment outcome in patients.  
Methods: Ninety detoxified, medication-free, alcohol-dependent patients and 96 age- 
and gender-matched control subjects underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging 
during the two-step task. Alcohol expectancies were measured with the Alcohol Expectancy 
Questionnaire. Over a follow-up period of 48 weeks, 37 patients remained abstinent and 53 
patients relapsed as indicated by the Alcohol Timeline Follow-back method.  
Results: Patients who relapsed displayed reduced medial prefrontal cortex activation 
during model-based decision making. Furthermore, high alcohol expectancies were associated 
with low model-based control in relapsers, while the opposite was observed in abstainers and 
healthy control subjects. However, reduced model-based control per se was not associated 
with subsequent relapse.  
Conclusions: These findings suggest that poor treatment outcome in alcohol dependence 
does not simply result from a shift from model-based to model-free control but is instead 
dependent on the interaction between high drug expectancies and low model-based decision 
making. Reduced model-based medial prefrontal cortex signatures in those who relapse point 
to a neural correlate of relapse risk. These observations suggest that therapeutic interventions 
should target subjective alcohol expectancies. 
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3.2 Introduction  
A prominent theory in addiction research suggests that drug consumption is initially 
goal directed, aiming at drug-associated positive effects, then becomes habitual and 
eventually compulsive (Everitt & Robbins, 2005, 2016). This shift from goal-directed to 
habitual control has been suggested to be caused by long-lasting drug-associated changes in 
the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the ventral striatum which are involved in reward 
processing and reinforcement learning (Berridge, 2012; Heinz et al., 2004; Volkow & Li, 
2004). 
Behaviorally, there is good evidence for reduced goal-directed decision making 
facilitating habitual behavior in humans with substance use disorders (McKim, Bauer, & 
Boettiger, 2016), including methamphetamine (Voon et al., 2014), cocaine (Ersche et al., 
2016), and alcohol dependence (Sebold et al., 2014; Sjoerds et al., 2013; but see Voon et al., 
2014). Overreliance on habits at the expense of goals in AUD may be particularly pivotal 
during early abstinence, where patients are required to inhibit automatic patterns of alcohol 
intake and to develop alternative coping strategies (Tiffany & Conklin, 2000; Wiers, Eberl, 
Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011). Neuroimaging studies implicate a crucial role for the 
mPFC and the ventral striatum for the balance between goal-directed and habitual control 
(Alexander & Brown, 2011; S. de Wit et al., 2009; Killcross & Coutureau, 2003; O’Doherty, 
2011; Ostlund & Balleine, 2005), craving (Goldstein & Volkow, 2011), and relapse in AUD 
(Beck et al., 2012; Charlet et al., 2014; Grüsser et al., 2004). Moreover, in animals, there is 
evidence that habits (e.g., automatic action tendencies) precede relapse-like behavior (Barker, 
Torregrossa, & Taylor, 2012; Flagel, Waselus, Clinton, Watson, & Akil, 2014; Katner, 
Magalong, & Weiss, 1999). 
However, habit formation is not only a deficit: it is a fundamental and adaptive ability, 
and using habits facilitates decision making whenever cognitive resources are limited (Otto, 
Gershman, Markman, & Daw, 2013) or action sequences are too complex to mentally 
compute them (Huys et al., 2012). In AUD, specific habits may be altered and induce alcohol 
craving, seeking, and intake. Besides habit formation, positive alcohol expectancies as 
assessed by the Alcohol Expectancy Questionnaire (AEQ; Brown, 1985; Brown, Goldman, 
Inn, & Anderson, 1980) have been associated with current (Leigh, 1989) and future (Goldman 
& Darkes, 2004; Reese, Chassin, & Molina, 1994) alcohol consumption. Explicit, self-report 
measures of alcohol expectancies reflect the specific expectations of the reinforcing effects of 
alcohol and are associated with prefrontal cortex activity and structure (Anderson, 
Schweinsburg, Paulus, Brown, & Tapert, 2005; Deckel, Hesselbrock, & Bauer, 1995; 
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Gundersen, Specht, Grüner, Ersland, & Hugdahl, 2008; Ide et al., 2014; Wiers et al., 2007). 
One study in humans has demonstrated that acute expectation of alcohol induced by 
presenting alcohol beverages impairs goal-directed regulation of drug-seeking behavior in 
social drinkers (Hogarth, Field, & Rose, 2013), which parallels animal findings (Ostlund, 
Maidment, & Balleine, 2010). Such acute expectation of alcohol may be particularly strong in 
subjects who have generally positive expectancies regarding the effects of alcohol 
consumption. Indeed, subjects who report greater positive, arousing, and social alcohol 
expectancies show increased appetitive responses toward alcohol cues (Drobes, Carter, & 
Goldman, 2009). However, it is yet unclear how this association relates to real-life drinking 
behavior and treatment outcome in AUD. 
We recruited recently detoxified alcohol-dependent patients who expressed a desire to 
remain abstinent. We asked whether a tendency for positive alcohol expectancies interacts 
with model-based control and its neurobiological correlates in predicting treatment outcome. 
 
3.3 Methods and materials 
3.3.1 Participants 
All data were collected as part of the Learning and Alcohol Dependence study, a 
bicentric German study hosted at Universitätsklinikum Dresden/Technische Universität 
Dresden and Charité–Universitätsmedizin Berlin. Two hundred two subjects (106 AUD 
patients, 96 control participants) completed the Two-Step task (Daw et al., 2011) to 
disentangle habitual from goal-directed decision making and the brief German version of the 
AEQ (Brown, 1985). Patients fulfilled diagnostic criteria for alcohol dependence according to 
ICD-10 and DSM-IV-TR (Saß et al., 2003) for a minimum of 3 years. Healthy control 
subjects were carefully matched for age, gender, education, and smoking. Exclusion criteria 
for all subjects were left-handedness [Edinburgh Handedness Inventory <50 (Oldfield, 1971)], 
a history of current or past substance use disorder (except nicotine dependence in control 
participants and alcohol and nicotine dependence in AUD patients), other major psychiatric 
disorder [as assessed with the computer-based CIDI (Jacobi et al., 2013; Wittchen & Pfister, 
1997)], or neurological disease. No subjects were using psychotropic medications that were 
known to interact with the central nervous system for at least four half-lives (including illegal 
drugs and detoxification treatment tested by a drug urine test). Study participation of the 
patients took place shortly after detoxification (Table 4). Participants gave written informed 
consent. Ethical approval for the study was obtained from both sites (Universitätsklinikum 
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Dresden/Technische Universität Dresden, EK 228072012; Charité–Universitätsmedizin 
Berlin, EA 1/157/11), and procedures were in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
 
3.3.2 Procedure 
Participants were seen twice for investigation. In the first assessment, participants 
completed the CIDI, a neuropsychological test battery, and additional questionnaires (Table 
4). Subjects completed the German version of the AEQ at this time (Brown, 1985). On the 
second appointment, which took place shortly after the first appointment (mean ± SD, 7.0 ± 
12.2 days), subjects performed the Two-Step task (Daw et al., 2011) along with another 
learning task (Garbusow et al., 2014). The two-step task was programmed using Matlab 
software (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, MA) with the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 
1997) and was performed while undergoing fMRI. All participants had negative alcohol 
breath tests and patients were free of significant withdrawal symptoms [Clinical Institute 
Withdrawal Assessment of Alcohol Scale, Revised (CIWA) score ≤3 (Sullivan, Sykora, 
Schneiderman, Naranjo, & Sellers, 1989)]. Participants received compensation of 10 € an 
hour plus a financial bonus contingent on their performance. Blood samples for analysis of 
ALT, AST, γ-GT, and PEth were collected. 
 
3.3.3 Alcohol Expectancy Questionnaire 
The brief German version of the AEQ includes 19 items. Each item describes 
anticipated reinforcing effects of alcohol. Items include statements such as “Alcohol generally 
has powerful positive effects on people (e.g., makes a person feel good or happy)” or 
“Alcohol helps a person to relax (e.g., feel less tense, can keep a person’s mind off of 
mistakes at work).” 
Subjects are asked to agree or disagree with each item. Disagreement and agreement of 
each item are coded as 1 and 2, respectively, resulting in a potential sum score between 19 
and 38, for low to high expected reinforcement, respectively. 
 
3.3.4 Task 
Each participant performed 201 trials of the Two-Step task (Figure 7A, see section 2.3.2 
for detailed task description). This task enables the analysis of model-based (goal-directed) 
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and model-free (habitual) decisions on a trial-by-trial level, because both decision strategies 
make distinct predictions on choice behavior (Figure 7B). 
 
3.3.5 Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
fMRI was performed using a 3T Siemens Trio scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) 
with a 12-channel head coil. For fMRI, we used a T2-weighted echo planar imaging sequence 
with the following parameters: TR = 2410 ms, TE = 25 ms, 80° flip angle, 3 × 3 × 2 mm³ 
voxel size, and a 192 × 192 mm² field of view. One volume comprised 42 transverse slices in 
descending order, oriented 25° to the anteroposterior commissure line. We additionally 
acquired a structural T1-weighted MPRAGE image (TR = 1900 ms, TE = 2.52 ms, 9° flip 
angle, 1 × 1 × 1 mm³ voxel size, 256 × 256 mm² field of view). 
 
3.3.6 Follow-up procedure 
After study participation, alcohol-dependent patients were regularly contacted for 
personal (after 4, 8, 12, 24, and 48 weeks) and telephone (after 6, 10, 18, and 36 weeks) 
assessments over a period of 1 year. At each contact, we assessed daily alcohol intake amount 
using the Alcohol Timeline Followback method (Sobell & Sobell, 1992), with relapse defined 
as consumption of 60/48 g (male/female) of alcohol on any occasion. Personal assessment 
included alcohol breath tests to validate self-reports. During the follow-up period, we lost 16 
patients (15%). In two cases, we only had relapse reports from close relatives, which we 
accepted for classification. Altogether, 53 patients (59%) relapsed during the follow-up 
period, whereas 37 (41%) remained abstinent. Demographic and clinical characteristics of this 
sample are shown in Table 4. 
 
3.3.7 Data analysis 
We investigated two questions: 1) whether the balance between model-free and model-
based control was different between control participants and detoxified alcohol-dependent 
patients who remained abstinent (abstainers) and who subsequently relapsed (relapsers), and 
2) whether the balance between model-free and model-based control moderated the effect of 
alcohol expectancies on drinking behavior. As previous studies have overwhelmingly 
suggested that the two-step task has power to detect variations in the goal-directed but not the 
habitual system (Doll, Bath, Daw, & Frank, 2016; Gillan et al., 2015; Sebold et al., 2014; 
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Voon et al., 2014), we focused on individual differences in model-based control in all 
analyses. We tested assumptions for all statistical analyses and computed nonparametric tests 
when necessary. 
 
3.3.7.1 Task-related group differences 
To derive individual measurements of model-based control from behavior of the two-
step task, we focused on first-stage choices because model-free versus model-based decision 
making is differentially affected by reward and transition from the previous trial (Daw et al., 
2011) (Figure 7B). We calculated individual model-based scores, as done previously (Sebold 
et al., 2014), which reflect the interaction between transition frequency and reward of the 
previous trial (% reward common + % unrewarded rare – % rewarded rare – % unrewarded 
common). Model 1A involved a multinomial logistic regression analysis (multinom function 
from the nnet package [version 7.3-8] in R software [available at https://www.R-project.org]) 
to test whether group (dummy coded with three levels: control participants, abstainers, and 
relapsers) was predicted from model-based scores. 
The raw data analysis provides a direct measurement of model-free and model-based 
behavior. However, it only considers trial-by-trial repetition effects. Computational models 
allow more comprehensive assessments, examining longer behavioral trends. Therefore, we 
fitted a hybrid model as previously described (Daw et al., 2011; Deserno, Huys, et al., 2015; 
Deserno, Wilbertz, et al., 2015) to the behavior and estimated parameters for each subject. We 
used an expectation maximization algorithm to find maximum a posteriori estimates. During 
the fitting procedure, all subjects (control participants, abstainers, relapsers) were treated as 
one group. 
The hybrid model contains seven parameters, of which the parameter ω is of major 
interest because it determines the balance between model-free (ω = 0) and model-based (ω = 
1) control. Crucially, this seven-parameter hybrid model was the best-fitting model for all 
groups (Figure S 3). The estimation of the parameter ω relies on the fact that subjects 
concurrently use model-free and model-based strategies. We excluded subjects who did not 
use this hybrid model as indicated by the individual log-likelihoods that did not fit better than 
chance (see Appendix B.1.1; n in analyses = 143). Model 1B then mirrored the analysis of the 
first-step repetition probabilities: again, we performed a multinomial logistic regression 
analysis to test whether ω was predictive of group membership (control participants, 
abstainers, and relapsers). In line with Voon et al. (2014), we compared all other model 
parameters between groups (Table S 12). 
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3.3.7.2 Interaction between alcohol expectancies and model-based control  
Our second hypothesis was that model-based scores would moderate the effect of 
alcohol expectancies on group. Model 2A tested this using multinomial logistic regression 
where we additionally allowed for interaction between AEQ scores and model-based control 
to predict group. To elucidate the direction of our effects, we computed post hoc Spearman 
correlations between AEQ scores and model-based control within all groups. For illustrative 
purposes and further analyses, we assigned participants to high versus low alcohol expectancy 
groups using median splits of the AEQ (control participants Mdn = 25; AUD patients Mdn = 
35). We compared models 1A and 2A with respect to model fit. To assess the predictive 
capacity of the winning model, we additionally performed a cross-validation approach 
(stratified 10-fold cross-validation with class balancing during training). Finally, model 2B 
replicated the above analysis using the computational parameter ω. We compensated for the 
reduced power caused by the removal of poorly fit subjects (see Appendix B.1.1) by using 
categorical AEQ information. Again, we compared models 1B and 2B with respect to model 
fit. Post hoc analyses were performed, comparing ω between individuals with high and low 
alcohol expectancies within each group using Kruskal–Wallis tests. To evaluate whether AEQ 
scores were related to a motivational aspect of alcohol intake, we correlated AEQ scores with 
sum scores of the Drinking Motives Questionnaire (Kuntsche, Knibbe, Gmel, & Engels, 
2006), which measures motives of alcohol intake (Gmel, Labhart, Fallu, & Kuntsche, 2012). 
 
3.3.8 fMRI analysis 
Preprocessing details of the fMRI data can be found in the Supplement. All first-level 
analyses were based on 116 subjects (60 control participants, 21 abstainers, and 35 relapsers; 
see Figure S 4 for dropout details). In line with the hypothesis that relapse in AD is 
characterized by a shift away from model-based control, the aim of the statistical analysis of 
the fMRI data was to elucidate whether relapsers would show decreased model-based neural 
signatures in brain areas associated with the computation of these learning signals (Daw et al., 
2011; Deserno, Huys, et al., 2015; Deserno, Wilbertz, et al., 2015). 
First-level analyses were conducted as previously described (Daw et al., 2011; Deserno, 
Huys, et al., 2015; Deserno, Wilbertz, et al., 2015; Appendix A.2.1, Appendix B.4). Briefly, 
we derived individual RPEMF and RPEMB trajectories from the computational model under the 
assumption of pure model-free (ω = 0) versus full model-based control (ω = 1), respectively. 
In line with Daw et al. (2011), we used means across all groups for all parameters to compute 
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prediction errors. Next, we used RPEMF as a parametric regressor in the first-level analyses 
and added a second regressor—RPEΔMB, the difference between RPEMF and RPEMB—to 
explain variance in the blood oxygen level–dependent signal uniquely related to model-based 
prediction errors. At the second level, contrast images for RPEMF and RPEΔMB were taken to a 
random effects analysis. Site (Berlin vs. Dresden) was added as a covariate of no interest. For 
correction of multiple comparisons, familywise error (FWE) correction with p = .05 at the 
peak level was applied for whole brain analyses. Group comparisons in the mPFC and the 
ventral striatum — both areas with a pivotal role in coding RPEMF and RPEΔMB signals (Daw 
et al., 2011; Deserno, Huys, et al., 2015; Deserno, Wilbertz, et al., 2015; Gläscher et al., 2010; 
Lee et al., 2014) — were performed using small volume correction (SVC) with a mask 
containing all voxels showing a significant effect for RPEMF and RPEΔMB (conjunction at 
puncorr. < .001) combining all three groups. 
There is evidence for pronounced structural alterations in relapsers compared to 
abstainers in the mPFC, a region of interest (Beck et al., 2012; Charlet et al., 2014; Durazzo et 
al., 2011). We conducted voxel-based morphometry (Ashburner & Friston, 2000) and added 
gray matter density as a nuisance variable in our fMRI analysis to control for morphometric 
alterations in the fMRI analyses (Table S 13). 
To mirror the behavioral analyses, we additionally tested whether model-based neural 
signatures would differently correlate with AEQ scores between groups. As we had assumed 
that the interaction between model-based neural correlates and alcohol expectancies plays a 
role in the predefined regions (right/left ventral striatum and mPFC), we extracted average 
model-based cluster activity of these regions. Mirroring our behavioral analyses, we 
performed three subsequent multinomial regressions with group as dependent variable and 
tested for the interaction between AEQ scores and the respective cluster values. 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Sample characteristics 
Compared to control participants, abstainers and relapsers reported significantly higher 
symptoms in almost all clinical characteristics, increased deficits in neuropsychological 
testing, and increased blood parameters related to alcohol consumption (Table 4). 
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Table 4. Sample characteristics of the final sample. 
Note: AEQ = Alcohol Expectancy Questionnaire. ALT = alanine transaminase. AST = aspartate transaminase. DMQ-R = Drinking Motives Questionnaire, revised version. DSbw = digit span 
backwards. DSST = Digit Symbol Substitution Test. γ-GT = gamma-glutamyl transferase. HADS-D = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, Depression subscale. M: mean. MWT-B = 
Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz Test, version B. OCDS-G = Obsessive-Compulsive Drinking Scale. PEth: phosphatidylethanol. SD: standard deviation. 
a p-value of linear model (LM) with group as predictor, or p-value of respective contrast.  
b p-value of Chi-Square Test.  
c p-value of Kruskal-Wallis Rank Sum Test with group as predictor or Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for respective contrast. 
Variable Group  p-values for test statistic 
 
Control participants (n=96) 
 
Abstainers (n=37) 
 
Relapsers (n=53) 
 Main 
effect 
group 
Controls 
vs. 
Abstainers 
Abstainers 
vs. 
Relapsers 
Controls 
vs 
Relapsers 
Gender ♀: 16; ♂: 80  ♀: 7; ♂:30  ♀: 6; ♂: 47  .56b .8b .37 b .47 b 
Site Berlin: 56; Dresden: 40  Berlin: 24; Dresden: 13  Berlin: 28; Dresden: 25  .52b .56b .28b .61b 
 M SD NA  M SD NA  M SD NA  F T T T 
Demographical variables 
Years of school education  11.9 1.5 2  10.8 1.5 2  10.6 3.5 2  <.05c .20c .61 c <.05 c 
Age 43.6 10.9 0  45.7 12.0 0  45.2 9.9 0  .52a .36a .82a .38a 
Net income in € 1201 686 22  1150 741 0  1013 621 5  .22c .61c .38c .08c 
Proportion of smokers 65% - 0  75% - 0  75% - 0  .33b .45b >.99b .45b 
Duration of abstinence at fMRI 66.5 280.9 0  21.4 11.6 0  22.3 12.4 0  <.0001c <.0001c .80c <.0001c 
Clinical characteristic 
Number of detoxifications - - -  2.13 2.06 0  4.75 5.03 0  <.05c - <.05 -  
AEQ 25.7 4.6 0  31.7 4.4 0  32.8 3.9 0  <.0001c <.0001c .20c <.0001c 
HADS-D 1.9 2.3 1  3.9 3.9 0  4.2 3.7 0  <.0001c <.001c .67c <.0001c 
OCDS-G 2.7 2.8 1  10.3 8.2 1  12.9 8.4 3  <.0001c <.0001c .10c <.0001c 
DMQ-R 29 7 3  44 11 1  48 14 1  <.0001c <.0001c .36c <.0001c 
Time to relapse in days  - - -  - - -  87.1 80.0 4   -  -   -   -  
Neuropsychological testing 
MWT-B 28.3 4.6 3  28.6 4.3 0  28.2 4.8 1  .90c .87c .73c .96c 
DSST 10.7 3.12 0  9.9 2.6 1  9.1 2.9 0  <.01a .11a .26a <.01a 
DSbw 7.5 2.04 0  6.62 1.91 0  6.54 1.89 0  <.01a <.05a .86a <.01a 
Blood markers 
AST(µKat/l)  0.45 0.17 28  0.69 0.53 5  0.71 0.52 11  <.001c <.05c .68c <.001c 
ALT (µKat/l)  0.43 0.19 28  0.88 0.73 5  1.08 2.16 11  <.001c <.01c .94c <.001c 
γ-GT (µKat/l)  0.54 0.67 28  3.33 6.71 5  1.51 1.38 11  <.0001c <.0001c .91c <.0001c 
PEth (ng/ml)  203.24 359.68 16  447.85 349.13 16  806.15 736.83 31  <.0001c <.0001c .14c <.0001c 
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Matching of control participants and alcohol-dependent patients was successful in all 
variables of interest (gender, school education, smoking status, and age). At baseline, there 
were no significant differences between abstainers and relapsers, except that the patients in 
the relapse group reported a larger number of previous detoxifications. 
 
3.4.2 Task-related group differences 
Model-based control per se did not predict group membership of control participants, 
abstainers, or relapsers (model 1A; R²McF = .003, p = .55; Figure 7C). The computational 
analysis confirmed these results. The parameter ω was not associated with group (model 1B; 
R²McF = .003, p = .60). 
 
 
Figure 7. (A) Design of the Two-Step task. (B) Exemplary model-free and model-based response patterns. While pure model-
free decisions only depend on the reward in previous trials, model-based decisions take transition frequencies from first to 
second stage into account. (C) Real response pattern as a function of group. All three groups showed a mixture of model-free 
and model-based decision making. Groups did not differ significantly regarding their model-free or model-based choice 
pattern. 
 
3.4.3 Interaction between alcohol expectancies and model-based control 
However, model-based control and alcohol expectancies interacted in predicting group 
membership (model 2A; R²McF = .23, p = .01). This interaction was significantly different 
between relapsers and control participants (p < .01) and trendwise different between relapsers 
and abstainers (p = .06). Post hoc analyses using Spearman correlation to associate AEQ 
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scores with model-based control indicated a positive association in control participants (ρ = 
.20, p = .04) which was absent in abstainers (p = .36, Figure 2A) and negative in relapsers (ρ 
= −.30, p = .03). Model comparisons between models 1A and 2A indicated that model 2A, 
which included the interaction between the model-based term and AEQ scores to predict 
group membership, outperformed model 1A, which included only the model-based term (χ² = 
87.1, p < .001). To ensure the robustness of our analysis in a predictive classification scheme, 
we ran the logistic regression model in a cross-validated procedure. The regression model 
correctly predicted group membership with an area under the curve of 0.77 (chance level: 0.5; 
p < 10−4 based on a permutation test with 10,000 label permutations), corroborating the 
significant predictive capacity of model 2A. 
Similar to our raw data analysis, model 2B indicated a significant interaction between ω 
and AEQ scores (R²McF = .12, p = .01), which was significantly different between relapsers 
and control participants (β = 1.48, p < .01) and did not reach significance between relapsers 
and abstainers (β = 1.8, p = .1). Again, model 2B outperformed model 1B, which only 
included the parameter ω (χ² = 10.2, p = .03). 
Post hoc analyses comparing high and low AEQ individuals revealed a positive 
association between AEQ scores and ω in control participants (p < .01), but no significant 
association between AEQ and ω in abstainers (p = .51) and a trend toward negative 
association between AEQ and ω in relapsers (p = .05, Figure 8C). Adding site as a potential 
covariate did not change any of these results. Repeating our analyses with time to relapse as 
dependent variable did not reach significance (Appendix B.8). 
Among all subjects, AEQ scores were positively correlated with a variety of drinking 
motives (Figure S 5-6). 
 
3.4.4 fMRI results 
Across all groups and in line with previous work (Daw et al., 2011; Deserno, Huys, et 
al., 2015; Deserno, Wilbertz, et al., 2015), the conjunction between RPEMF and RPEΔMB 
reached significance in the bilateral ventral striatrum (t = 6.38, x = 12, y = 12, z = –8 and t = 
6.27, x = –16, y = 8, z = –10, pFWE < .001) and the mPFC (t = 4.85, x = –8, y = 32, z = –8, 
pFWE < .05) (Figure 9A; Table S 14). Within these regions, we found a significant correlation 
between neural model-based signatures (average cluster activation) and model-based scores in 
control participants (right ventral striatum: ρ = .29, p = .02; mPFC: ρ = .27, p = .03; Figure 
9B). 
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Figure 8. (A, B) Model-based strategy usage as a function of alcohol expectancies. Subsequent relapsers showed a negative 
relationship between alcohol expectancies and model-based control. This negative association was not apparent in the 
abstaining patients and positive in the healthy control subjects. (C) The relationship between u, which indicates the balance 
between model-based and model-free decision making, and positive alcohol expectancies. Again, whereas healthy control 
subjects showed a positive association between u and alcohol expectancies, this association was negative in relapsers and 
absent in abstaining patients. 
 
With regard to group comparisons, control participants did not differ from alcohol-
dependent patients. However, with regard to treatment outcome, we observed significantly 
lower model-based prediction error signals (RPEΔMB) in the mPFC for relapsers compared to 
abstainers and control participants (t = 3.9; x = –16, y = 42, z = –8, pFWE_SVC = .026; Figure 
9C). Post hoc analyses, for which we extracted estimates from the peak voxel in the mPFC 
and compared activation between groups, indicated significantly higher activation in control 
participants compared to relapsers (t = 3.47, p < .001) and trendwise higher activation in 
control participants compared to abstainers (t = 1.74, p = .08). Abstainers and relapsers did 
not differ (p = .10). Crucially, adding individual gray matter densities of the mPFC did not 
change these results (pFWE_SVC = .024), suggesting that reduced neural signatures of model-
based RPEs in relapsers were not caused by gray matter atrophy (Table S 13). 
Model-free neural signatures did not differ between groups (Figure S 7). 
Mirroring our behavioral analyses, we also examined whether AEQ scores interacted 
with neural correlates of model-based control in predicting group. However, the interaction 
between neural correlates of model-based control and AEQ scores was not significantly 
different between groups, neither in the left (relapsers vs. abstainers, p = .06; relapsers vs. 
control participants, p = .32) or right ventral striatum (relapsers vs. abstainers, p = .10; 
relapsers vs. control participants, p = .54) nor in the mPFC (relapsers vs. abstainers, p = .60; 
relapsers vs. control participants, p = .21). 
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Figure 9. (A) Conjunction. Across all three groups, we found a significant coding of model-free prediction errors and 
additional model-based prediction errors in the ventral striatum (VS) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (conjunction 
displayed at puncorr. < .0001). These regions were also the only ones that reached significance at a more conservative 
threshold (pFWE < .05). (B) Association between neural and behavioral model-based effects. (C) Group effects. A region of 
the mPFC showed reduced model-based signatures for relapsers compared to abstainers and healthy control subjects. This 
effect survived small volume correction for the main effects of the above reported conjunction (pFWE < .026) (panel A). 
Model-free signatures were not statistically different between groups. ROI = region of interest. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
The main findings of our study are 1) a reduction in mPFC activation during model-
based behavior in relapsers and that 2) an interaction between alcohol expectancies and goal-
directed control distinguishes relapsers from abstainers and control participants. Reductions in 
goal-directed behavior per se were not significantly associated with AUD or relapse. Instead, 
relapsers had high alcohol expectancies in association with low goal-directed behavior and 
vice versa, suggesting that the interaction between alcohol expectancies and habitual drug 
intake characterizes subjects with low treatment outcome. 
Replicating previous studies (Cooper, Frone, Russell, & Mudar, 1995; Wiers et al., 
2007), alcohol expectancies were correlated with drinking motives, suggesting that high 
alcohol expectancies reflect a motivation to consume alcohol. In abstainers and control 
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participants, high alcohol expectancies were associated with stronger model-based control, 
which might help these subjects to use alcohol within a framework of self-determined values 
and goals. Conversely, relapsers with relatively high model-based control had low alcohol 
expectancies and may accordingly underestimate the effect of even low doses of alcohol to 
achieve a certain desired state of intoxication, whereas reductions in model-based control 
might facilitate excessive alcohol intake when general alcohol expectancies are high. Indeed, 
Hogarth et al. (2013) observed that acute expectation of alcohol can temporarily interfere with 
goal-directed control. Our data add to this line of arguments and suggest that beyond 
momentary effects of alcohol expectations, a tendency to expect positive and reinforcing 
alcohol effects is particularly dangerous when combined with habitual or compulsive patterns 
of alcohol intake (Everitt & Robbins, 2005, 2016). Our findings differed to some degree from 
a study in cocaine and polysubstance abusers, where decreased goal-directed control was 
found (Ersche et al., 2016; McKim, Bauer, et al., 2016). Likewise, Voon et al. (2014) 
observed such reduction in methamphetamine abusers but not alcohol-dependent patients, 
whereas a study from our own laboratory in an independent sample suggested that AUD was 
related to reductions in goal-directed control (Sebold et al., 2014).  
Consumption of legal drugs (e.g., alcohol) is sensitive to social traditions, including 
expected alcohol effects on personal well-being and social interactions. Such influences may 
be particularly important for subjects with AUD. We also observed that functional correlates 
of model-based behavior in the mPFC were reduced in relapsers compared to abstainers and 
control participants, while at the behavioral level model-based decision making differed only 
between these groups when alcohol expectancies were taken into consideration. This suggests 
that neural activation patterns during cognitive tasks provide a valuable tool for predicting 
treatment outcomes (Gowin, Ball, Wittmann, Tapert, & Paulus, 2015) independent of alcohol 
expectancies. Two other studies have associated blunted mPFC activation with reduced goal-
directed control and flexible decision making in AUD (Reiter et al., 2016; Sjoerds et al., 
2013). The mPFC plays a key role in alcohol-associated behavior, including cue-induced 
craving in animals (Koya et al., 2009; Park et al., 2002) and humans (Childress et al., 1999; 
Heinz et al., 2005). Further evidence for a role of the mPFC in relapse comes from animal 
studies, where drug-associated mPFC activity has been shown to provoke relapse to 
diamorphine (Bossert et al., 2011). In humans, relapse in AUD has been associated with 
enhanced cue-related activity in the mPFC (Beck et al., 2012; Grüsser et al., 2004). These 
findings suggest that impaired mPFC function and a potential bias toward cue-induced 
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functional activation in association with drug craving characterizes relapse across substance 
use disorders. 
There are several limitations that need to be addressed. First, our sample size, although 
comparatively large, includes only a limited number of abstainers (n = 21) available for 
imaging, and effect sizes for the behavioral data were only moderate. Second, rodent studies 
have demonstrated a bias toward habitual control after chronic alcohol reward (Doll et al., 
2016; Sobell & Sobell, 1992; Sullivan et al., 1989). The task here, however, used only 
monetary, nondrug rewards (Ersche et al., 2016; Sebold et al., 2014; Sjoerds et al., 2013; 
Voon et al., 2014) and no alcohol cues. To what extent habitization of monetary outcomes 
captures the processes induced by alcohol is unclear, but ethical concerns limit the use of 
alcohol in detoxified subjects with AUD. 
Third, alcohol expectancies, although reflecting a trait rather than a state marker of 
motivation (Aas, Leigh, Anderssen, & Jakobsen, 1998; Duka, Tasker, & Stephens, 1998), are 
directed at consuming alcohol and are thus outcome oriented. In our study, this motivational 
trait was associated with low model-based control in relapsers. We do not know whether 
individual relapses were triggered by acute expectation of alcohol, e.g. elicited by alcohol 
cues. However, acute expectation of alcohol could not be tested as all subjects were motivated 
to remain abstinent. Additional studies in individuals with low substance use (e.g., heavy 
drinkers without dependence) may help to identify the effects of acute alcohol expectations on 
decision making. 
Fourth, relapsers had gone through significantly more previous detoxifications 
compared to abstainers, which may contribute to neurobiological alterations associated with 
further and even more excessive alcohol intake, as indicated by animal experiments (Spanagel 
& Hölter, 1999; Vengeliene, Bilbao, & Spanagel, 2014; Vengeliene, Celerier, Chaskiel, 
Penzo, & Spanagel, 2009). However, model-based neural correlates in the mPFC were not 
associated with previous detoxifications in the patient group (Appendix B.9). Finally, our 
study cannot disentangle preexisting conditions from alcohol-induced changes [e.g., on 
dopaminergic neurotransmission and its effect on goal-directed correlates (Deserno, Huys, et 
al., 2015)]; therefore, further studies employing longitudinal designs are required. 
In conclusion, decreased model-based control may predict relapse only in patients with 
high alcohol expectancies. This study further specifies the theory of goals and habits in AUD 
and suggests a pivotal role of alcohol expectancies, which can easily be assessed in clinical 
settings. Our study showed how the computational mechanism underlying goal-directed 
control and its neurobiological correlate (reduced mPFC activation) are associated with poor 
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treatment outcome. The interaction between alcohol expectancies and drug taking habits 
points to potential therapeutic interventions that aim to increase goal-directed control (such as 
motivational interviewing) and alter the anticipated outcomes of alcohol use. 
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Chapter 4. Study 3  
This chapter has been published as the following: Bernhardt*, N., Nebe*, S., Pooseh, S., 
Sebold, M., Sommer, C., Birkenstock, J., Zimmermann, U. S., Heinz, A., & Smolka, M. N. 
(in press). Impulsive decision making in young adult social drinkers and detoxified alcohol-
dependent patients: A cross-sectional and longitudinal study. Alcoholism: Clinical and 
Experimental Research. 
 
4.1 Abstract  
Background: Impulsive decision making relates to problematic substance use. 
Specifically, altered delay discounting has been suggested as a behavioral marker for 
addiction, while other relevant facets of choice impulsivity such as probability discounting or 
loss aversion are clearly understudied.  
Methods: Two studies were performed collecting behavioral data on choice impulsivity 
with a value-based decision-making battery providing estimates of delay discounting, 
probability discounting for gains and losses, and loss aversion. Study 3.1) In a sample of 198 
male 18-year-old social drinkers, we analyzed impulsive choice behavior and its association 
with alcohol consumption and self-report measures of substance use related personality traits 
on a cross-sectional level. Additionally, the predictive value of baseline choice behavior for 
the trajectories of alcohol consumption over a 12-month follow-up period was evaluated. 
Study 3.2) Behavioral data on choice impulsivity was collected for 114 detoxified patients 
with alcohol use disorder (AUD) and 98 control participants. We analyzed group differences 
at baseline and assessed the predictive value of choice impulsivity for relapse to heavy 
alcohol use in patients during a follow-up period of 48 weeks. 
Results: Study 3.1) Only delay discounting was associated with baseline alcohol use, but 
no measure of choice impulsivity predicted the drinking trajectories over the following 12 
months. Study 3.2) Compared to the control group, AUD patients showed higher delay 
discounting, lower risk aversion regarding probabilistic gains, lower risk seeking regarding 
probabilistic losses, and lower loss aversion facing mixed prospects. Further, shallow 
discounting of probabilistic losses at baseline was predictive for relapse in patients. 
Conclusions: All four domains of impulsive decision making were considerably altered 
in AUD patients though mostly not related to alcohol use in young-adult social drinkers. This 
suggests that these facets of impulsive behavior may develop as consequences of chronic 
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alcohol consumption. Furthermore, discounting of probabilistic losses might prove valuable in 
identifying patients vulnerable for relapse. 
 
4.2 Introduction 
Biased decision making is fundamental to several neuropsychiatric disorders such as 
SUDs (Redish et al., 2008), eating disorders (Amlung, Petker, Jackson, Balodis, & 
MacKillop, 2016), and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Jackson & MacKillop, 2016), 
and also to self-regulation and health behavior in general (Story et al., 2014). In SUDs, drug 
consumption can be considered an impulsive choice for a highly probable immediate 
outcome, e.g. hedonic experience, peer bonding, pain or stress relief, on the possible expense 
of long-term health, social, and financial benefits. Choice impulsivity includes two aspects of 
the definition of impulsivity: lack of planning and lack of regard for future consequences 
(Peters & Büchel, 2011). Every-day choices usually include time and/or risk factors. In line, 
Weafer, Baggott, and de Wit (2013) categorized laboratory measures of choice impulsivity to 
quantify either an individual's preference for smaller sooner rewards over larger later rewards 
(Delay Discounting; DD) or their proclivity for smaller, certain outcomes over larger less 
certain ones (Probability Discounting; PD).   
DD refers to the systematic decrease in the subjective value of a reinforcer as a function 
of delay to delivery (Rachlin & Green, 1972). Typically, individual parameters of DD are 
estimated by presenting a series of binary choices between a small but immediate reward and 
a larger reward available after some time. The subjective value of any amount-delay pair can 
be estimated and fitted to a discounting function (Mazur, 1987) where the subjective value 
(V) of an outcome of amount A obtained following delay D declines hyperbolically, and the 
degree of this devaluation is described by the discounting parameter k: 
 
[4]  𝑉 = A/(1 + kD) 
 
 High k values reflect steep discounting of delayed outcomes and, therefore, a tendency 
to favor immediate options, which is considered impulsive. These nonlinear changes in 
subjective value have been implied to reflect key aspects of the clinical phenomenology 
among individuals with AUD such as the behavioral manifestation to repeatedly choose the 
immediate but brief rewards of intoxication despite the knowledge of negative future 
consequences (Dick et al., 2010). Accordingly, numerous studies have shown higher DD in 
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individuals with higher levels of alcohol abuse and dependence (see Bickel, Koffarnus, 
Moody, & Wilson, 2014; MacKillop et al., 2011, p. 2011). Further, steep DD has been 
associated with earlier onset of AUD symptoms (Dom, D’haene, Hulstijn, & Sabbe, 2006) 
and has been identified as a predictor for drug relapse following treatment for a range of 
substances (see Bickel et al., 2014; Sheffer et al., 2014; L. Stevens et al., 2015). Yet, only a 
few studies have addressed the question whether DD is predictive for relapse to alcohol use 
following detoxification in AUD patients (de Wilde, Verdejo-García, Sabbe, Hulstijn, & 
Dom, 2013; Rupp et al., 2016) and no significant associations have been reported so far. 
Similar to DD, PD can be assessed through repeated offers of smaller certain and larger 
probabilistic outcomes systematically varying the reward amount or probability of receiving it 
(Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991). Analogous to [4], Equation [5] can be used to evaluate the 
degree of discounting probabilistic gains or losses, 
 
[5]  V = A/(1 + kθ) 
 
with θ being the odds against the event of winning or losing, respectively. Independent 
from the valence of the outcome, risk aversion is the tendency to choose the certain option 
while risk seeking behavior means the opposite. Commonly, people have been found to be 
risk averse facing choices for gains according to the saying “A bird in the hand is worth two 
in the bush”. Such a preference for certain rewards is reflecting steep discounting of 
probabilistic gains and, thus, high k values. In contrast, high k values reflecting steep 
discounting of probabilistic losses represent the tendency to favor probabilistic choices and 
evidence from empirical data suggests a general bias towards risk seeking when engaging 
losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
Diverging from the common choice tendency in the general population by being risk 
seeking for probabilistic gains is considered as impulsive (Green & Myerson, 2013). 
However, the interpretation of choice tendencies regarding probabilistic losses in the context 
of impulsivity is less clear (Green & Myerson, 2013), rendering analyses in cohorts of high 
impulsive individuals like AUD patients valuable.  
In contrast to DD, only few studies have addressed associations of PD with alcohol use 
and findings have been inconsistent: For probability discounting for gains (PDG), reduced 
risk aversion was reported for every-day drinkers compared to non- or light drinkers (Ida & 
Goto, 2009), while other studies showed no association with drinking frequency (Takahashi, 
Ohmura, Oono, & Radford, 2009) and no differences between alcohol-dependent participants 
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and matched controls (Myerson, Green, Berk-Clark, & Grucza, 2015). For probability 
discounting for losses (PDL), the very limited research so far suggests no associations to the 
frequency of alcohol consumption in a healthy participant sample (Takahashi et al., 2009) and 
to our knowledge no investigations in patients have been reported, yet. 
The above-mentioned gain-loss distinction in the common choice tendencies (risk 
aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses, i.e. the “reflection effect”, Kahnemann & 
Tversky, 1979) might be understood from an evolutionary perspective: only few positive 
experiences (e.g. food) offer a significant additional advantage to justify taking a risk to gain 
even more and thereby risking to get nothing at all, but taking a risk to avoid a single negative 
experience (e.g. predators) may be essential for survival (McDermott, Fowler, & Smirnov, 
2008). Prospect theory, the most successful behavioral model of decision-making under risk, 
explains these risk attitudes based on the evaluation of losses relative to gains, called “mixed 
prospects”, and introduces the concept of loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Loss 
aversion characterizes the tendency to weight the absolute value of losses higher (on average 
twice as high) as the absolute value of gains when comparing a loss and a gain directly with 
each other. To evaluate the individual weighting of mixed prospects in experimental settings 
and estimate the behavioral measure of loss aversion, repeated choices to accept or reject a 
50/50% gamble of gaining one amount or losing another amount, have been used in 
combination with a simple linear model (Tom et al., 2007).  
 
[6]  V = 1/2 (G − λL) 
 
The behavioral measure of loss aversion (λ) is computed as the ratio of the contribution 
of the loss magnitude L and that of the gain magnitude G to the subject's decision. High 
values of λ reflect a high degree of loss aversion. Although loss aversion has been well 
described in healthy populations, little research exists in individuals with AUDs. So far, one 
study reported lower loss aversion in alcohol-dependent patients (Brevers et al., 2014) and a 
relationship of low loss aversion to high impulsivity has been suggested (Ernst et al., 2014).  
It is likely that the cognitive processes involved in choice impulsivity are important 
during several stages of AUD, including initiation and increase of alcohol use, progression to 
AUD, seeking and completing treatment, and maintaining abstinence. However, recent studies 
have emphasized inconsistencies in prior findings, and facets of choice behavior and their 
association to different stages of AUD remain understudied. This stresses the importance of 
longitudinal studies to understand how maladaptive patterns of choice behavior develop and 
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persist, which is critical to identify mechanisms of disease etiology and advancing 
interventions.  
We here report four different facets of impulsive decision making - delay discounting, 
probability discounting for gains, probability discounting for losses, and loss aversion - in 
relation to alcohol use and AUD. In Study 3.1, we investigated a sample of social-drinking 
young male adults, of which some are likely at risk of developing hazardous alcohol use. We 
examined cross-sectional associations between behavioral choice impulsivity, self-reported 
personality measures, and patterns of alcohol consumption. Further, we investigated the 
potential predictive value of baseline choice parameters for trajectories of drinking behavior 
over a 12-month follow-up interval. In Study 3.2, we assessed differences in choice 
impulsivity in a group of recently detoxified AUD patients compared to matched control 
subjects. We analyzed the predictive value of individual decision-making parameters 
following detoxification for relapse to heavy drinking over a 48-weeks follow-up interval. 
 
4.3 Study 3.1 
4.3.1 Material and methods 
4.3.1.1 Participants 
Participant data was collected within the bicentric longitudinal study on Learning and 
Alcohol Dependence (LeAD; www.lead-studie.de) conducted in Berlin and Dresden. This 
study examines mechanisms relevant for the development and maintenance of AUD with a 
variety of self-report, behavioral, and fMRI measures. Thus, general exclusion criteria were a 
history of or current neurologic or mental disorders except for nicotine dependence according 
to DSM-IV-TR (Saß et al., 2003), MRI contraindications (history of severe head trauma, 
epilepsy, brain or heart surgery, non-removable metal objects or implants in or on 
participant’s body, permanent makeup or tattoos on head or neck, claustrophobia), left-
handedness, and no normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The study protocol was approved 
by the corresponding ethics committees. All subjects gave written informed consent prior to 
taking part and received a monetary compensation for participation. 
Study 1 was conducted with healthy social-drinking young adults, hereafter referred to 
as Sample 1 (ClinicalTrials.gov identifier: NCT01744834). Participants were randomly 
sampled from the population of 18-year-old men by the respective local registration office. 
Women were not included due to their comparatively lower risk of problematic alcohol use 
(Pabst & Kraus, 2008; Wittchen et al., 2011). Participants were allowed to have a diagnosis of 
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alcohol abuse according to DSM-IV-TR and had to have had at least two drinking occasions 
in the past three months. Applying this and general exclusion criteria as mentioned above 
resulted in a sample of 201 participants from which three had to be excluded after assessment 
due to screening failure (one subject fulfilled criteria for alcohol dependence, two were 
abstinent from alcohol in the past three months). Criteria were used to acquire data of social 
drinkers, of whom some may be at risk for the development of problematic drinking over the 
course of the following years, some may show stable patterns of alcohol consumption, and 
some may reduce their alcohol intake without intervention, but none would already have 
strong behavioral and neural alterations due to prolonged heavy alcohol misuse. 
 
 
Figure 10. Schematic overview of time course (Study 3.1 and 3.2) and tasks included in the value-based decision-making 
battery. Upper panel shows the time course of the study procedure. Black arrows indicate time points of follow-ups (FU) to 
assess drinking trajectories after baseline, where Sample 2 AUD patients (arrows) were regularly contacted and Sample 1 
participants (bold arrow) were contacted 12 months after baseline. Below that, the tasks in the computerized value-based 
decision-making battery to measure different facets of choice impulsivity is shown including delay discounting, probability 
discounting for gains and losses, and a mixed gambles task. 
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4.3.1.2 Measures 
Procedure 
At the baseline assessment, participants were first interviewed using the computer-based 
German CIDI (Jacobi et al., 2013; Wittchen & Pfister, 1997). This CIDI version includes an 
extended alcohol section, wherein we collected information about participants’ alcohol 
consumption (Table 5). Baseline drinking data of Sample 1 have previously been used in 
another publication concerning the association of goal-directed and habitual control with 
alcohol consumption (Study 1). Next, participants completed several self-report 
questionnaires about drinking motives, alcohol expectancies, obsessive-compulsive drinking, 
impulsivity and personality, nicotine dependence, traumatic events, depression and anxiety. 
These included the BIS-15 (Meule et al., 2011) and the SURPS (Woicik et al., 2009) to assess 
impulsivity and substance-use related personality traits (i.e. anxiety sensitivity, hopelessness, 
sensation seeking). At the end of the baseline session, impulsive choice was assessed 
employing a VBDM battery (Pooseh, Bernhardt, Guevara, Huys, & Smolka, 2017). Twelve 
months after the baseline assessment, follow-up data (FU12) was collected employing a 
shortened version of the CIDI via telephone and an online module containing questionnaires 
(same as baseline). 
 
Value-based decision-making battery 
The battery contained four independent tasks: 1) DD to measure the discounting 
parameter kD, 2) PDG and 3) PDL to measure the discounting parameter kʘ for gains and 
losses, respectively, and 4) a mixed-gambles task (MG) to measure the degree of loss aversion 
λ. All tasks were designed in the established format of binary choice presentation. Participants 
repeatedly had to decide for one of two offers presented simultaneously on a computer screen 
(Figure 10). Offers were randomly assigned to the left or to the right of the screen. For each 
trial, the participant’s choice was indicated with a red frame before presenting the next offer. 
There was no time limit for responses and no feedback about the outcomes of choices during 
the experiment. For each task, subjects were informed that at the end of the experiment one 
trial was to be selected randomly and credited to their compensation according to their choice. 
Task parameters were set as follows: for DD, delays were set to the values of 3, 7, 14, 31, 61, 
180, and 365 days. Monetary rewards ranged from 0.30 to 10 €. For PDG and PDL, possible 
probability values were set to 2/3, 1/2, 1/3, 1/4, and 1/5. Amounts ranged from 0.30 to 10 € in 
PDG and -0.30 to -10 € in PDL. For the MG task, amounts ranged from 1 to 40 € for gains 
and -5 to -20 € for losses. At the beginning of the task, subjects received 10 € “house money”. 
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Task length for DD, PDG, and PDL was 30, for MG 40 trials. The experiments were 
presented using Matlab Release 2010a (The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United 
States.) and the Psychtoolbox 3.0.10 based on the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). 
To provide behavioral estimates, a trial-by-trial adaptive Bayesian approach for binary 
choice presentation was used (Pooseh et al. 2017). The main advantage of this approach is its 
isochronous adaptive nature. After each trial, the individual choice parameter is estimated and 
informs the options in the next trial, thus providing the most informative offers near the 
individual indifference point. This procedure allows for a very efficient inference of 
behavioral parameters, which are immediately available rendering post hoc parameter 
inference unnecessary. In addition, the employed implementation supports controlling for 
unsystematic, illogical data, or simple strategies like always picking the immediate outcome, 
which could then be considered to be treated as outliers. For a detailed description of the 
mathematical framework, see Pooseh et al. (2017), and for incorporated differences compared 
to the task versions used here, see Supporting Information. Differences in the priors of the 
Bayesian algorithms and the range of monetary outcomes led to generally lower estimates of 
behavioral parameters in our versions of the tasks. Given that behavioral estimates were 
assessed with this new approach, the distribution of parameter estimates over task progression 
was simulated prior to participant data collection to prove the successful implementation of 
the mathematical framework (Figure S 8-9). Behavioral parameter estimates across all 
sampled participants converged well and yielded stable final estimates of choice behavior 
(Figure S 10). 
 
Data analysis 
Analyses were done using SPSS (IBM Corp. Released 2013, IBM SPSS Statistics for 
Windows, Version 22.0. Armonk, NY: IBM Corp). Normal distribution of data was tested 
using Shapiro Wilk tests and visual inspection of Q-Q-plots. Since most variables did not 
conform to a normal distribution, reported correlations are Spearman’s ρ. The corresponding 
p-values of correlations were computed via Monte Carlo sampling methods with a confidence 
level of 99% and 10,000 samples. The significance level for all analyses was set to α ≤ .05 
(two-tailed) with False Discovery Rate (FDR) correction (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) to 
account for multiple comparisons for each tested hypothesis.  
Baseline analyses included correlation of VBDM parameters with alcohol consumption, 
and measures of personality (BIS-15, SURPS). A composite score (DrinkscoreBL) was 
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computed from z-standardized CIDI alcohol consumption items (i.e. estimated alcohol 
consumption in past year per day, alcohol consumption in past year per drinking occasion, 
number of binge-drinking events lifetime, and alcohol intake per binge-drinking event). We 
used a multiple linear regression model to predict the DrinkscoreBL with VBDM parameters as 
independent variables. For longitudinal analyses, we computed difference scores subtracting 
baseline from follow-up data for all measures of drinking behavior, which were then used to 
assess the predictive value of VBDM parameters for changes in alcohol consumption over 
time. Additionally, we built a hierarchical linear regression model adding the BIS-15 
subscales as predictors and in a second to fifth step the VBDM parameters separately to 
examine incremental validity of the VBDM parameters. 
 
4.3.2 Results 
4.3.2.1 Sample description 
Sample data are presented in Table 5. The group of young adults was rather well 
educated (Mdn = 12 school years). They reported consumption of alcohol with a median of 1 
to 3 drinking occasions per month and 75.3% reported having had at least one binge-drinking 
event in their life (consumption of at least 60 g alcohol on one occasion). Applying criteria for 
health risk of alcohol consumption published by the World Health Organization (World 
Health Organization, 2000) for comparative research purposes, this sample has to be 
characterized as follows: regarding average alcohol intake per day in the past year, 96.0% 
have to be characterized as having low-risk (1-40 g), 2.5% as having medium-risk (41-60 g), 
and 1.5% as having high-risk (61+ g) alcohol consumption; regarding alcohol intake on a 
single drinking occasion in the past year, 21.7% fall into the low-risk (1-40 g), 30.8% in the 
medium-risk (41-60 g), 29.8% in the high-risk (61-100 g), and 17.6% in the very-high-risk 
category (101+ g). In conclusion, most participants had rather few drinking occasions but, 
when having one, average consumption on that occasion differed greatly between 
participants. Due to technical issues, behavioral data were missing for four (DD), six (PDG), 
two (PDL), and seven (MG) participants, respectively. All participants completed the VBDM 
battery within 20 minutes (M = 16 min 20 sec, SD = 4 min 23 sec), including computerized 
instructions, offer presentation, algorithmic parameter estimation, and pay-out presentation. 
Behavioral VBDM estimates are given in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics of sociodemographic data, behavioral measures of decision making, questionnaire scores, and 
measures of alcohol consumption at baseline, 12-month follow up, and their difference in Sample 1. 
     Sample 1 (N=198) 
  Gender ♂: 198 
  Smokers (%) 17.20 
    n mean SD 
  Age (years) 1 198 18.38 0.20 
  
        
V
B
D
M
 DD log(k) 1 194 -4.63 2.22 
PDG log(k) 1  192 -0.49 1.04 
PDL log(k) 1 196 -0.82 1.63 
MG log(λ) 1 191 0.32 0.81 
  
        
B
IS
-1
5 
A 1 195 8.81 1.93 
M 1 196 10.17 2.36 
NP 1 196 11.28 2.79 
Sum score 195 30.29 5.20 
         
S
U
R
P
S
 AS 
1 196 10.57 2.26 
H 1 196 11.90 2.76 
IMP 1 196 9.94 1.98 
SS 1 195 16.42 3.11 
  
        
B
as
el
in
e 
Age of 1st drink 1 198 14.29 1.37 
Age of 1st time drunk 1 190 15.74 1.17 
Age of 1st binge-drinking event 1 142 16.50 0.81 
Est. alcohol consumption in past year (g alc/day) 1 198 12.01 13.97 
Alcohol consumption in past year (g alc/drinking occasion) 1 198 70.45 43.38 
Number of binge-drinking events lifetime 1 190 14.91 24.86 
Alcohol intake per binge-drinking event in past year (g) 1 198 92.45 67.18 
DrinkscoreBL 
1 198 0.00 3.18 
  
        
F
U
12
 
Est. alcohol consumption in past year (g alc/day) 1 154 11.10 10.62 
Alcohol consumption in past year (g alc/drinking occasion) 1 154 61.20 42.43 
Number of binge-drinking events past year 1 155 10.28 19.59 
Alcohol intake per binge-drinking event in past year (g) 1 155 109.05 94.99 
DrinkscoreFU12 
1 155 -0.07 2.84 
          
Δ
 F
U
1
2
-B
L 
ΔEst. alcohol consumption in past year (g alc/day) 
1 154 -0.86 11.19 
ΔAlcohol consumption in past year (g alc/drinking occasion) 
1 154 -10.39 35.56 
ΔNumber of binge-drinking events past year 
1 148 1.30 18.00 
ΔAlcohol intake per binge-drinking event (g alc) 
1 155 14.06 85.63 
ΔDrinkscore 
1 155 -0.18 2.67 
Note: N occasionally differs from 198 for baseline and 155 for FU12 CIDI due to single missing data points. BIS-15 = 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, German short version, with subscales for attentional (A), motor (M), and nonplanning (NP) 
impulsiveness. SURPS = Substance Use Risk Profile Scale with subscales for AS = anxiety sensitivity; H = hopelessness; 
IMP = impulsivity; SS = sensation seeking. 
1 Shapiro Wilk Tests and visual inspection of Q-Q-plots implied non-normality of this measure (p<.05). 
 
4.3.2.2 VBDM and personality measures 
Correlation analysis between behavioral estimates and personality measures showed 
that steeper DD was associated with higher scores on the BIS-15 non-planning subscale (ρ = 
.216, p = .003) and the BIS-15 sum score (ρ = .189, p = .008; see Table S 15). In addition, we 
found a plausible association between lower loss aversion in the MG task with higher 
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sensation seeking scores (ρ = -.203, p = .004). No further correlation between VBDM 
parameters and BIS-15 and SURPS survived FDR correction for multiple comparisons. In 
addition, we explored the intercorrelations between VBDM parameters. We found an 
association between higher loss aversion and lower risk seeking regarding probabilistic losses 
(ρ = -.231, p = .001) after FDR correction. 
 
4.3.2.3 VBDM and baseline alcohol consumption 
Correlation analysis between behavioral estimates and measures of alcohol consumption 
showed that steep DD was associated with higher alcohol intake during a binge-drinking 
event (ρ = .205, p = .004; see Table S 15). No further baseline measure of alcohol 
consumption was significantly correlated with a VBDM parameter after FDR correction. 
Prediction of the composite DrinkscoreBL with all VBDM parameters showed a small but 
significant amount of explained variance (see Table 2; smallest value of tolerance in 
collinearity statistics .933 for MG) with DD constituting the only significant predictor (β = 
.211, p = .004; all other |β|s ≤ .112, ps ≥ .130). Beyond that, DrinkscoreBL prediction with the 
three BIS-15 subscales yielded a small but significant proportion of explained variance, and 
adding the VBDM parameters separately to this second regression model yielded a significant 
change in explained variance when entering DD (see Table 6; smallest value of tolerance in 
collinearity statistics .741 for BIS-15 non-planning) showing incremental validity of DD 
beyond self-reported impulsivity to explain drinking behavior. 
 
4.3.2.4 VBDM and drinking trajectories 
At FU12, we collected data about participants’ drinking behavior with the CIDI of 78% 
of Sample 1 (n = 155). With regard to baseline variables, no significant differences were 
found between participants reached and not reached (all ps ≥ .078). Comparing variables of 
alcohol consumption at baseline with the respective variable after the 12-month follow-up 
interval over the whole group, measures of drinking behavior did not change significantly 
with the exception of lower alcohol consumption per drinking occasion in the past year (exact 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests; Z = -3.55, p < .001; all other ps ≥ .095). But the descriptive 
within-subject differences of drinking variables for each participant revealed individual 
changes from baseline alcohol consumption for the majority of the sample: 33% reported 
greater average consumption per day in the past year (M = +6 g/day in comparison to baseline 
level, SD = 7 g) and 38% reported lower consumption (M = -7 g, SD = 11 g); regarding 
average consumption per drinking occasion at FU12 compared to baseline, 24% reported 
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greater consumption (M = +26 g alc/drinking occasion, SD = 20 g) and 44% reported lower 
consumption (M = -33 g, SD = 28 g); in regard to binge drinking, 31% reported more binge-
drinking events in the past year (M = +13, SD = 20), 33% reported less events (M = -9, SD = 
11), and, finally, 35% reported greater consumption per binge-drinking event (M = +72 
g/binge-drinking event, SD = 86 g) and 30% reported lower consumption (M = -48 g, SD = 
49 g). Changes in drinking behavior yielded no significant associations with any of the 
VBDM estimates (all ps ≥ .082; see Table 6). In line, prediction of the difference in the sum 
scores of drinking behavior (ΔDrinkscore) by the baseline decision-making parameters yielded 
no significant result (see Table 6; smallest value of tolerance in collinearity statistics .910 for 
MG). 
 
Table 6. Summary statistics of regression analyses predicting baseline drinking behavior and drinking trajectory over 12-
month follow up with behavioral VBDM estimates and self-reported impulsivity in Sample 1. 
Outcome Predictors adj. R² F change (df) p(F change) 
DrinkscoreBL multiple regression       
    DD log(k), PDG log(k), PDL log(k), MG log(λ)  .039 2.88 (4, 179) .024 
  hierarchical regression       
    BIS-15 A, M, NP .047 3.95 (3, 177) .009 
    + DD log(k) .067 4.86 (1, 176) .029 
    + PDG log(k)  .066 0.86 (1, 175) .354 
    + PDL log(k) .068 1.35 (1, 174) .247 
    + MG log(λ) .063 0.04 (1, 173) .840 
            
ΔDrinkscore multiple regression       
    DD log(k), PDG log(k), PDL log(k), MG log(λ)  -.020 0.29 (4, 139) .884 
Note. The effect of adding DD to the hierarchical regression is independent of the order of added predictors. DD = Delay 
Discounting.  BIS-15 = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, German short version, with subscales for attentional  (A), motor  (M) 
and non-planning (NP) impulsiveness . MG = Mixed Gambles. PDG = Probability Discounting for Gains. PDL = Probability 
Discounting for Losses. 
 
4.4 Study 3.2 
4.4.1 Material and methods 
4.4.1.1 Participants 
Study 3.2 was conducted with treatment-seeking alcohol-dependent patients and 
matched control participants hereafter referred to as Sample 2 (ClinicalTrials.gov identifier: 
NCT01679145). General exclusion criteria were the same as in Study 1. This sample 
consisted of 114 alcohol-dependent patients (16% female) and 98 matched control 
participants (17% female). Control participants were sought via advertisements in the area of 
the Universitätsklinikum Dresden and Campus Charité Mitte and in newspapers. Interested 
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persons were screened for the inclusion and exclusion criteria and matched with the patient 
group for age, gender, smoking status, and educational background. Patients had a diagnosis 
of alcohol dependence for a minimum of three years and had gone through detoxification 
procedures on average four times (SD 4.5; range 1-20). At time of testing, patients were 
abstinent from alcohol on average 17 days (SD = 10 d; range 4-50 d), showed no signs of 
alcohol withdrawal (CIWA (Stuppaeck et al., 1994), score ≤ 3), and had a result of zero in a 
breath-alcohol test. Patients were followed up for 48 weeks. They were contacted (alternating 
phone and personal appointments) every 2 weeks for 3 months, then again 24, 36 and 48 
weeks after baseline assessment (Figure 10). We assessed relapse to heavy drinking defined 
as consumption of ≥ 60/48 (male/female) gram of alcohol in one drinking occasion and the 
amount of alcohol consumption using the Timeline Follow-Back (Sobell & Sobell, 1992). In 
addition, we verified the relapse status of patients with their PEth levels at the follow-up 
assessments after 12 and 24 weeks. A value of 112ng/ml or higher was set as cut-off marker 
for heavy drinking (Schröck, Wurst, Thon, & Weinmann, under review). Phosphatidylethanol 
levels were only acquired for 58 and 64 patients at follow up after 12 and 24 weeks, 
respectively, due to temporary drop out for these time points (n = 41 and n = 37, respectively) 
and organizational constraints. Twelve patients were classified as relapsers despite their self-
reported abstinence due to increased PEth blood levels at least at one of the follow-up 
assessments. Three of those twelve patients were drop outs at the last follow-up assessment. 
At the end of the follow-up interval after 48 weeks, we had reached 75% (n = 85) of the 
patients. Furthermore, there were two patients classified as abstainers who consumed alcohol 
during the follow-up interval (two and six standard drinks, respectively, over 48 weeks) but 
never reached the critical threshold for relapse of at least five drinks on one occasion. 
 
4.4.1.2 Measures 
The procedure of assessment, CIDI, and the VBDM tasks were the same as in Study 1. 
In addition, the severity of alcohol dependence was assessed using the ADS (Horn et al., 
1984). Current alcohol craving was assessed with the OCDS-G (Mann & Ackermann, 2002). 
Additionally, symptoms of Anxiety and Depression were assessed with the Hospital Anxiety 
and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983). 
 
4.4.1.3 Data analysis 
Survival analyses were done with the survival package (version 2.38-3; Therneau, 2015; 
Therneau & Grambsch, 2000) implemented in R (version 3.2.2; R Development Core Team, 
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2008). Group comparisons between patients and controls were performed using non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U-tests. Analysis of relapse prediction over 48 weeks was done 
with two analytical strategies: first, with a Cox proportional-hazard regression model using 
VBDM parameters as covariates to investigate the continuous relationship between hazard for 
relapse and behavioral decision making, and second, with exact Mann-Whitney U-tests 
comparing prospective relapsers and abstainers. Additionally, we tested the associations of 
alcohol dependence severity (ADS), obsessive-compulsive drinking and craving (OCDS-G), 
anxiety (HADS-A) and depression scores (HADS-D) on time to relapse using Cox regression 
with the VBDM parameters and those four covariates included. VBDM parameters and 
covariates were z-standardized before being entered in the Cox regression model for better 
interpretability and comparability of the hazard ratios. 
 
4.4.2 Results 
4.4.2.1 Sample description 
Sample data are presented in Table 7. Groups did not differ in gender distribution, mean 
age, and proportion of current smokers but in SES. Due to technical issues, data for DD, 
PDG, and MG was missing for three and for PDL for two control participants. Participants 
completed the VBDM battery on average within 20 minutes (M = 18 min 32 sec, SD = 4 min 
21 sec). There were neither statistical differences between groups in the time needed for 
battery completion (t(184) = 1.74, p = .083) nor in the median deliberation time before 
making a decision in any of the four tasks (DD: controls M = 3.6±1 s, patients M = 3.7±1.3 s, 
t(202)= -.641, p = .409; PDG: controls M = 2.5±0.9 s, patients M = 2.5±1 s, t(204) = .055, p = 
.956; PDL: controls M = 2.5±1.1 s, patients M = 2.3±1.2 s, t(202) = .917, p = .360; MG: 
controls M = 1.8±0.7 s, patients M = 1.7±0.7 s, t(206) = -.399, p = .690). 
 
4.4.2.2 VBDM in patients vs. control participants at baseline 
Correlations between VBDM measures, personality measures, and alcohol consumption 
for patients and control participants can be found in Table S 16. Group comparisons between 
patients and controls showed significant differences in all four behavioral measures of 
VBDM: higher delay discounting (Cohen’s d = 0.45), lower risk aversion regarding gains (d = 
0.46), lower risk seeking regarding losses (d = 0.44), and lower loss aversion (d = 0.61) in 
patients compared to control participants (Figure 11, Table 7). These group differences were 
still significant when controlling for SES (all adj. R²s > .022, all Fs > 5.088, all ps < .025) and 
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smoking status (all adj. R²s > .029, all Fs > 6.209, all ps < .013) in separate univariate 
ANOVAs. 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics of sociodemographic data, behavioral measures of choice impulsivity, questionnaire scores, 
and measures of alcohol consumption in Sample 2. 
     Sample 2 (N=212) 
    Alcohol-dependent patients   Healthy controls   Statistical difference   
    (n=114)   (n=98)   
test 
value 
p 
Sex ♀: 18; ♂: 96   ♀: 17; ♂: 81   0.09 a .853 e 
Smokers (%) 76.3   65.3   3.12 a .094 e 
 
  n mean SD   n mean SD       
Age (years) 1 114 44.77 10.56   98 43.75 10.86   -0.87 b .388 e 
SES1 113 -0.15 0.67   93 0.20 0.64   -3.67 b <.001 e 
HADS-A 1 114 4.42 3.43   97 2.34 2.10   -4.74 b <.001 e 
HADS-D 1 114 3.79 3.68   97 1.79 2.25   -4.48 b <.001 e 
                       
V
B
D
M
 DD log(k) 
1 114 -3.17 3.53   95 -4.40 2.98   -3.15 
b .002 e 
PDG log(k) 1 114 -1.14 2.52   95 -0.30 1.87   -3.21 
b .001 e 
PDL log(k) 1 114 -1.73 2.79   96 -0.67 2.62   -3.09 
b .002 e 
MG log(λ) 1 114 -0.43 1.24   95 0.13 1.25   -4.21 
b <.001 e 
                      
B
IS
-1
5 
A 1 108 9.23 2.62   96 8.56 2.16   -1.80 b .071 e 
M 1 109 10.30 2.58   97 9.66 2.32   -1.90 b .058 e 
NP 1 108 11.93 3.32   97 10.97 3.17   -1.94 b .053 e 
Sum 107 31.53 6.62   96 29.14 5.67   -2.76 c .006 
  
                      Est. alcohol consumption in past 
year (g alc/day) 1 
114 177.78 137.68   98 11.23 13.07   -11.68 b <.001 e 
Alcohol consumption in past year (g 
alc/drinking occasion) 1 
114 206.92 125.94   98 42.80 31.92   -11.68 b <.001 e 
Number of binge-drinking events 
lifetime 1 
104 496.63 428.08   95 70.71 161.14   -8.16 b <.001 e 
Alcohol intake per binge-drinking 
event in past year (g alc) 1 
114 276.95 157.37   98 93.21 92.61   -10.21 b <.001 e 
Cumulated lifetime alcohol intake 
(kg alc) 1d 
114 1749.1 1096.0   98 284.45 810.35   -11.36 b <.001 e 
                       DSM-IV Abuse symptoms 1 114 1.46 1.19   98 0.09 0.32   - - 
DSM-IV Dependence symptoms 1 108 5.65 1.27   98 0.43 0.90   - - 
DSM-V AUD symptoms 1 108 7.58 2.18   98 0.53 1.07   - - 
                       ADS sum score 1 113 14.69 6.74   98 1.86 2.83   -11.88 b <.001 e 
OCDS-G total score 1 109 11.81 8.36   97 2.64 2.84   -9.28 b <.001 e 
Note: N occasionally differs from 212 due to single missing data points. Bold printed values survive Benjamini-Hochberg 
FDR correction. Socioeconomic status (SES) was computed as the sum of z-transformed social status, household income and 
inverse personal debt scores (Garbusow et al., 2015; Schmidt, Gastpar, Falkai, & Gäbel, 2006). ADS = Alcohol Dependence 
Scale. BIS-15 = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, German short version, with subscales for attentional (A), motor (M) and 
nonplanning (NP) impulsiveness. DD = Delay Discounting. HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale with subscales 
for anxiety (A) and depression (D). MG = Mixed Gambles. OCDS-G = Obsessive Compulsive Drinking Scale, German 
version. PDG = Probability Discounting for Gains. PDL = Probability Discounting for Losses. 
1 Shapiro-Wilk test implied non-normal distribution of this measure (p<.05). 
a Pearson χ2 (Exact χ2 test) 
b Z (Exact Mann-Whitney U-test) 
c t (t-test) 
d Prior to detoxification in alcohol-dependent patients 
e exact p-value calculated with permutation test 
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Figure 11. Group comparisons for behavioral estimates of choice impulsivity between AUD patients and control participants 
(Study 3.2). All four facets are found to differ significantly between the groups. AUD patients (white) showed higher 
discounting rates in DD, lower discounting rates in PDG and PDL, and lower loss aversion than control participants (grey). 
DD = delay discounting, PDG = probability discounting for gains, PDL = probability discounting for losses, MG = Mixed 
Gambles task. ** p < .01, *** p <.001 
 
4.4.2.3 VBDM and relapse prediction 
Of the 85 AUD patients we had reached for the final follow-up assessment after 48 weeks, 
32% (n = 27) remained abstinent while 68% (n = 58) relapsed (see Table 8 for descriptive 
statistics and group comparisons and Figure 12 for the Kaplan-Meier survival plot) 3. Patients 
we reached did not differ significantly from those we did not reach regarding the variables 
reported in Table 8 (Mann-Whitney U-tests, all Zs ≤ |1.70|, all ps ≥ .091). We tested whether 
VBDM parameters were associated with the risk to relapse with Cox proportional-hazard 
regression models with the complete sample of patients (N = 114; n = 45 abstainers, n = 69 
relapsers). The Cox regression model was overall significant (see Table 9) and fulfilled the 
assumption of proportional hazards (χ²(4) = 4.41, p = .353). The covariates DD and PDL were 
significant predictors of relapse in this regression model (but note that the regression 
coefficients of DD increased over time, did not fulfill the assumption of proportional hazards 
over the observation period, and, thus, must be interpreted with caution; Spearman’s ρ = .23, 
p = .041). The other two VBDM parameters were not significantly associated with relapse 
(see Table 9). Exact Mann-Whitney U-tests comparing abstainers and relapsers corroborated 
the finding regarding PDL by showing significantly lower risk seeking for losses in 
prospective relapsers (see Table 8) in the subgroup of patients completing the follow-up 
interval, while there were no significant differences in the other VBDM parameters (see Table 
                                                 
3 Numbers of abstaining and relapsing patients differ from Study 2 due to different sample sizes completing the 
behavioral paradigms (Two-Step in Study 2 and VBDM battery in Study 3), and the inclusion of PEth 
information to classify relapsers here and information from relatives to classify relapsers in Study 2. 
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8). Interestingly, a post hoc exact Mann-Whitney U-test revealed no significant difference 
between controls and abstainers for PDL (Z = -0.70, p = .490). 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics of sociodemographic data, behavioral measures of choice impulsivity, questionnaire scores, 
and measures of alcohol consumption in the patients of Sample 2 compared between abstainers and relapsers during the 48-
week follow-up interval. 
    Abstaining patients   Relapsing patients   Statistical difference   
    (n=27)   (n=58)   test value p 
Sex ♀: 7; ♂: 20    ♀: 7; ♂: 51   2.57 a .126 d 
Smokers (%) 74.1   75.5   0.03 a >.999 d 
 
  n M SD   n mean SD       
Age (years) 27 44.14 13.06   58 46.03 10.22   -0.82 b .415 d 
SES 27 -0.17 0.60   57 -0.14 0.66   -0.59 b .559 d 
HADS-A 27 4.22 2.74   58 4.57 3.58   -0.11 b .915 d 
HADS-D 27 3.56 2.94   58 4.09 4.03   -0.05 b .964 d 
                       
V
B
D
M
 DD log(k) 27 -2.85 3.01   58 -3.49 3.61   -0.62 
b .539 d 
PDG log(k) 27 -0.88 2.06   58 -1.33 2.85   -1.76 
b .080 d 
PDL log(k) 27 -0.89 1.94   58 -2.27 2.92   -2.30 
b .021 d 
MG log(λ) 27 -0.24 0.96   58 -0.34 1.35   -0.63 
b .532 d 
                      
B
IS
-1
5 
A 26 8.81 2.55   56 9.50 2.43   -1.04 b .301 d 
M 27 9.70 2.38   56 10.71 2.59   -1.55 b .122 d 
NP 27 11.41 3.57   55 12.18 3.08   -1.03 b .308 d 
Sum 26 30.19 6.85   55 32.40 6.00   -1.18 b .242 d 
  
                      Est. alcohol consumption in past 
year (g alc/day) 
27 160.11 97.45   58 174.87 122.50   -0.29 b .772 d 
Alcohol consumption in past year 
(g alc/drinking occasion) 
27 190.33 96.28   58 206.53 105.50   -0.63 b .532 d 
Number of binge-drinking events 
lifetime 
26 567.65 437.51   53 446.77 438.81   -1.04 b .301 d 
Alcohol intake per binge-
drinking event in past year (g alc) 
27 258.67 112.23   58 290.02 155.17   -0.66 b .516 d 
Cumulated lifetime alcohol 
intake (kg alc) c 
27 1677.32 1207.02   58 1893.29 1139.54   -0.88 b .385 d 
                       DSM-IV Abuse symptoms  27 1.22 1.05   58 1.69 1.22   -1.76 b .080 d 
DSM-IV Dependence symptoms 25 5.84 1.25   57 5.79 1.18   -0.27 b .784 d 
DSM-V AUD symptoms 25 7.72 1.97   57 7.93 2.12   -0.47 b .640 d 
                       ADS sum score 27 14.67 7.06   57 15.00 6.14   -0.35 b .733 d 
OCDS-G total score 26 11.27 8.04   56 10.95 7.61   -0.01 b .998 d 
Note: N occasionally differs from 27 and 58, respectively, due to single missing data points. Bold printed statistics survive 
Benjamini-Hochberg FDR correction. Socioeconomic status (SES) was computed as the sum of z-transformed social status, 
household income and inverse personal debt scores (Garbusow et al., 2015). ADS = Alcohol Dependence Scale. BIS-15 = 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, German short version, with subscales for attentional (A), motor (M) and nonplanning (NP) 
impulsiveness. DD = Delay Discounting. HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale with subscales for anxiety (A) and 
depression (D). MG = Mixed Gambles. OCDS-G = Obsessive Compulsive Drinking Scale, German version. PDG = 
Probability Discounting for Gains. PDL = Probability Discounting for Losses. 
a Pearson χ² (Exact χ² test) 
b Z (Exact Mann-Whitney U-test) 
c Prior to detoxification 
d exact p-value calculated with permutation test 
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Table 9. Summary statistics of Cox proportional hazards regression analyses predicting time to relapse with behavioral 
VBDM estimates, AUD severity, and scores of anxiety and depression in the patients of Sample 2. 
Model Predictors   R² χ² (df) p   HR 95% CI p 
Model 1   .11 12.65 (4) .013         
  DD log(k)           0.75 0.58-0.97 .029 
  PDG log(k)           0.87 0.68-1.12 .282 
  PDL log(k)           0.71 0.56-0.92 .008 
  MG log(λ)           0.92 0.71-1.18 .491 
                    Model 2 ADS   <.01 0.41 (1) .521 †   1.08 0.85-1.37 .518 
Model 3 OCDS-G   <.01 0.07 (1) .792 †   1.03 0.82-1.31 .791 
Model 4 HADS-A   .03 3.95 (1) .047 †   1.28 1.01-1.63 .041 
Model 5 HADS-D   .02 2.10 (1) .147   1.20 0.95-1.51 .136 
                    Model 6     .14 16.68 (8) .034         
  DD log(k)           0.76 0.58-1.00 .053 
  PDG log(k)           0.95 0.73-1.23 .686 
  PDL log(k)           0.67 0.51-0.88 .004 
  MG log(λ)           0.98 0.75-1.28 .902 
  ADS           1.11 0.80-1.55 .524 
  OCDS-G           0.86 0.64-1.16 .321 
  HADS-A           1.16 0.86-1.58 .331 
  HADS-D           1.15 0.85-1.55 .360 
Note. Bold printed statistics survive Benjamini-Hochberg FDR correction. ADS = Alcohol Dependence Scale (Skinner & 
Horn, 1984). DD = Delay Discounting. HADS = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) with 
subscales for anxiety (A) and depression (D). MG = Mixed Gambles. OCDS-G = Obsessive Compulsive Drinking Scale, 
German version (Mann & Ackermann, 2000). PDG = Probability Discounting for Gains. PDL = Probability Discounting for 
Losses. 
† Assumption of proportional hazards not met by this regression model (p<.05). 
 
In addition, we examined the association of alcohol dependence severity (ADS), 
obsessive-compulsive drinking and craving (OCDS-G), anxiety (HADS-A) and depression 
(HADS-D) with relapse rates and the stability of the aforementioned findings when 
integrating these clinically relevant variables as covariates in the relapse analysis. Therefore, 
we did additional Cox regression analyses: first, separate analyses for those four covariates to 
check for their association with relapse rates on their own, and second, adding these four 
covariates to the model with the VBDM parameters. First, although anxiety levels had a 
significant effect on relapse rates on their own (see Table 9), this model did not meet the 
assumption of proportional hazards over the whole follow-up period (regression coefficients 
decreasing over time; Spearman’s ρ = -.32, p = .016) and, thus, should not be interpreted. The 
other models did not yield significant effects (see Table 9). Second, the Cox regression model 
with all eight predictors was overall significant (see Table 9) and fulfilled the assumption of 
proportional hazards (χ²(8) = 13.12, p = .108). The covariate PDL was still a significant 
predictor of relapse, while DD was not anymore. Predictability of relapse by PDG and MG 
did not change. 
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Figure 12. Survival plot displaying treatment outcome in AUD patients (Study 3.2). From the last reported drinking occasion 
to the end of the follow-up period on average 48 weeks later, 32% of patients included in the study did not relapse to heavy 
drinking. Vertical lines indicating censored data (drop out or end of follow-up interval, respectively). 
 
4.5 Discussion 
We evaluated different behavioral measures of impulsive decision making in 1) social-
drinking young adults and 2) alcohol-dependent patients compared to control participants 
within a cross-sectional and longitudinal design. In Study 3.1, we found steeper delay 
discounting at baseline to be associated with more severe binge-drinking events in young 
adults, but neither delay nor probability discounting or loss aversion could predict changes of 
alcohol consumption in the one-year follow-up. In Study 3.2, we confirmed significantly 
higher rates of delay discounting in early abstinent AUD patients compared to controls. 
Moreover, patients showed lower rates of probability discounting for gains and losses as well 
as lower loss aversion. Finally, low rates of probability discounting for losses were found to 
predict relapse to heavy drinking within one year.  
DD rates in the young adult social-drinkers did explain baseline drinking behavior 
above and beyond aspects of self-reported impulsivity, indicating an association of DD with 
alcohol consumption that is at least partially independent from other facets of impulsivity. 
The strongest association of DD was found with the amount of alcohol consumed per binge-
drinking event, which is in line with the assumption that it is associated with alcohol abuse 
rather than simply alcohol use (MacKillop et al., 2011). In this non-clinical sample, neither 
PD, in line with a previous report (Takahashi et al., 2009), nor loss aversion was associated 
with alcohol consumption. Interestingly, associations between heavy, frequent binge-drinking 
and disadvantageous performance were found in the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) in young 
adults (Goudriaan, Grekin, & Sher, 2007). The IGT measures risk preferences and 
disadvantageous choices for immediate gains resulting in overall losses in the long run. Thus, 
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associations between drinking and the IGT might also be related to “myopia of choice” 
behavior reminiscent of delay discounting procedures and, therefore, in line with our results.  
DD rates at baseline did not predict future alcohol consumption in our young-adults 
sample. Contrary to this finding, Audrain-McGovern et al. (2009) reported an association 
between DD in 15-year-old participants and smoking trajectories over the following four 
years. Besides the fact that we investigated alcohol instead of tobacco consumption, this 
discrepancy could also be attributed to the different age of our subjects or the shorter 
observation time. For example, a recent study could predict alcohol consumption trajectories 
employing self-report measures over a four-year follow up but not for shorter timespans (Jurk, 
Mennigen, Goschke, & Smolka, 2016). An alternative explanation is the relative small 
observed difference in the pattern of alcohol consumption. Although individual changes in 
drinking behavior were substantial in some participants, others did not report any changes 
and, furthermore, reported changes were rather small in absolute values. However, our 
findings are in line with animal models of DD, illustrating predictive power for later drug 
self-administration for nicotine but not for alcohol (Diergaarde, van Mourik, Pattij, 
Schoffelmeer, & De Vries, 2012). Likewise, none of the behavioral measures of decision 
making under risk showed a predictive value for future drinking trajectories, which had not 
been addressed before but might corroborate the suggestion that not initial levels of risk 
taking but its increment over time may contribute to subsequent alcohol use in adolescence 
(MacPherson, Magidson, Reynolds, Kahler, & Lejuez, 2010).  
As anticipated, AUD patients were found to be more impulsive than control participants 
according to self-report (BIS) and steeper discounting of delayed monetary rewards. 
Additionally, AUD patients exhibited shallower discounting of probabilistic gains and losses 
compared to controls. Within the theoretical conceptualization of risk attitudes, a general bias 
towards risk taking in AUD patients is in line with reduced risk aversion for probabilistic 
gains, but cannot explain our observation of reduced risk seeking for losses. In contrast, a 
general bias to overestimate the likelihood of probabilistic outcomes could explain choice 
behavior for both probabilistic losses and gains. Such a bias would lead to overestimating the 
likelihood of a probabilistic gain and thus result in higher risk taking in PDG, which is 
generally considered a facet of impulsive choice behavior (Green & Myerson, 2013). The 
same bias, i.e. overestimating the likelihood of a probabilistic loss, would lead to less risk 
seeking in the PDL task and, thus, seemingly less impulsive choices from a risk-taking 
perspective. Given the increased impulsivity of patients in all other self-report and behavioral 
measures, we rather interpret the lower risk seeking regarding probabilistic losses that was 
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also associated with poorer treatment outcome, as impulsive choice tendency. Replication of 
our findings and further elaboration on this combination of risk and loss attitudes is clearly 
needed in a clinical context. 
Within non-clinical samples, measures of PDG and PDL were shown to be negatively 
correlated (Shead & Hodgins, 2009), though not always significantly so (Mitchell & Wilson, 
2010). This was interpreted as a general risk attitude independent from the valence of the 
outcome, that is, people being relatively more risk seeking for gains were assumed to also be 
relatively more risk seeking for losses. Considering the significantly lower discounting 
parameters for both PDG and PDL in patients compared to controls and the positive 
correlation between PDG and PDL in patients in relation to the negative correlation in control 
participants, we might suppose that behavioral preferences regarding gains and losses develop 
in different directions in the course of the manifestation of AUD. Though this is highly 
speculative, given that a gain-loss asymmetry is well-established (e.g. Estle, Green, Myerson, 
& Holt, 2006) and that differential neurobiological manifestations in distinct brain regions are 
activated in response to monetary gains and losses (Liu, Hairston, Schrier, & Fan, 2011), a 
divergent development is not implausible. Overall, our findings thus imply differences in 
impulsive choice within the gain and loss domain in patients and suggest alterations in the 
differential evaluation of gains and losses in AUD rather than in general risk attitudes.  
In line with previous findings for cocaine and alcohol users (Brevers et al., 2014; 
Meade, Young, Mullette-Gillman, Huettel, & Towe, 2014), AUD patients in our study 
exhibited significantly lower rates of loss aversion than controls. Again, this might represent 
higher levels of impulsivity and could be interpreted within the concept of reduced 
punishment sensitivity. Reduced punishment sensitivity in behavioral performance in SUDs 
has been shown repeatedly and a diminished neural response to monetary losses in the 
striatum and anterior cingulate cortices has been shown in neuroimaging studies (Bechara, 
Dolan, & Hindes, 2002; Beck et al., 2009; Bjork, Momenan, Smith, & Hommer, 2008; Wrase 
et al., 2007). Taken together, our findings regarding probability discounting and loss aversion 
could be explained by a general tendency to overestimate the probability of uncertain 
outcomes (both gains and losses in the probability discounting paradigms) as well as reduced 
punishment sensitivity (reduced loss aversion).  
Due to their importance as candidate behavioral markers for addiction, we further tested 
whether DD rates were predictive for relapse in the treatment of alcohol-dependent patients. 
A set of studies demonstrated such a relation for different drug-dependent populations such as 
nicotine and cocaine in the way that more impulsive patients showing steeper DD were more 
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likely to relapse (Bickel et al., 2014). Group comparisons between abstainers and relapsers in 
our study did not support such a relationship, while Cox regression analysis showed an 
association in the opposite direction of steeper DD being related to a decreased hazard for 
relapse. Additionally, the Cox regression model suggests a time-varying relationship between 
DD and abstinence in detoxified AUD patients, which hampers the interpretation of this 
finding. Taking these results, prior findings (de Wilde et al., 2013; Rupp et al., 2016) and the 
possibility of unpublished studies not demonstrating a relationship between DD and 
abstinence from alcohol (Bickel et al., 2014), rates of DD might not represent a reliable 
predictor for treatment success in AUD.  
To our knowledge, we were the first to investigate how behavioral measures of PDG, 
PDL, and loss aversion correlate with relapse to heavy drinking. We provide evidence for 
choice behavior involving probabilistic losses to discriminate patients relapsing to heavy 
drinking from abstinent patients, which show k values comparable to the control group (i.e. 
more risk seeking). Besides this categorical prediction, shallower discounting also predicted a 
greater hazard for relapse in our sample. Perhaps behavior in this choice paradigm was 
sensitive to predict relapse because it combines subjects’ attitudes towards risk (i.e. 
overestimating the likelihood of the uncertain loss) and towards losses (i.e. reduced 
punishment sensitivity), and showing alterations in both constructs makes patients more 
vulnerable for prospective relapse. This interpretation would also be in line with Green and 
Myerson’s (2013) hypothesis of multiple impulsivities, which could in combination increase 
the risk for certain pathologies. 
Present findings should be interpreted in the light of several limitations. We used a 
rather new mathematical approach to obtain behavioral estimates. That is why we examined 
properties of the paradigms themselves beyond the investigation of the relation between 
behavioral measures of VBDM and alcohol consumption. In line with previous results and 
indicating validity, we found that DD was selectively associated with self-reported trait 
impulsivity (convergent validity) but not with anxiety sensitivity, hopelessness, and sensation 
seeking (divergent validity; H. de Wit, Flory, Acheson, McCloskey, & Manuck, 2007; Koff & 
Lucas, 2011; Mobini, Grant, Kass, & Yeomans, 2007). Further, we employed a limited range 
and rather small values of monetary outcomes in all four tasks. Though clearly sufficient to 
illustrate group differences for AUD and control subjects on a cross-sectional level, 
longitudinal predictions might have been strengthened through enhanced conflict between 
choices involving winning or losing larger amounts of money. Next, AUD patients in this 
study were treatment-seeking, and therefore results may not reflect outcomes for the large 
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group of alcohol-dependent persons not seeking treatment. Likewise, our young adult sample 
did not include women hence impeding generalization of our findings. We might argue that 
this sample is more likely to include individuals at risk of the development of future AUD 
symptoms since women show decreased rates of alcohol abuse and dependence and 
differences in impulsivity (Nederkoorn, Baltus, Guerrieri, & Wiers, 2009). However, due to 
the small changes in alcohol consumption within the limited observation time in our 
longitudinal design, results must be interpreted carefully and extended observation of the 
development of drinking trajectories should be awaited. 
In conclusion, our findings suggest systematic alterations in different facets of 
impulsive choice behavior after chronic, heavy alcohol use. While supporting the notion of 
delay discounting as behavioral marker for AUD, confidence in its ability to prospectively 
predict alcohol consumption or treatment outcome remains weak. Meanwhile, impulsive 
choice behavior involving risks might undergo a developmental change that parallels alcohol 
consumption indicated by the robust alterations in alcohol-dependent patients and the 
suggested association to treatment outcome. Combining our results of both samples thereby 
indicates that the parameters of impulsive choice are less relevant as risk factors predisposing 
for alcohol consumption in healthy young adults and its trajectory over one year, but instead 
might rather be a consequence of prolonged risky drinking. Of course, our data does not 
conclusively rule out the possibility that there might be a subgroup of young-adult social 
drinkers, in which decision making could predict later onset of AUD symptoms. The ongoing 
longitudinal assessment of these subjects might shed light on this issue. Nevertheless, our 
findings may bear important clinical implications. They underline the importance of using 
neurocognitive measures when identifying high relapse risk patients in clinical populations 
and, more generally, stress the relevance of promoting treatment interventions targeting 
decision-making abilities. 
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Chapter 5. General discussion  
5.1 Summary of findings and discussion  
The three presented studies investigated the association between VBDM and alcohol 
use (disorder). In Study 1, we showed that model-free and model-based RL as 
operationalization of habitual and goal-directed behavioral control, respectively, were not 
related to alcohol consumption in young adult social drinkers on a behavioral and neural 
level, except for an exploratory finding of stronger BOLD responses to the model-free RPE in 
putamen in early-onset drinkers. In Study 2, we could not replicate our previous findings of 
the pilot study (Sebold et al., 2014) in a larger sample, that is, we did not find a difference in 
model-based strategies between AUD patients and control participants. However, we found 
that model-based control interacted with alcohol expectancies. Subsequently relapsing AUD 
patients showed high model-based control but low alcohol expectancies or vice versa, while 
model-based control and alcohol expectancy were positively correlated in abstaining patients. 
Furthermore, relapsing AUD patients showed decreased BOLD responses to the model-based 
signal in vmPFC compared to control participants and abstaining patients. In Study 3, we 
showed systematic differences in VBDM regarding delays, risks, and valence of monetary 
outcomes between AUD patients and control subjects, that is, AUD patients showed stronger 
delay discounting, were less risk averse in the gain domain, less risk seeking facing losses, 
and less loss averse. Moreover, individual levels of a risk-seeking tendency when facing 
losses were found to be predictive of relapse within one year. However, we did not find an 
association with alcohol consumption in general in young adult social drinkers on a cross-
sectional level and no predictive value for the change of alcohol consumption one year later.  
In summary, there was no indication of a general imbalance between goal-directed and 
habitual control in association with non-pathological alcohol consumption and AUD. This 
contrasts with the assumptions of current etiological models of AUD (Everitt & Robbins, 
2016; Redish et al., 2008) and adds to the mixed findings of previous studies (Gillan et al., 
2016; Reiter et al., 2016; Sebold et al., 2014; Sjoerds et al., 2013; Voon et al., 2014). In 
addition, choice biases regarding modulating features of option valuation – delay, risk, and 
valence – seem not to be predisposing factors for non-pathological alcohol consumption in 
young adults. On the contrary, all examined modulators were systematically altered in AUD, 
which is in line with previous reports for delays (MacKillop et al, 2011) and extends the 
literature considerably for the other three modulating features. These findings have sizable 
consequences for our current understanding of AUD and its etiology. 
 
 
98 
 
5.1.1 Goal-directed and habitual decision making and alcohol use (disorder) 
There was no indication that goal-directed and habitual decision making would be a 
predisposing risk factor for non-pathological alcohol use per se. Additional analyses yielded 
no significant association between measures of model-free and model-based control in the 
Two-Step task and drinking behavior twelve months after baseline assessment (see Appendix 
D). Furthermore, there were no general differences in these processes between AUD patients 
and control participants or abstaining and relapsing AUD patients. These findings do not 
support the assumption of a generalized shift from goal-directed to habitual decision making 
in AUD. This is puzzling given the widespread belief that SUDs must be at least partially a 
result of an emerging dominance of habitual behavioral control (e.g. Everitt & Robbins, 2016; 
Redish et al., 2008; Vandaele & Janak, 2017; Voon et al., 2017). Assuming our results would 
be replicated, this would speak against this common view. Consequently, the dual-system 
accounts proposing a shift from goal-directed to habitual behavioral control could be either 
abandoned, modified, or extended.  
Abandoning the dual-system accounts of SUD completely would be premature. There is 
some evidence for the control shift in the domain of cocaine and methamphetamine use 
disorders (Ersche et al., 2016; Voon et al., 2014) and most SUDs have often been assumed to 
comprise similar psychological and neurobiological mechanisms (Volkow & Baler, 2014) due 
to their common effects on dopaminergic signaling in the VTA and its innervated regions in 
striatum and PFC (Volkow et al., 2013). Furthermore, many investigations in rodent models 
of addiction have yielded supportive findings for the shift from goal-directed to habitual 
control when using drugs of abuse as outcomes  (e.g. Clemens et al., 2014; Corbit et al., 2012; 
Dickinson et al., 2002; Miles et al., 2003; Nordquist et al., 2007). However, as the translation 
of these findings to the domain of human AUD was rather unsuccessful so far, the validity of 
the animal findings for human behavioral control must be scrutinized. Indeed, it has been 
argued recently that rodent models of the shift of behavioral control related to drugs of abuse 
has exclusively examined habitization of reward-seeking behavior and neither habitual drug 
intake nor avoidance of aversive states (McKim, Shnitko, et al., 2016). This is an unfortunate 
shortcoming as the habitization of drug consumption is a crucial assumption of the learning 
account by Everitt and Robbins (2016) and other dual-system approaches and the avoidance 
of aversive states (e.g. withdrawal symptoms) has often been associated with SUDs (Koob, 
2013; Koob & Le Moal, 2001). Additionally, avoidance behavior has been shown to shift 
from goal-directed to habitual faster in obsessive-compulsive disorder patients than in control 
participants (Gillan et al., 2014), which is of interest because obsessive-compulsive disorder 
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has been shown to have many similarities with SUDs (Fontenelle, Oostermeijer, Harrison, 
Pantelis, & Yücel, 2011). Furthermore, human frontal cortical areas have expanded severely 
during evolution and this difference to the relative volume of rodent cortical areas might very 
well limit the comparability of rodent and human research (McKim, Shnitko, et al., 2016), 
especially regarding higher cognitive functions like goal-directed behavioral control that 
strongly depends on frontal cortical areas (Dolan & Dayan, 2013). Thus, the animal research 
that gave rise to Everitt and Robbins’ (2016) learning account needs to be extended to 
scrutinize its fundamental role for models of human SUDs, but the concerns not yet justify 
abandoning this theoretical approach altogether. 
Alternatively, the learning theory (Everitt & Robbins, 2016) could be modified instead 
of refuted. The most parsimonious alteration of the underlying theoretical model in 
consequence to our results would be to limit the assumed generalization of the shift in 
behavioral control beyond alcohol use. Indeed, while the evidence for a diminishment of goal-
directed control in reward-seeking behavior by alcohol consumption in procedures with 
alcohol outcomes is quite strong in the rodent literature (Corbit, Nie, & Janak, 2014; 
Dickinson et al., 2002; Lopez, Becker, & Chandler, 2014; Mangieri, Cofresí, & Gonzales, 
2012; Samson et al., 2004), the evidence for generalized, outcome-unspecific effects of 
alcohol intake is still sparse (Corbit et al., 2012). Moreover, it seems plausible that actual 
alcohol consumption in human AUD would be at least partially stimulus-evoked due to 
increased salience of alcohol cues on the one hand (as revealed by increased alcohol cue 
reactivity in AUD patients compared to healthy controls; Schacht, Anton, & Myrick, 2013) 
and automatic alcohol intake elicited by alcohol stimuli in AUD after numerous repetitions of 
this behavioral program on the other. However, empirical evidence for this habitual drug 
intake is still missing in the human domain. Yet, there is one descriptive finding in our AUD 
patient sample that hinted at a shift of control over alcohol intake from goal-directed to 
habitual. Interestingly, some of the AUD patients yielded the high score in the AEQ. Alcohol 
use disorder patients’ AEQ scores were significantly higher than those of the control group. 
Thus, patients still expected numerous positive consequences of alcohol consumption even 
after years of chronic alcohol use (one inclusion criterion was an AUD diagnosis for at least 
three years) and a degree of impairment in their personal, social, and work life that had led 
them to seeking treatment on average four times before the current treatment. This persistent 
positive expectancy might indicate that there is no re-learning of the value of alcohol-use 
options in AUD, although alcohol use will probably have had adverse consequences. If indeed 
AUD patients in our sample experience negative effects of alcohol intake but nevertheless do 
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not adapt their value expectation, this indicates habitual alcohol intake in real-life scenarios in 
AUD. Yet, as mentioned previously, this issue awaits empirical investigation.  
The third possibility to resolve the incompatibility of our results with the learning 
account (Everitt & Robbins, 2016) is an extension of the theory in terms of a search for 
meaningful subgroups or endophenotypes (Gottesman & Gould, 2003) for which this 
(possibly generalized) transition in control strategies is or is not an important factor in the 
development and maintenance of AUD (Everitt & Robbins, 2016). As was the main insight 
from the UFA (Redish et al., 2008), the paths to an SUD can be diverse and not all AUD 
patients need to be affected by an imbalance in control strategies. There is heterogeneity in 
the clinical population of AUD patients, let alone SUD patients in general, so that 
investigation into consistent clusters of underlying features may yield valuable advances for 
understanding the mechanisms behind this class of disorders. The spectrum of inhibitory 
control and its underlying genetic and epigenetic determinators might be one promising aspect 
of such an endophenotype for SUDs in general (Ersche et al., 2012, 2013), especially because 
of inhibition’s fundamental role in enabling goal-directed behavior (Diamond, 2013), its 
established diminishment in SUDs (Copersino, 2017; Everitt & Robbins, 2016), and its 
relevance for successful treatment of SUDs (Konova, Moeller, & Goldstein, 2013; 
Zilverstand, Parvaz, Moeller, & Goldstein, 2016). Without proper inhibition of irrelevant or 
inadequate thoughts, memories, perceptions, emotions, and behavioral responses, 
achievement of any long-term goal is almost impossible or at least very challenging. 
Moreover, failed behavioral inhibition has been suggested to result in impulsive or 
compulsive behavior and delay and probability discounting have been described as sub-
processes of behavioral inhibition (Bari & Robbins, 2013; Diamond, 2013). As we have 
shown in Study 3, delay and probability discounting were altered in AUD patients compared 
to control participants making their choice patterns more impulsive. However, as can be seen 
in Figure 11, not all patients had comparably low values in these parameters. These 
behavioral paradigms reveal substantial interindividual differences in VBDM even within the 
group of AUD patients. This variance in discounting processes in particular, and in inhibitory 
control in general, might be decomposed into subgroups with methods of dimension reduction 
(e.g. factor analysis, structural equation modeling) or clustering algorithms (e.g. latent class 
analysis). But to do so, a large amount of data for each participant is needed covering a wide 
range of distinct yet connected constructs. Hence, the rich data set acquired by our research 
group might deliver insights in this regard in the near future. 
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In summary, our findings indicate no general shift from goal-directed to habitual control 
in AUD or in association with levels of non-pathological alcohol use. Findings in rodent 
models of drug use as well as studies in human SUD patients need to be extended to examine 
the habitization of actual drug consumption. If evidence for this shift of control regarding the 
consumption of the abused drug is found, the generalization of this shift of control to other 
non-drug-related areas could be investigated in a second step. Thus far, Everitt and Robbins’ 
(2016) learning account is not supported by our and previous findings, at least for AUD.   
 
5.1.2 Neuroimaging correlates of goal-directed and habitual control 
Neuroimaging analyses replicated the findings of Daw et al. (2011) in the young adults 
of Sample 1 and the AUD patients and controls of Sample 2. Model-free RPEs as well as the 
model-based signature in this reinforcement learning signal were associated with BOLD 
responses in ventral striatum and vmPFC. This replication showed that the original effect of 
shared neural resources between the goal-directed and habitual system was present in a 
sample much larger than in the original study (Daw et al., 2011; N = 17) and in healthy 
participants as well as persons suffering from AUD. However, the magnitude of these BOLD 
responses were not related to alcohol use measures in Sample 1 and AUD status in Sample 2 
except for an exploratory finding of an increased association of BOLD responses to model-
free RPEs in putamen with earlier onset of drinking in the young-adult sample and a 
decreased model-based signature in vmPFC in relapsing patients compared to abstainers and 
control participants. These two findings seem plausible in themselves: during the transfer 
from goal-directed to habitual control, the focus of neural activation controlling behavior is 
supposed to shift from ventral to dorsal striatum (Everitt & Robbins, 2005, 2016) and the 
activation of vmPFC (Volkow & Baler, 2014) and its influence on striatal activation 
supposedly decreases (Everitt & Robbins, 2005, 2016). Furthermore, decreased vmPFC 
activation in relapsers was accompanied by decreased grey matter density in vmPFC (see 
Table S 13). Therefore, relapsing AUD patients seemed to have neuroanatomical changes in 
line with previous reports (Beck et al., 2012; Durazzo et al., 2011), but they did not translate 
to altered behavioral strategies in the Two-Step task.  
However, the learning account of SUDs (Everitt & Robbins, 2016) would have 
predicted more general alterations in neural activation in dependence to the amount and 
history of alcohol misuse. The emerging imbalance between excitatory D1 and inhibitory D2 
signaling in striatum after chronic alcohol misuse should have led to decreased prefrontal 
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activation and, in turn, decreased prefrontal modulation of striatal activation, possibly 
contributing to impulsive and habitual decision making (Volkow & Baler, 2014). In line with 
this model, we did find increased impulsive choice behavior in AUD patients in Study 3 and 
reduced model-based BOLD responses in the vmPFC of prospective relapsers in Study 2, but 
no generally increased habitual strategies in the patient sample in the Two-Step task. 
However, the lack of a neural difference between patients and controls in Study 2 
complemented the missing finding in a behavioral level. This might again advocate for 
subgroups within the population of AUD patients or an alcohol-specific instead of outcome-
unspecific shift in control strategies.  
 
5.1.3 Modulators of the valuation systems and alcohol use (disorders) 
Our findings in Study 3 indicate an involvement of impulsive choice regarding delays, 
risks, and valence of options in AUD but not non-pathological alcohol use. This is partly 
consistent with previous studies suggesting increased impulsivity to be involved in the 
development and maintenance of SUDs (Bickel et al., 2007; Dalley et al., 2011; Kreek, 
Nielsen, Butelman, & LaForge, 2005; Stanford et al., 2009). Our results regarding lower loss 
aversion and stronger delay discounting and risk taking regarding monetary gains in AUD 
patients complement this line of research and fit well with the assumed increased impulsive 
choice behavior in AUD. Furthermore, the lack of consistent intercorrelations among the four 
paradigms used in Study 3 corroborates the suggestion of multiple impulsivities (Green & 
Myerson, 2013). These authors showed that delay and probability discounting might be 
separate and partly independent dimensions of impulsivity. Our findings support this view 
and extend it with the dimension of the valence of outcomes. Thus, persons might differ in 
their appraisal of delay, risk, and valence and might be grouped regarding specific patterns 
when combining their attitudes toward these three dimensions. The resulting subgroups could 
all show the same pathologies, but the underlying mechanisms leading to the individual 
syndrome could differ between the subgroups. This is in line with the assumptions of the UFA 
(Redish et al., 2008) that the same class of disorder might entail individuals with very 
different etiological paths. 
In addition, the finding of lower risk seeking facing monetary losses added a new 
perspective on choice biases in AUD patients showing that it might have been a general 
tendency to overestimate the probability of uncertain outcomes instead of or besides a general 
disregard for the risk of an option. This general choice bias regarding stochastic events is 
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understudied in AUD patients. It holds promise to yield further insights into the mechanisms 
of AUD given its shown association to treatment outcome in AUD patients, but further 
research is needed to corroborate this finding first. 
Finally, we did not find evidence for increased impulsive choice to be a predisposing 
risk factor of non-pathological alcohol consumption. This is at odds with the tentative 
suggestions of an impulsive endophenotype (Dalley et al., 2011) and possible common 
genetic factors for delay discounting and AUD (Mitchell, 2011). The ongoing assessment of 
the young-adult sample will provide further insights whether baseline VBDM parameters 
might predict escalation of drinking behavior, but so far our results do not indicate a 
considerable role as a risk factor for alcohol use per se. 
 
5.1.4 Integration of findings 
These findings indicate that AUD patients do not have deficits in higher-order cognitive 
processes like goal-directed control of behavior, but in processes on a lower level. In their 
model of VBDM, Rangel, Camerer, and Montague (2008) have suggested that processing 
features like delay and risk of outcomes are lower-order processes being implemented in the 
habitual, goal-directed, and Pavlovian valuation systems. Thus, it is possible that AUD 
patients have a different way of integrating these features in the subjective value of one 
option, but not in the general valuation schemes in the higher-order goal-directed, habitual, 
and Pavlovian valuation systems. If this assumption was true, we could reveal differences in 
goal-directed and habitual control between pathological and healthy populations only in tasks, 
in which these modulating features have a palpable influence on the computed subjective 
values. This is not the case in the Two-Step task. The delay until the outcome is constantly 
below two seconds and, therefore, almost irrelevant. The valence of the outcome is either 
positive or zero diminishing the influence of loss aversion. Only the probability of reward 
receipt (i.e. the risk of options) is varying during the task and should exert influence on the 
valuation systems. Yet, it is unclear how the on average more risk-taking choice strategies of 
AUD patients would translate to Two-Step task performance. The design of this task makes it 
difficult for the participants to derive the actual risk of one option (see section 5.2.1). Thus, 
the perceived risk will probably not differ strongly between the different 2nd-stage options, 
thereby decreasing the influence of risk appraisal on option valuation. Consequently, 
additional analyses revealed no significant associations between measures of model-free and 
model-based control in the young-adult sample with the four VBDM parameters (all 
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Spearman’s ρ < |.142|, all ps > .061; Table S 17, Appendix D). This is in line with one recent 
report for delay discounting (Solway, Lohrenz, & Montague, 2017) and is the first reported 
finding in this vein for the other three VBDM parameters. 
In summary, while lower-order cognitive functions showed systematic alterations in 
AUD, higher-order functions did not, and neither were associated with non-pathological 
alcohol use.  
 
5.2 Limitations 
There are limitations to our results that need to be kept in mind when interpreting these 
findings. First, the observation period of the young-adult sample (Sample 1) was rather short. 
This impedes the interpretation of the longitudinal analyses in Study 1 and 3. Further 
observation will show how many of the participants of Sample 1 will show escalating 
drinking behavior and whether our measures of VBDM might predict the transition from non-
pathological social to pathological alcohol consumption. Second, there was a selection bias in 
sampling these participants. Registration offices sampled 18-year-old men randomly but those 
who responded and committed themselves to our study were more frequently pupils attending 
academic high school (German “Gymnasium”) than what is observed in the general 
population of this age (65.8% of our sample compared to 51.3% on average in Saxony and 
Berlin; Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 2016). Despite this selection bias, there 
were neither ceiling effects in the assessment of working memory capacity nor deviations 
from the general population in measures of processing speed and verbal intelligence in this 
sample. Thus, task performance should not have been systematically changed due to the 
overrepresentation of participants with a higher educational background. However, it is 
possible that drinking patterns over the whole group would have shown more variance if we 
would have sampled relatively fewer participants with a rather high educational background. 
This selection bias might have led to an underestimation of correlative associations. Third, 
young-adult participants were all male. We followed this sampling approach, because men 
have a three times higher risk for the development of AUD than women (Wittchen et al., 
2011) making it more probable to have included participants with escalating drinking patterns 
during the observation period, but this also reduces the scope of generalizability of our 
findings to men only. 
Furthermore, our exclusion criteria for the AUD patients in Sample 2 contained 
comorbid mental and neurological diseases. On the one hand, this led to a sample in which 
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alterations are more probably associated with AUD itself than with concomitants like Major 
Depression, Korsakoff’s syndrome, or personality disorders. On the other hand, this patient 
sample is thus less representative for AUD patients in general as epidemiologic studies have 
shown that of those AUD patients who seek treatment 41%, 33%, and 33% have also suffered 
from an independent comorbid mood, anxiety, or substance use disorder, respectively, in the 
past 12 months (Grant et al., 2004). For the aim of this thesis, this sampling procedure was 
adequate, because it enabled us to examine effects specific to AUD. However, the 
generalizability of our findings to the population of all treatment-seeking AUD patients is 
impeded as a consequence. In addition to these limitations, there are methodological 
limitations due to the task design of Two-Step.  
 
5.2.1 Methodological critique of the Two-Step task 
With its elaborated design and sophisticated computational model of task performance, 
the sequential decision-making task designed by Daw et al. (2011) tried to solve the 
difficulties in operationalizing goal-directed and habitual control in human research (see 
section 1.2.3.2). However, there is accumulating evidence that the interpretation of findings 
using the original Two-Step task might be more challenging than previously thought (Akam, 
Costa, & Dayan, 2015; Kool, Cushman, & Gershman, 2016; Kool, Gershman, & Cushman, 
2017; Toyama, Katahira, & Ohira, 2017). Recent theoretical advances underpinned with 
simulations and empirical data showed that model-based behavioral strategies in the Two-
Step task do not lead to increased reward rates for participants, in turn decreasing the 
motivation to invest the mental effort to behave goal-directedly (Akam et al., 2015; Kool et 
al., 2016). This might be due to the relative difficulty of distinguishing high from low reward 
probability options on the second stage of the Two-Step task due to the limited information 
entailed in the dichotomous outcomes of 2nd-stage choices (rewarded vs. unrewarded) and, 
thus, the limited insight in what the best stimulus might be at present. After all, one can only 
sample reward information from one 2nd-stage stimulus at a time and needs several repetitions 
to deduce the corresponding reward probability for this stimulus, and all the while the reward 
probabilities for the other three 2nd-stage stimuli change unobserved. Therefore, a model-
based strategy has decreased importance at 1st-stage choice. This is worsened by the rather 
small differences in reward probabilities between options at 2nd stage resulting from the 
reflecting boundaries of the Gaussian random walks at 0.25 and 0.75. As a result of these 
boundaries, two different 2nd-stage stimuli can have a maximum difference in reward 
 
 
106 
 
probability of 50% when one is at the top and the other at the bottom of the possible 
probability distribution, but on average the winning probability of two 2nd-stage stimuli 
differs by only 18% (Kool et al., 2016). Another potential disadvantage of the currently used 
setup of the Two-Step task is that the rare transitions lead to a decrease in the accuracy-effort 
association, because model-based control at the 1st stage might not end up in the desired state 
on the 2nd stage. Consequently, investing mental effort to exert model-based control was not 
associated with increased accuracy of performance and more reward (Kool et al., 2016), thus, 
frustrating the participant and further decreasing the motivation to invest effort. Taken 
together, though the Two-Step task might be well designed to measure the balance between 
model-free and model-based strategies in theory, participants have no incentive to exert goal-
directed control over their behavior due to the task setup. This issue confounds the previously 
obtained results as it is not apparent whether the individually estimated amount of goal-
directed control indeed corresponds to the ability of the participant or rather is a result of 
demotivation (which would even be cost efficient given the lack of benefit from investing 
cognitive effort). I have performed several additional analyses to test the influence of these 
shortcomings of the task design in our samples. 
 
5.2.1.1 Additional analyses – Goal-directed control, motivation, reward, and cognitive 
abilities 
First, we asked the participants to rate their motivation to choose the currently best 
stimulus in the Two-Step task and how this motivation changed over the course of the 
experiment right after they performed the task paradigm (Figure 13, left panel). These ratings 
revealed that participants on average reported to be rather motivated during task performance 
(Mdn = 5, mode = 6 on a scale ranging from 1 = little motivated to 7 = very motivated), but 
motivation decreased on average over the course of the task (Mdn/mode = -1 on a scale 
ranging from -3 = decreased to 3 = increased). Furthermore, ratings of motivation correlated 
positively with parameters of model-based control (MBscore; Spearman's ρ = .153, p = .037) 
but the change of motivation did not (see Figure 13, right panel). As you can see in the upper 
right panel of Figure 13, every participant in the highest 15% of model-based behavior 
(MBscore > 0.59, vertical line) was motivated to perform well (motivation rating ≥ 5).  
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Figure 13. Upper panel: Histogram of Sample 1 participants’ answers to rate their motivation to choose the currently best 
stimulus in the Two-Step task on a seven-point Likert scale (left) and the correlation of this rating with the score for model-
based control strategies derived from the individual stay probabilities (MBscore; Spearman's ρ=.153, p=.037). The horizontal 
line in correlation plot represents the middle category of the Likert scale, the vertical line represents 85th percentile (MBscore 
= 0.59). Lower panel: The same as in the upper panel but with participants’ ratings of how their motivation has changed 
during task performance (Spearman's ρ=.053, p=.474; N=186 for both panels due to two missing data points in the ratings). 
 
Although this is speculative and exploratory, this correlational pattern suggests that 
there might be three subgroups in this sample regarding their Two-Step behavior: one group 
being motivated and exerting goal-directed control although it is not profitable (upper right 
quadrant in correlation plot, corresponding to 15% of the sample), one group lacking 
motivation and ranging from low to medium goal-directed control (lower left quadrant in 
correlation plot, corresponding to 9% of the sample), and one group being motivated to 
perform well but nevertheless yielding a rather wide range of the amount of goal-directed 
control (upper left quadrant in correlation plot). Thus, the motivation to perform well in the 
Two-Step task in this sample seems to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for high 
amounts of goal-directed behavior, but reported motivation cannot explain low to medium 
amounts of goal-directed control. In general, this shows that motivation was not decreased in 
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most of our participants and the amount of goal-directed control varied widely. Additionally, 
motivation to perform well in the task was similarly distributed in AUD patients (Mdn = 6, 
mode = 6) and control participants of Sample 2 (Mdn = 5, mode = 6), and did not differ 
between these two groups (z = -1.35, p = .179 4). These additional findings do not invalidate 
the critique on the Two-Step task, but indicate that our results might not have resulted from 
pure demotivation of the participants. 
Moreover, Kool, Cushman, and Gershman (2016) found no association between the 
degree of goal-directed control and the average reward rate in the Two-Step task. This finding 
is evident in our young-adult sample, too (MBscore x average reward rate; Spearman's ρ = .016, 
p = .832). Nevertheless, participants’ 2nd-stage choice behavior was not random. The four 2nd-
stage stimuli can be brought into an order from the lowest to the highest reward probability 
associated with them at each trial for each participant and ranked accordingly (from 1 = 
lowest to 4 = highest probability). With the help of this coding scheme, I could classify each 
choice depending on its relative optimality and calculate a rank sum score of this choice 
parameter. By dividing this rank sum by the amount of trials (201 minus missing trials), I 
obtained the average rank of the chosen 2nd-stage stimuli. Examining this rank score yielded 
two important insights: first, the average reward score over the group differed significantly 
from 2.5, which would have signified random choice behavior on 2nd stage (t(187) = 17.30, p 
< .001; see Figure 14, left panel). Second, the amount of model-based control during the Two-
Step task correlated positively with the average rank of chosen stimuli (Spearman's ρ = .171, 
p = .019). These analyses replicate the finding of Kool, Cushman, and Gershman (2016) that 
goal-directed behavior in the original Two-Step task does not benefit the participant in terms 
of an overall increased reward rate. However, they also suggest that participants in our 
samples tried to perform well despite the lack of benefit from exerting mental effort, again 
suggesting that task performance was not just a result of demotivation or random choice 
behavior.  
A third approach to put the validity of our Two-Step findings to the test is by looking at 
the association with cognitive abilities. Previous studies have found that higher working 
memory capacity and cognitive processing speed was related to more model-based goal-
directed control in the Two-Step task (Schad et al., 2014; Smittenaar et al., 2013), though this 
relation might be mediated by acute (Otto, Raio, Chiang, Phelps, & Daw, 2013)and chronic 
stress (Friedel et al., 2017). 
                                                 
4 Mann-Whitney U-test due to ordinal scale of motivation ratings. 
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Figure 14. Display of choice behavior of young-adult sample on 2nd stage of the Two-Step task. Left panel: Histogram of the 
average rank score of chosen 2nd-stage stimuli. Right panel: Scatterplot of average rank score of chosen 2nd-stage stimuli and 
model-based control parameter calculated from stay probabilities (MBscore). Horizontal line in both plots at 2.5 represents 
theoretical random choice behavior.  
 
Indeed, additional correlational analyses of the association between model-based 
control and cognitive abilities in Sample 1 revealed significant correlations of the score of 
model-based behavior (MBscore) with performance in the Trail Making Test B (TMT-B; 
Spearman's ρ = -.217, p = .003; Reitan, 1992), digit span backwards (DSbw; Spearman's ρ = 
.198, p = .006; Wechsler, 1997) and digit symbol substitution test of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (DSST; Spearman's ρ = .204, p = .005; Wechsler, 1997), and 
Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatztest Version B (MWT-B; Spearman's ρ = .183, p = .012; Lehrl, 
2005). These correlations signify an association between more model-based behavior in the 
Two-Step task to be associated with faster cognitive processing speed (TMT-B, DSST), 
higher working memory capacity (DSbw), and a higher proxy for verbal intelligence (MWT-
B). Taking together the results of these additional analyses indicated that the amount of goal-
directed and habitual control utilized in Study 1 and 2 represented the actual abilities of the 
participants at least in part, which suggests our results might not be invalidated by the 
methodological critique of the Two-Step task. But at the same time, the associations of Two-
Step task performance with individual cognitive abilities show the necessity to investigate this 
link further in health as well as their possible alteration in disease (see section 5.3.1). 
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5.3 Outlook for future studies 
Despite the indication that the design shortcomings of the original task version (Daw et 
al., 2011) might not have solely driven our results, changes of the experimental paradigm 
should be considered for future research. Especially the task version by Kool and colleagues 
(Kool et al., 2016) holds promise as they have shown the superiority of the adapted paradigm 
and analyses in finding evidence for model-based goal-directed behavior in simulations as 
well as participant data (Kool et al., 2016; Kool et al., 2017). In their task version, there are 
two different possible states at 1st stage. Each 1st-stage state entails two stimuli to choose 
from. Choice of one stimulus will deterministically lead to one 2nd-stage stimulus and choice 
of the alternative stimulus to the other one. At 2nd stage, there is no more choice involved as 
there is only one stimulus presented, which has to be selected involuntarily. After “choosing” 
the 2nd-stage stimulus, the participant earns reward in the form of points, ranging from 0 to 9, 
instead of a dichotomous outcome. The amount of points earned at 2nd stage varies 
independently for both stimuli according to Gaussian random walks with a higher drift rate 
than in the original version (Daw et al., 2011), so participants can directly experience changes 
in these probabilities. In addition, the absence of rare transitions allows them to generalize 
their experience from a trial starting in one 1st-stage state to the other one. This is supposed to 
increase the accuracy-effort association (Kool et al., 2016). Using this task version, Kool, 
Gershman, and Cushman (2017) could show that goal-directed control was only exerted when 
weighing the costs of investing mental effort against the benefits in terms of accrued rewards 
yielded a favorable ratio. Their new design of the Two-Step task (Kool et al., 2016) had this 
quality and should, therefore, be preferred over the original task by Daw et al. (2011) in 
designing future studies. As I cannot conclusively rule out the possibility that our null results 
in both samples might at least in part be due to these design issues, the finding of a lack of a 
generalized, outcome-unspecific shift from goal-directed to habitual control in AUD should 
be replicated using the revised Two-Step task to validate our findings. Additionally, the 
combination of our findings in all three studies with the presented limitations leads to several 
more suggestions for future studies.  
First, the habitization of alcohol intake in persons suffering from AUD should be 
investigated. This is a crucial piece of information that is assumed by theories of AUD 
development and maintenance, but has not been investigated in the human domain, yet. To 
investigate this, a specific cohort of non-treatment seeking persons suffering from AUD 
would be needed, because working with real alcohol outcomes in treated AUD patients 
aiming for abstinence from alcohol would hazard treatment success and, thus, be unethical. 
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Future studies with this special cohort might inform theories about the alcohol-specific 
habitization of behavioral control. To test whether alcohol intake in persons suffering from 
AUD is habitual in real life, experience sampling approaches could be used. With this 
approach, participants’ decision making regarding alcohol intake could be sampled directly in 
their natural environment and during every-day life, for example by using a smartphone 
application asking about a person’s intentions of alcohol consumption several times a day and 
the actual amount of consumed alcohol on the day before. But it could also go beyond the 
mere amount of consumed alcohol to repeated, habitual tendencies to go and open the fridge 
looking for alcoholic beverages or to habitually go to bars without the explicit intention to do 
so. In addition, information about every-day behavior other than alcohol consumption could 
be gathered by experience sampling methods, thereby testing the assumed generalized shift 
from goal-directed to habitual decision-making. These possible avenues to test the alcohol-
specific and outcome-unspecific habitization of decision making would complement the 
previous findings, which currently do not support a generalized, outcome-unspecific shift in 
behavioral control in AUD. 
Second, habitization of alcohol consumption as well as in non-alcohol-related behavior 
as predictor of the transition from non-pathological to escalating, pathological alcohol use 
should be examined. Only the longitudinal investigation of participants traversing from non-
pathological to pathological alcohol intake could yield definitive insights into etiological 
mechanisms. This might be possible to achieve in the ongoing investigation of the young-
adult sample presented in this thesis, which will be followed-up for at least five years.  
Third, big-data approaches should be utilized to search for meaningful subgroups within 
the cohort of AUD patients. This cohort comprises considerable heterogeneity of the afflicted 
persons regarding the severity of symptoms, factors contributing to chronic pathological 
alcohol use, comorbid mental and physical syndromes, and the areas of every-day life being 
compromised by the consequences of drug use (Redish et al., 2008). If future research could 
identify consistent patterns in the features of this clinical population, we could focus on 
finding the most efficient treatment plan for each AUD subtype. Finding ways to improve 
long-term treatment outcomes would be a very valuable endeavor seeing that relapse rates 
after completion of current standard detoxification treatments are often higher than 50% 
within the next 12 to 24 months (Stock, 2017). To aid future investigations of mechanisms 
involved in the etiology of AUD, possible AUD subgroups, and promising treatment 
approaches, a holistic, heuristic model might be of use. This model should try to integrate the 
insights from various streams of research into the basis of out-of-control alcohol drinking. 
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5.3.1 Tentative framework for future studies 
Bringing together higher cognitive functions like goal-directed planning and more basic 
executive functions is the theme of a different line of research that attempted to draw a more 
nuanced cognitive model of addiction. This research line recently cumulated in Copersino 
(2017) sketching a dual-system model of the cognitive mechanisms of SUDs. He separated 
implicit, automatic, effortless processes from explicit, effortful cognitive processes (see 
Figure 15). The implicit cognitive processes entail classical and operant conditioning, upon 
which processes like cognitive biases, cue reactivity, Pavlovian-instrumental transfer, and 
incentive sensitization are based. The explicit cognitive processes are divided into executive 
functions, which Copersino defined as “mental operations necessary for the planning, 
execution, and monitoring of goal-directed behavior” (Copersino, 2017, p. 94), and 
metacognition, “the critical awareness, knowledge and control of our own cognitive 
processes, reasoning and decision-making” (Copersino, 2017, p. 93). The author described the 
etiology of SUDs as a mixture of increasing habits and urges to use a substance 
(strengthening of implicit processes) while contemporaneously decreasing executive 
functioning to counter habits and urges as well as metacognition regarding the growing 
number of triggers for them (weakening of explicit processes). Thus, the basic mechanism 
proposed by Copersino (2017) is the same as in the learning account by Everitt and Robbins 
(2016) and also parts of the UFA (Redish et al., 2008). However, while Everitt and Robins 
(2016) focused more strongly on the neural underpinnings of this mechanism and based their 
theory mostly on animal models of addiction, Copersino (2017) preferentially addressed the 
human cognitive functions and abilities underlying habitual and goal-directed control (Figure 
15). Therefore, Copersino’s model opens up additional avenues of research into the cognitive 
epiphenomena producing or accompanying the shift from goal-directed (i.e. in Copersino’s 
terms the successful deployment of executive functions to limit or avoid substance use despite 
possible urges and habits of use) to habitual (i.e. the successful interference of automatic 
habits and Pavlovian associations with metacognition and executive functions to initiate and 
maintain substance use) control in SUDs.  
The taxonomy put together by Copersino (2017) can be used to explore how processes 
underlying goal-directed and habitual control differ between the AUD patients and control 
participants of Sample 2, which did not differ in general in model-free and model-based 
control in the Two-Step task (Study 2). One of the epiphenomena predicted by the 
strengthening of implicit cognitive processes is the growing influence of Pavlovian 
conditioned stimuli on instrumental behavior (i.e. Pavlovian-instrumental transfer, PIT; 
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Figure 15. Schema of the model of cognitive processes involved in the development and maintenance of SUDs (adapted from 
Copersino, 2017).  
 
Cartoni, Balleine, & Baldassarre, 2016; Estes, 1948). Pavlovian-instrumental transfer has 
previously been assumed to be one factor underlying maintenance of and relapse to AUD 
(Belin, Jonkman, Dickinson, Robbins, & Everitt, 2009) and, indeed, we showed stronger 
behavioral PIT effects in AUD patients compared to control participants in a pilot study 
(Garbusow et al., 2014) and in Sample 2 (Garbusow et al., 2015; Sommer et al., 2017). 
Moreover, we could previously show in the young adults of Sample 1 and the control 
participants of Sample 2 that increased PIT effects were related to diminished goal-directed 
control in the Two-Step task (Sebold et al., 2016), which further corroborates Copersino’s 
(2017) theoretical framework. Furthermore, Copersino (2017) related weakened executive 
functions with SUDs. This includes diminished working memory capacity, which has 
previously been found to be decreased in AUD patients (see meta-analysis by Stavro, 
Pelletier, & Potvin, 2013) and is also lower in the patients of Sample 2 compared to the 
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control participants (DSbw, z = -3.97, p < .001 5), although we successfully matched patients 
and controls for years of school education and age. In addition, decreased executive function 
entails increased impulsivity and delay discounting (Copersino, 2017; Diamond, 2013; N. P. 
Friedman & Miyake, 2016), which have often been shown to be related to AUD (Bickel et al., 
2014; Stanford et al., 2009; Laura Stevens et al., 2014) and were also increased in our patient 
sample compared to the control group (Study 3, Table 7; BIS-15: t(201) = -2.76, p = .006; 
DD: z = -3.15, p = .002 5). In summary, those processes underlying goal-directed and habitual 
control that we examined in Sample 2 in addition to the Two-Step task all point to diminished 
explicit, goal-directed and enhanced implicit, habitual control. Yet, the direct examination of 
these control strategies did not yield the expected group difference, which might be 
confounded by the task design that does not benefit those who exert goal-directed control as I 
have discussed previously (see section 5.2.1.).  
Crucially, if we had found a systematic diminishment of goal-directed control in favor 
of habitual strategies, how would this have informed improving therapeutic approaches? 
Recently, a departure from treatment approaches trying to enhance goal-directed control in 
AUD patients and instead focusing on implicit processes via cognitive and attentional bias 
modification and habit reversal therapy has been suggested (Gladwin, Wiers, & Wiers, 2017; 
Stock, 2017; Wiers et al., 2011). This suggestion was based on the observation that habitual 
control is intact in AUD patients, whereas goal-directed control is assumed to be disrupted. 
Conclusive evidence for this disruption is yet missing, but even if it were to be found, the 
question of the cause of diminished goal-directed control would still be open. Human real-life 
goal-directed control is embedded in an ever-changing world with an extremely large state 
space (Gershman & Daw, 2017). Finding a beneficial path through this state space and 
navigating to an attractive long-term goal, that is, controlling your behavior in a goal-directed 
manner, requires cognitive resources and proper executive functioning (Copersino, 2017; Otto 
et al., 2013; Schad et al., 2014; Smittenaar et al., 2013). Deficits in a task of goal-directed 
control like devaluation or sequential decision-making paradigms would not yield information 
about the cause of decreased goal-directed behavior. These deficits could be due to decreased 
working memory capacity interfering with maintaining the currently pursued goal, or 
decreased inhibitory control allowing intrusive stimulus-response habits to take control over 
behavior or task-irrelevant information to capture attention among other things.  
                                                 
5 Mann-Whitney U-test due to violation of normality assumption of this measure. 
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To disentangle these interrelated constructs, future studies would need to acquire large 
data sets in large samples6 of AUD patients and healthy control participants. This big data 
approach is probably only to be accomplished by collaborative efforts of several research 
groups at various sites and the adoption of open science practices. Furthermore, the data 
should include a big variety of measures on alcohol use patterns, executive functions, 
metacognition, habitization of alcohol use and non-alcohol-related behavior, impulsivity, and 
intelligence. The primary ideas behind the use of big data approaches in such a wide heuristic 
model of interrelated constructs to guide future research are the following. First, there has 
been a divide between clinical psychology/psychiatry research and cognitive 
psychology/neuroscience in investigating cognitive approaches in psychopathology leading to 
decreased communication between fields examining the same processes. That is why 
theoretical and methodological advances in one of those fields were often not applied in the 
other (Snyder, Miyake, & Hankin, 2015). Consequently, future clinical studies should begin 
with holistic models of psychological function from basic research and seek to advance 
understanding of these mechanisms in disease. Second, the amount of studies examining 
single impaired mental processes in single mental disorders is overwhelmingly large by now. 
Significant scientific progress is probably not to be expected from future studies taking the 
same route (McTeague, Goodkind, & Etkin, 2016). Rather, meta-analyses are needed to 
combine the findings of previous studies, which have higher statistical power and yield more 
stable results than single clinical studies with often rather small sample sizes, especially in 
clinical neuroscience studies. The results of these meta-analyses can then inform the heuristic 
models in turn. Third, there should be efforts made to conduct studies using more than one 
task paradigm or questionnaire per latent construct, although this is less ecological. As 
Harden et al. (2017) have recently shown in a sample of more than 800 adolescent twins, no 
single behavioral task of reward seeking or cognitive control (including a delay discounting 
task and Iowa Gambling Task) sufficed to operationalize the underlying construct as most 
variance in the performance of one task was task-specific and non-systematic for the 
construct. This finding strongly advocates for the use of several tasks and combining their 
results in investigating rather complex constructs and, thus, supports the notion of task 
diversity even at higher costs for data acquisition. Factor analytic and structural equation 
modelling approaches are ideal candidates for this endeavor. The research group “Learning 
                                                 
6 The actually needed sample size depends on many variables besides the desired power for a given effect size 
and level of α. For structural equation models, the number of factors, the expected factor loadings, and 
percentage of missing data also play a role  (see Wolf, Harrington, Clark, & Miller, 2013). 
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and Habitization as Predictors of the Development and Maintenance of Alcoholism”, within 
which the presented data were acquired, represents a step in the right direction but could only 
cover a limited area of the processes and mechanisms associated with non-pathological and 
pathological alcohol use. Finally, computational modeling will be vital in bridging the gap 
between behavioral and neuroscientific approaches (e.g. Huys, Maia, & Frank, 2016; Teufel 
& Fletcher, 2016). This forces the researcher to formalize the assumed cognitive processes in 
an algorithmic way leading to increased precision and better communicability of research. 
Furthermore, analyses on this level have the potential to overcome descriptive and 
correlational models and yield evidence of causal relationships between neural and behavioral 
data. It is also a useful tool in translating behavioral findings to neuroimaging data and might 
help identify transdiagnostic features of perception, decision making, and behavior. 
 
5.4 Conclusions  
This thesis has made a valuable contribution to understanding the cognitive mechanisms 
of alcohol use and AUD. I have shown that processes of VBDM are unlikely predisposing 
factors for alcohol consumption on a non-pathological level. Regarding AUD, systematic 
alterations of the valuation of delays, risks, and the valence of expected outcomes were 
evident while a general imbalance between goal-directed and habitual control was absent in 
the group of AUD patients. In addition, relapse to heavy drinking in detoxified AUD patients 
was associated with a tendency to overestimate probabilities of uncertain losses and decreased 
goal-directed control in those patients with high positive expectancies of alcohol 
consumption. Moreover, the neuroimaging analysis of these processes in both samples did not 
yield reliable associations with alcohol use. Taking all of these findings together, there is not 
much support for the learning account of SUDs (Everitt & Robbins, 2016) for alcohol, which 
is why I advocate for a more detailed investigation of the cognitive mechanisms involved in 
the development and maintenance of AUD. While our ongoing examination of the young 
adults of Sample 1 might deliver a better understanding of cognitive mechanisms leading to 
escalation of drinking behavior, future studies are needed to put our findings in the broader 
context of various cognitive domains related to alcohol use and AUD and find possible 
subgroups or endophenotypes within the heterogeneous population of persons suffering from 
AUD. Though these insights signify important steps towards the understanding of cognitive 
and neural mechanisms in AUD, we still have a very long way ahead of us until we will reach 
this goal.  
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Appendix 
A Supplementary Information of Study 1 
A.1 Supplementary Methods 1 - behavioral 
A.1.1 Measures of goal-directedness 
In the computational modeling we exactly follow Daw et al. (2011). For completeness 
we repeat the used methods here. Two states s that are visited during trial t are denoted sx,t, 
where the index x indicates the stage: s1,t denotes the 1
st-stage state, which is always the same; 
s21,t and s22,t denote the two 2
nd-stage states, only one of which is visited per trial. Choices ax,t 
= {1, 2} lead to transition between successive states, which are probabilistic at the 1st-stage 
(a1,t) and deterministic at the second stage (a2,t). Probabilistic 1
st- and 2nd-stage rewards are 
denoted by r1,t, which is always zero, and r2,t, which can be zero or one. We used the model-
free reinforcement learning algorithm SARSA(λ) temporal difference learning (Rummery & 
Niranjan, 1994) to model habitual choices. Here, action values QTD(sx,t, ax,t) are used to 
compute the reward prediction error (RPE): 
(1)   𝛿𝑥,𝑡 =  𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝑥+1,𝑡, 𝑎𝑥+1,𝑡) +  𝑟𝑥,𝑡 −  𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝑥,𝑡, 𝑎𝑥,𝑡) 
QTD values are then updated based on the RPE via 
(2)   𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝑥,𝑡, 𝑎𝑥,𝑡) =  𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠𝑥,𝑡, 𝑎𝑥,𝑡) + 𝛼𝑥𝛿𝑥,𝑡 
with free learning parameters αx. We used separate learning rates α1 and α2 for 1
st- and 2nd- 
stages. We moreover used the eligibility parameter λ (Sutton & Barto, 1998), by which 1st-
stage Q values were updated based on 2nd-stage RPE via 
(3)   𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠1,𝑡, 𝑎1,𝑡) =  𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠1,𝑡, 𝑎1,𝑡) + 𝛼1𝜆𝛿2,𝑡 
Critically, the habitual system only learns from the non-/rewarding consequences of 
actions, but does not consider the structure of the transitions between stages. The goal-
directed system, to the contrary, computes 1st-stage action values QMB(s1,t, a1,t) at each trial by 
constructing a tree of states, actions and transitions, and by weighting each action’s expected 
outcome by the probability of their occurrence: 
(4)  
 𝑄𝑀𝐵(𝑠1,𝑡, 𝑎1,𝑡) =
𝑃(𝑠21,𝑡|𝑠1,𝑡, 𝑎1,𝑡) max𝑎 𝑄(𝑠21,𝑡, 𝑎21,𝑡) + 𝑃(𝑠22,𝑡|𝑠1,𝑡, 𝑎1,𝑡) max𝑎 𝑄(𝑠22,𝑡, 𝑎22,𝑡) 
Subjects were instructed that transitions between 1st and 2nd stage are probabilistic with 
one transition being more probable than the other. In the computational model, the more 
frequently observed (“common”) transition was set to probability 0.7 and the other (“rare”) 
was set to probability 0.3. Goal-directed and habitual action values were combined via 
weighting parameter ω: 
(5)   𝑄𝑛𝑒𝑡(𝑠1,𝑡, 𝑎1,𝑡) = (1 − 𝜔)𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠1,𝑡, 𝑎1,𝑡) +  𝜔𝑄𝑀𝐵(𝑠1,𝑡, 𝑎1,𝑡) 
Here, the relative contribution of model-free and model-based action values is 
determined by the free weighting parameter ω. A parameter value of ω = 0 indicates fully 
model-free choice and ω = 1 indicates fully model-based choice. At 2nd-stage, Q values are 
assumed to be identical for both systems: 𝑄𝑛𝑒𝑡(𝑠2,𝑡, 𝑎2,𝑡) = 𝑄𝑇𝐷(𝑠2,𝑡, 𝑎2,𝑡) =  𝑄𝑀𝐵(𝑠2,𝑡, 𝑎2,𝑡). 
Integrated Q values were passed through a softmax function to compute action probabilities: 
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(6)   𝑃(𝑎𝑥,𝑡 = 𝑎|𝑠𝑥,𝑡) =  
exp(𝛽𝑥[𝑄𝑛𝑒𝑡(𝑠𝑥,𝑡,𝑎𝑥,𝑡)+ 𝜌 𝑟𝑒𝑝(𝑎)])
∑ exp(𝛽𝑥[𝑄𝑛𝑒𝑡(𝑠𝑥,𝑡,𝐴𝑥,𝑡)+𝜌 𝑟𝑒𝑝(𝐴)])𝐴
 
Given the Q values, free inverse-temperature parameters βx determine how noisy 
choices are. Choice behavior is purely random for a value of βx = 0, always and 
deterministically preferring higher-valued choices for a value of βx = ∞, and matching 
probability and value for an intermediate value of βx = 1. Here, we also allowed for separate 
parameters for 1st and 2nd stage (β1, β2). Effects of 1
st-stage choice repetition are implemented 
via the indicator variable rep(a), which codes whether the current action a1,t has been chosen 
on the last trial (for a1,t = a1,t-1 → rep(a) = 1 and for a1,t ≠ a1,t-1 → rep(a) = 0). For second-
stage actions, the parameter ρ was set to zero. The model overall contains seven free 
parameters θ = (β1, β2, α1, α2, λ, ω, ρ). For fMRI analysis, we again followed Daw et al. 
(2011) and computed RPEs with respect to integrated action values Qnet, which captures a 
mixture of both model-based and model-free action values: 
(7)   𝛿𝑛𝑒𝑡;𝑥,𝑡 =  𝑄𝑛𝑒𝑡(𝑠𝑥+1,𝑡, 𝑎𝑥+1,𝑡) +  𝑟𝑥,𝑡 −  𝑄𝑛𝑒𝑡(𝑠𝑥,𝑡, 𝑎𝑥,𝑡) 
This effectively defines a generalized version of Equation (1). Following Daw et al. 
(2011), we calculated the difference between δnet;x,t computed for purely model-based (ω = 1) 
versus purely model-free (ω = 0) choice. 
 
A.1.2 Measures of alcohol consumption 
The procedure for calculating Drinkscore from the CIDI (Jacobi et al., 2013; Wittchen & 
Pfister, 1997) drinking measures was the following: transforming the three onset variables 
into timespan since 1st drink, 1st time being drunk, and 1st binge-drinking episode, so each 
CIDI measure of drinking behavior has the same direction (higher values indicating riskier 
drinking behavior); setting binge-related measures to zero for non-bingers, because zero 
implies the least risky drinking behavior in these variables; z-standardizing of each variable; 
setting missing data to zero, so they do not influence the Drinkscore; summing up all variables 
to calculate Drinkscore. 
 
A.2 Supplementary Methods 2 - fMRI 
A.2.1 Individual fMRI statistics – first-level model 
We set up 1st-level statistics according to Daw et al. (2011). This included an onset 
regressor for 2nd stage and outcome presentation. RPEMF and RPEΔMB were parametric 
modulators locked onto this onset regressor. The time series of these two modulators are our 
contrasts of interest. Furthermore, we included several nuisance and regressors of no interest. 
This included an onset regressor at outcome presentation to control for general differences in 
mean activation between choice and outcome events and an onset regressor of 1st-stage 
presentation. Activation at this last onset regressor was being modulated by two additional 
parametric modulators of no interest: P(a1,t|sA) from Equation 6 “as a normalized measure of 
the 1st-stage action value” and “its partial derivative with respect to ω” (Daw et al., 2011; 
Supplement, section “fMRI analysis”). In addition, we included the six motion parameters 
(three translation, three rotation parameters) from the realignment of the fMRI data 
preprocessing to control for movement artifacts. 
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A.2.2 ROI masks 
Masks of vmPFC and ventral striatum were taken from meta-analysis software with the 
search term “vmPFC” and “accumbens” (http://old.neurosynth.org/terms/ and the BrainMap 
database (Nielsen & Hansen, 2002)), respectively. The vmPFC mask from neurosynth.org 
was smoothed and parts of the ACC were removed. The mask of ventral striatum from 
BrainMap has been thresholded with p>.6. These masks have been used before (Kroemer et 
al., 2014). Mask images were binarized with SPM’s Image Calculator. Then the NAcc mask 
was subtracted from vmPFC to prevent overlap. 
 
 
 
 
Figure S 1. ROI masks. Ventral striatum in red, vmPFC in blue. 
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A.3 Supplementary Results - behavioral 
A.3.1 Demographics 
 
Table S 1. Demographic information and descriptive statistics of drinking measures in the full sample (N=201). 
  N 1st quartile median 3rd quartile 
Descriptive statistics of sample 
    
Age 201 18.24 18.33 18.50 
Years in school 200 11 12 12 
Measures of goal-directedness 
    
ω a 198 0.19 0.57 0.80 
MFscore 198 -0.04 0.09 0.22 
MBscore 
a 198 0.06 0.23 0.48 
Measures of drinking behavior 
    
Drinkscore 198 -3.80 -0.19 2.27 
Age of 1st drink a 201 14 14 15 
Age of 1st time drunk a 191 15 16 16 
Estimated alcohol consumption in past year (g alc/day) a 201 3.21 7.07 16.07 
Alcohol consumption in past year (g alc/drinking 
occasion) a 
201 45 54 90 
Age of 1st binge-drinking episode a 142 16 16 17 
Number of binge-drinking episodes lifetime a 142 5 10 25 
Alcohol consumption per binge-drinking episode (g alc) 
a 
150 90 117 137 
ADS Sum Score a 193 2 4 7 
OCDS-G Sum Score a 195 1 3 5 
AST (µKat/l) a 196 0.35 0.40 0.48 
ALT (µKat/l) a 195 0.27 0.34 0.43 
γ-GT (µKat/l) a 196 0.23 0.27 0.35 
PEth a 170 10 60 60 
B
IS
 
Attention a 197 8 9 10 
Motor a 198 8 10 12 
Non-planning a 198 9 11 13 
Sum Score 197 27 30 34 
S
U
R
P
S
 
Anxiety sensitivity a 198 9 11 12 
Hopelessness a 198 10 12 14 
Impulsivity a 198 9 10 11 
Sensation seeking 197 15 16 19 
a Exact Kolmogorov-Smirnov test implied non-normal distribution of this measure (not tested for descriptive statistics). 
Note: N occasionally differs from 201 (or 150 in binge-drinking related measures, respectively) due to single missing data 
points.   
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A.3.2 Hierarchical logistic mixed-effects regression of 1st-stage choice repetition depending 
on previous trial’s outcome and transition – model formula and results. 
 
Generalized linear mixed model fit by maximum likelihood estimation, using the 
Laplace Approximation for integrating out individual effects. Responses (choice repetition) 
followed a binomial distribution and were modeled via a logistic regression model, with fixed 
effects predictors reward and transition in the last trial and their interaction, as well as with all 
fixed effects varying across subjects as random effects. 
 
Family: binomial  ( logit ) 
Formula: repetition ~ transition * reward + (reward * transition | subject) 
Factors reward and transition were effect coded (i.e. -0.5 / 0.5). 
N=188 
 
AIC       BIC    logLik deviance df.resid 
41111.3   41230.5 -20541.7   41083.3     36703  
  
Random effects: 
Groups Name            Std.Dev. Corr      
sjind (Intercept)     0.7712                    
 reward1    0.3694    0.52             
 trans1          0.4090    0.30 0.22       
 reward1:trans1 1.7806    0.50 0.10 0.58 
Number of obs: 36717, groups:  sjind, 188 
 
Fixed effects: 
 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)      0.95779     0.05814   16.474   < 2e-16 *** 
trans1           0.21745     0.04197    5.181 2.21e-07 *** 
reward1    0.35805     0.04000    8.952   < 2e-16 *** 
trans1:reward1   1.79721     0.14256   12.606   < 2e-16 *** 
Signif. codes:  p < .05 *, p < .01 **, p < .001 *** 
 
Correlation of Fixed Effects: 
 (Intr) trans1 rewrd1 
trans1        0.159                 
reward1       0.370   0.211         
trns1:rwrd1   0.463   0.416 -0.017 
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To test the influence of drinking behavior on stay probabilities, we repeated the 
hierarchical logistic regression analysis with Drinkscore included as additional fixed between-
subjects factor. Note that we had to switch optimizers to get the model to converge. 
 
Generalized linear mixed model fit by maximum likelihood (Laplace Approximation) 
[glmerMod] 
Family: binomial  ( logit ) 
Formula: repetition ~ transition * reward * Drink_score + (reward * transition | subject) 
Factors reward and transition were effect coded (i.e. -0.5 / 0.5). 
N=188 
 
AIC       BIC    logLik deviance df.resid 
41114.6 41267.8 -20539.3   41078.6     36699  
  
Random effects: 
Groups Name            Std.Dev. Corr      
sjind (Intercept)     0.7695                    
 reward    0.3648    0.52             
 trans          0.4055    0.28 0.20       
 reward:trans 1.7809    0.51 0.10 0.59 
Number of obs: 36717, groups:  sjind, 188 
 
Fixed effects: 
 Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)      0.958004    0.058065   16.499   < 2e-16 *** 
trans1           0.216141    0.041822    5.168 2.36e-07 *** 
reward   0.356882    0.039789    8.969   < 2e-16 *** 
Drink_score                 -0.009734    0.012297   -0.792     0.429     
trans:reward   1.798780    0.142900   12.588   < 2e-16 *** 
trans:Drink_score          -0.012876    0.008520   -1.511     0.131     
reward:Drink_score -0.010731    0.008058   -1.332     0.183     
trans:reward:Drink_score   0.007755    0.030060    0.258     0.796     
Signif. codes:  p < .05 *, p < .01 **, p < .001 *** 
 
Correlation of Fixed Effects: 
 (Intr) trns rew Drnk trns:rew trns:Drnk rew:Drnk 
trans        0.149                                              
reward      0.363   0.203                                       
Drink_score   0.001 -0.004 -0.006                                 
trans:reward   0.466   0.420 -0.017 0.003                        
trans:Drink_score          -0.003   0.000   0.008   0.156 -0.008                
reward:Drink_score -0.005   0.007   0.000   0.371 -0.006   0.167         
trans:reward:Drink_score   0.003 -0.009 -0.007   0.467   0.003   0.427 -0.021 
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A.3.3 Two-Step parameters and intercorrelations of measures of goal-directed/habitual 
control 
 
Table S 2. Descriptive statistics of 2-Step parameters (n=188). 
 
β1 β2 α1 α2 λ ω Ρ 
1st quartile 2.123 1.700 0.218 0.408 0.236 0.199 0.045 
Median 4.554 2.652 0.609 0.630 0.598 0.593 0.099 
3rd quartile 7.326 3.741 0.999 0.807 1.000 0.796 0.185 
 
 
Table S 3. Intercorrelation of measures of goal-directed/habitual behavioral control (n=188). 
 
ω MFscore MBscore 
ω 1 -.090 .673† 
MFscore  
1 -.298† 
MBscore   
1 
Note: † p < .001 (two-tailed). All correlations are Spearman’s ρ. 
 
 
A.3.4 Elastic net analysis 
Regression analyses were performed with glmnet (version 2.0-2; J. Friedman et al., 
2010) in R (version 3.2.1; R Development Core Team, 2008) with ten 10-fold cross-
validations and α=0.5. This level of α was chosen to have a balance between ridge regression 
and lasso. This approach selects the best predictors of the dependent variable (Drinkscore) with 
a penalty for the number of predictors, thereby building a parsimonious regression model. 
When selecting the model with the least mean squared error, the included variables 
were the BIS sum score and SURPS Impulsivity subscale (see Table S 4). When applying the 
“one-standard-error” rule for model selection (cf. J. Friedman et al., 2010) instead, which is 
more conservative and prefers sparser models, no predictor was chosen (see Table S 4 and  
Figure S 2).  
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Table S 4. Coefficients of 17 predictors of Drinkscore for λmin and λ1SE. 
 coef(λmin) coef(λ1SE) 
(Intercept) -4.497 -0.463 
BIS Sum score  0.071 . 
SURPS Impulsivity  0.189 . 
ω . . 
MFscore . . 
MBscore . . 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure S 2. Mean squared error (MSE) of elastic net model ± standard deviation for different values of log(λ). Digits above 
figure show included number of predictors. First vertical line from the left depicts the value of λ with the smallest MSE 
(λmin), second vertical line depicts largest λ within one standard error (λ1SE) which represents the sparser and more 
conservative model.  
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A.3.5 Comparisons between binge-drinkers and non-bingers 
 
Table S 5. Results of Exact Mann-Whitney U-tests comparing measures of goal-directedness and drinking behavior between 
binge-drinkers and non-bingers. 
 
ω MFscore MBscore Drinkscore 
Age of 
1st 
drink 
Age of 
1st 
time 
drunk 
Estimated 
alcohol 
consumption 
in past year 
(g alc/day) 
Nnon-bingers 49 49 49 49 49 44 49 
Nbinge-drinkers 139 139 139 139 139 136 139 
mean ranknon-bingers 96.61 84.22 97.10 27.86 109.61 107.50 48.59 
mean rankbinge-drinkers 93.76 98.12 93.58 117.99 89.17 85.00 110.68 
rank sumnon-binge 4734 4127 4758 1365 5371 4730 2381 
rank sumbinge-drinkers 13032 13639 13008 16401 12395 11560 15385 
Mann-Whitney-U 3302 2902 3278 140 2665 2244 1156 
Z -0.316 -1.537 -0.389 -9.970 -2.349 -2.608 -6.881 
Exact significance (2-tailed) .754 .125 .699 .000 .019 .009 .000 
 
Alcohol 
consumption 
in past year 
(g 
alc/drinking 
occasion) 
ADS 
Sum 
Score 
OCDS 
Sum 
Score AST ALT γ-GT PEth 
Nnon-bingers 49 48 49 48 48 48 41 
Nbinge-drinkers 139 133 134 135 134 135 117 
mean ranknon-bingers 44.52 58.29 66.39 96.08 86.33 85.02 73.50 
mean rankbinge-drinkers 112.12 102.80 101.37 90.55 93.35 94.48 81.60 
rank sumnon-binge 2181.5 2798 3253 4612 4144 4081 3013.5 
rank sumbinge-drinkers 15584.5 13673 13583 12224 12509 12755 9547.5 
Mann-Whitney-U 956.5 1622 2028 3044 2968 2905 2152.5 
Z -7.544 -5.071 -4.014 -0.622 -0.792 -1.063 -1.049 
Exact significance (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .536 .430 .289 .296 
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A.3.6 Associations between measures of impulsivity (BIS-15) and measures of goal-
directed/habitual control and neural correlates thereof 
 
To examine the relationship between impulsivity and behavioral control during the 2-
Step task, we correlated our measures of goal-directed/habitual control and λ from the 
computational model with the BIS-15 subscales and Sum score (λ was the one parameter, 
where (Deserno, Wilbertz, et al., 2015) found a difference between high and low impulsive 
participants.) Furthermore, we correlated the BIS-15 with the extracted mean ROI activation 
in ventral striatum and vmPFC in response to RPEMF and RPEΔMB. In addition, we examined 
whether there is a correlation between BOLD response to RPEMF and RPEΔMB, respectively, 
and BIS-15 Sum scores in the lateral prefrontal/orbitofrontal cortex, where Deserno et al. had 
found a group difference using 10mm-spheres around the three peaks of their cluster in the 
OFC (peak 1: 20|28|-16; peak 2: 38|24|-16; peak 3: 32|42|-14). None of these analyses yielded 
significant effects. This could be due to the different samples of our study in comparison to 
Deserno, Wilbertz, et al. (2015): our participants have medium BIS-15 scores whereas 
Deserno’s participants were selected due to their BIS-11 scores to represent extreme groups 
of the distribution of impulsiveness.  
 
Table S 6. Correlation of BIS-15 subscales and Sum score with behavioral and neural measures of goal-directed/habitual 
control. 
   
BIS-15 
   
ATT 
 
MOT 
 
NONP 
 
SUM 
   
ρ p 
 
ρ p 
 
ρ p 
 
ρ p 
λ 
 
.063 .397  .085 .250  -.020 .786  .035 .632 
ω 
 
-.016 .826 
 
.042 .571 
 
.001 .995 
 
-.013 .860 
MFscore 
 
.048 .514 
 
.077 .293 
 
.008 .914 
 
.062 .404 
MBscore 
 
-.019 .796 
 
.025 .737 
 
.003 .972 
 
-.011 .877 
RPEMF 
vS 
 
.138 .100 
 
.022 .790 
 
.053 .524 
 
.066 .431 
vmPFC 
 
.089 .291 
 
.057 .496 
 
.063 .452 
 
.115 .172 
RPEΔMB 
vS 
 
.042 .619 
 
-.026 .755 
 
.002 .977 
 
-.018 .834 
vmPFC 
 
.000 .998 
 
-.022 .794 
 
.013 .879 
 
-.005 .950 
 Note: All correlations are Spearman’s ρ. BIS-15, Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (short form) with ATT, Attention, MOT, Motor, NONP, Non-
planning, SUM, Sum score. MBscore, score of model-based control. MFscore, score of model-free control. ωlog, balance between model-free and 
model-based control, log-transformed. vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex. vS, ventral striatum.  
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A.4 Supplementary results - fMRI 
A.4.1 Results of fMRI analyses of the main effects of 2Step and the interaction with age of 1st 
drink 
 
Table S 7. Correlation of BOLD response with RPEMF in whole-brain analyses. 
Area k T R/L x y z 
Middle occipital gyrus 12830 13.008 R 28 -92 4 
Cuneus 
 
10.410 R 20 -94 8 
Cerebellum 
 
10.305 L -34 -74 -20 
Nucleus accumbens 4963 12.468 L -12 4 -10 
Caudate nucleus 
 
11.093 R 12 12 -8 
Putamen 
 
8.402 L -28 -12 6 
Superior parietal lobule 1729 8.244 L -34 -64 48 
Inferior parietal lobule 
 
8.098 L -46 -58 50 
Inferior parietal lobule 
 
7.925 L -50 -50 50 
Posterior cingulate cortex 700 7.311 L -2 -30 30 
Angular gyrus 1397 6.915 R 36 -64 50 
Angular gyrus 
 
6.771 R 50 -58 42 
Middle occipital gyrus 
 
4.979 R 32 -68 36 
Middle temporal gyrus 190 6.785 R 58 -34 -12 
Middle frontal gyrus 491 6.760 L -42 50 0 
Inferior frontal gyrus (p. Triangularis) 
 
6.533 L -46 46 10 
Inferior frontal gyrus (p. Oribitalis) 
 
6.070 L -44 46 -10 
Cerebellar vermis 113 6.212 
 
0 -60 -22 
Superior frontal gyrus 190 6.059 R 24 62 0 
Middle frontal gyrus 
 
5.709 R 40 56 -2 
Inferior frontal gyrus (p. Oribitalis) 
 
4.876 R 48 48 -6 
Middle temporal gyrus 43 5.603 L -52 -40 -14 
Middle frontal gyrus 168 5.578 R 36 12 58 
Superior frontal gyrus 
 
5.265 R 26 32 54 
Middle frontal gyrus 
 
5.136 R 40 24 50 
Superior orbital gyrus 52 5.379 R 20 38 -16 
Superior orbital gyrus 
 
5.152 R 20 48 -16 
Anterior cingulate cortex 72 5.345 R 12 40 20 
Insula 25 5.141 R 26 24 -4 
Superior frontal gyrus 19 5.092 R 2 26 62 
Brain stem 5 4.994 
 
0 -34 -30 
Anterior cingulate cortex 16 4.936 R 12 44 2 
Superior frontal gyrus 19 4.901 L -18 28 56 
Middle cingulate gyrus 8 4.833 
 
0 -14 32 
Precuneus 7 4.762 R 12 -54 40 
Note. Displayed at pFWE<.05, k≥5, T≥4.617. k is cluster size. T value of peak. R = right, L = left.  x, y, z are MNI coordinates. 
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Table S 8. Correlation of BOLD response with RPEΔMB in whole-brain analyses. 
Area k T R/L x y z 
Caudate nucleus 203 8.913 R 12 10 -8 
Putamen 228 8.255 L -10 10 -8 
Inferior parietal lobule 55 5.697 L -50 -50 52 
Inferior temporal gyrus 44 5.331 L -56 -32 -18 
Inferior occipital gyrus 23 5.088 R 30 -88 -4 
Medial orbital gyrus 39 5.028 L -10 44 -6 
Middle orbital gyrus 10 5.001 L -44 46 -8 
Medial orbital gyrus 40 4.891 R 6 42 -6 
Superior medial gyrus 
 
4.846 R 4 54 2 
Superior medial gyrus 8 4.882 L -10 60 10 
Superior frontal gyrus 5 4.860 L -20 36 50 
Note. Displayed at pFWE<.05, k≥5, T≥4.617. k is cluster size. T value of peak. R = right, L = left. x, y, z are MNI coordinates. 
 
Table S 9. Results of conjunction analysis of RPEMF and RPEΔMB in whole-brain analyses. 
Area k T R/L x y z 
Caudate nucleus 295 9.826 R 12 10 -8 
Putamen 318 9.481 L -10 10 -8 
Inferior parietal lobule 297 6.443 L -50 -48 52 
Angular Gyrus 
 
5.703 L -40 -70 46 
Angular Gyrus 
 
4.988 L -48 -62 48 
Middle temporal gyrus 95 5.749 L -56 -38 -14 
Middle cingulate cortex 65 5.728 R 2 -32 38 
Cerebellum 21 5.623 R 42 -62 -42 
Middle orbital gyrus 113 5.620 L -44 46 -8 
Inferior frontal gyrus (p. Triangularis) 
 
5.018 L -40 44 2 
Inferior frontal gyrus (p. Orbitalis) 
 
4.901 L -42 36 -14 
Inferior occipital gyrus 59 5.466 R 32 -88 -2 
Middle temporal gyrus 26 5.379 R 60 -36 -12 
Inferior frontal gyrus (p. Orbitalis) 26 5.331 L -26 28 -16 
Superior medial gyrus 47 5.176 R 8 48 0 
Middle occipital gyrus 12 4.959 L -24 -90 4 
Superior frontal gyrus 5 4.920 L -18 34 52 
Fusiform gyrus 26 4.911 L -34 -76 -14 
Fusiform gyrus 12 4.904 L -30 -52 -16 
Inferior occipital gyrus 5 4.780 R 40 -76 -10 
Note. Displayed at pFWE<.05, k≥5, T≥4.617. k is cluster size. T value of peak. R = right, L = left. x, y, z are MNI coordinates. 
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Table S 10. Correlation of BOLD response with RPEMF in whole-brain analyses covarying negatively with age of 1
st drink. 
Area k T R/L x y z 
Putamen 472 4.768 R 34 -6 -8 
Insula 
 
3.939 R 34 10 -8 
Pallidum 
 
3.853 R 20 6 0 
Pallidum 608 4.017 L -14 -2 0 
Putamen 
 
3.899 L -26 -2 4 
Putamen/Insula 
 
3.854 L -40 -20 -10 
Superior temporal gyrus 150 3.934 L -52 -8 -8 
Superior temporal gyrus 151 3.870 R 62 -24 4 
Superior temporal gyrus 
 
3.818 R 44 -20 0 
Superior temporal gyrus 
 
3.411 R 54 -22 6 
Anterior cingulate cortex 84 3.870 L -12 30 18 
Anterior cingulate cortex 87 3.858 R 12 32 28 
Insula 55 3.837 R 28 28 8 
Insula 
 
3.290 R 34 40 0 
Inferior orbital gyrus 
 
3.237 R 26 30 0 
Middle frontal gyrus 119 3.817 L -46 38 22 
Superior temporal gyrus 64 3.763 R 58 -8 -8 
Middle temporal gyrus 
 
3.173 R 50 -8 -16 
Supramarginal gyrus 92 3.690 L -66 -30 28 
Supramarginal gyrus 
 
3.445 L -56 -36 32 
Angular gyrus 115 3.643 L -40 -68 38 
Middle occipital gyrus 
 
3.557 L -34 -70 32 
Postcentral gyrus 114 3.613 L -52 -16 52 
Postcentral gyrus 
 
3.606 L -62 -14 36 
Supramarginal gyrus 
 
3.425 L -54 -20 36 
Fusiform gyrus 69 3.511 L -32 -18 -26 
Inferior temporal gyrus 
 
3.460 L -42 -28 -18 
Fusiform gyrus   3.234 L -34 -28 -22 
Note. Displayed at puncorr<.001, k≥50, T≥3.148. k is cluster size. T value of peak. R = right, L = left. x, y, z are MNI 
coordinates.  
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A.4.2 Comparisons between binge-drinkers and non-bingers 
 
Table S 11. Results of Exact Mann-Whitney U-tests comparing extracted mean ROI BOLD response between binge-drinkers 
and non-bingers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
RPEMF  
RPEΔMB 
 
vS vmPFC 
 
vS vmPFC 
Nnon-bingers 41 41  
41 41 
Nbinge-drinkers 105 105  
105 105 
mean ranknon-bingers 70.78 73.73  
78.1 74.76 
mean rankbinge-drinkers 74.56 73.41  
71.7 73.01 
rank sumnon-binge 2902 3023  
3202 3065 
rank sumbinge-drinkers 7829 7708  
7529 7666 
Mann-Whitney-U 2041 2143 
 
1964 2101 
Z -0.49 -0.04 
 
-0.82 -0.22 
Exact significance (2-tailed) .630 .969 
 
.414 .825 
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B Supplementary Information of Study 2 
B.1 Computational fits 
Besides the abovementioned hybrid model, we fitted two alternative model types to our 
choice data: 1) a model-free algorithm SARSA(λ), which only captures a main effect of 
reward on first stage choices and 2) a pure model-based algorithm, which considers the 
interaction between reward and transition frequencies but does not capture a main effect of 
reward on first stage choices. The overarching aim of these alternative model fittings was the 
subsequent model comparison, where we aimed to identify the best fitting algorithm for all 
groups (healthy controls, abstainers, relapsers). Therefore, we subjected individual model 
evidences (integrated likelihoods) for all three models to a Bayesian model selection 
procedure. In line with previous studies (Daw et al., 2011; Deserno, Wilbertz, et al., 2015) the 
hybrid model was the best fitting model for all three groups (see Figure S 3A and Figure S 
3B). Beyond this, we also fitted several other reduced computational models to our data. In 
our data, the best model fit was always achieved with the original seven parameter model. 
Simplifications by reducing/ removing particular parameters did not yield more parsimonious 
fits (Figure S 3C). Moreover, surrogated data generated from the fitted full seven parameter 
hybrid model captured both the Reward (R) and the Reward x Transition (R x T) effects from 
the raw behavioral data analyses (Figure S 3D). 
 
B.1.1 Computational fits: between group comparisons and association with other variables 
The hybrid model fitted better than chance in 85% of all subjects (143/186). Other 
studies using young college students did not evidence this large amount of “non-fitting” 
individuals (Daw et al., 2011; Deserno, Wilbertz, et al., 2015) and we have previously 
suggested that our comparably low evidence of computational fits might be specific for the 
here studied age cohort (Sebold et al., 2016) and patient group. Crucially, the proportion of 
subjects for whom the computational model fitted better than chance was not different 
between healthy controls, abstaining patients and relapsing patients (χ = .89, p = .63, see 
Figure S 3B). We aimed to further elucidate which variables interfered with computational 
model fits and focused on demographical and cognitive domains known to interact with 
model-based or model-free control, namely 1) working memory (Otto, Gershman, et al., 
2013; Otto, Raio, et al., 2013; Schad et al., 2014), 2) cognitive speed (Schad et al., 2014), and 
3) age (Eppinger, Walter, Heekeren, & Li, 2013). We compared these variables between 
subjects, whose behavior was fitted better than chance by the computational model and those 
who were not, by using Wilcoxon rank sum test. We found that working memory capacity 
was significantly lower in the poor fit individuals (Digit Symbol backwards: W = 3832, p = 
.01, r = -0.18). This might indicate that sufficient working memory capacity is an essential 
prerequisite to adequately execute the two-step task. In line with this finding, two other 
studies have shown, that patients suffering from schizophrenia, who tend to show deficits in 
working memory capacity (Deserno, Sterzer, Wüstenberg, Heinz, & Schlagenhauf, 2012) also 
show worse model fits for a computational model-based reinforcement learning model 
(Culbreth, Westbrook, Daw, Botvinick, & Barch, 2016; Schlagenhauf et al., 2014). None of 
the other two variables (age: W = 3259, p = .57, r = -0.04 and cognitive speed measured by 
the Digit Symbol Substitution Test: W = 3487, p = .16, r = -0.1) was significantly different 
between these two groups.  
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Figure S 3. A: Results from Bayesian model comparison: The final hybrid model was the most likely 
model for HC (healthy controls), abstainers and relapsers. B: Individual Log-Likelihoods for all three 
groups. Blue color/triangles indicate individual model fits worse than chance. For further imaging 
analyses and analyses concerning model parameters, we excluded these subjects. Black solid lines 
indicate mean log-likelihoods for individuals, who fit better than chance. There were no significant 
differences between groups in terms of number of subjects who fitted worse than chance. C: 
Comparisons of model fits for different computational models. The winning model is entitled as mf/mb 
which is the original seven parameter hybrid model. D: Association between surrogated data from the 
seven-parameter hybrid model and the model-free and model-based effects from the raw behavioral 
data analysis. 
 
B.1.2 Between group comparisons of model-parameters from computational model 
For exploratory analyses, we also compared all other parameters between groups. 
Except from a small effect of group on the repetition parameter (ρ, p = .03), which describes 
general first stage perseveration behavior, we did not see any significant between-group 
differences in these parameters. Post-hoc analyses demonstrated that abstainers showed 
stronger perseveration behavior compared to relapsers (p = .008) and trendwise stronger 
perseveration behavior compared to control participants (p = .05). However, there was no 
difference between control participants and relapsers (p = .2). Crucially, the effect of group on 
the repetition parameter (ρ) did not survive correction for multiple comparisons (pBonferroni < 
.007).  
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Table S 12. Mean parameters from the computational model 
 Inferred parameters from computational model: mean (sd) 
Group α1 α2 β1 β2 λ ω ρ 
Controls 0.45 
(0.30) 
0.50 
(0.29) 
7.45 
(4.34) 
3.57 
(2.02) 
0.58 
(0.22) 
0.42 
(0.19) 
0.18 
(0.10) 
Abstainers 0.51 
(0.30) 
0.58 
(0.27) 
6.68 
(3.47) 
3.25 
(1.94) 
0.67 
(0.19) 
0.44 
(0.20) 
0.23 
(0.09) 
Relapsers 0.43 
(0.37) 
0.50 
(0.32) 
7.86 
(4.42) 
3.55 
(3.17) 
0.63 
(0.21) 
0.39 
(0.24) 
0.16 
(0.12) 
F 0.66 0.90 0.66 0.19 1.80 0.51 3.56 
p 0.51 0.41 0.51 0.83 0.17 0.60 0.03 
 
 
B.2 Preprocessing of the functional imaging data 
fMRI preprocessing was conducted using Statistical Parametric Mapping software 
(SPM8; London, UK: Wellcome Department for Imaging Neuroscience) and MATLAB 
R2014a (Natick, MA: The MathWorks Inc.) and was implemented in Nipype (Gorgolewski et 
al., 2011). Preprocessing included the following steps: 1) correction for differences in slice 
acquisition times with reference to the middle slice, 2) realignment of all slices to the first to 
correct for motion, 3) correction for field inhomogeneities with a voxel displacement map 
from acquired field maps, 4) coregistration of the mean EPI image to the individual structural 
MPRAGE image, 5) segmentation and normalization of the individual MPRAGE image to 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space and applying normalization parameters to the 
distortion-corrected EPI images and resampling EPI images to 2 x 2 x 2 mm³, and 6) spatial 
smoothing of the EPI images with a Gaussian kernel of 6mm full-width at half-maximum. 
Prior to statistical analysis, data were high-pass filtered with a cut-off of 128 seconds. 
 
B.3 Exclusion criteria for different analyses  
In the imaging analyses we excluded subjects, who did not fit the computational model 
better than chance (see Computational fits section, above). From the remaining 143 subjects, 
we excluded 6 subjects due to incidental anatomical findings diagnosed by a neuroradiologist. 
From the remaining 137 subjects excessive head motion (> 3mm translation and 3° rotation) 
led to exclusion of 14 additional subjects. In 3 subjects coregistration or normalization had 
failed and in 4 additional subjects significant parts of the ventral striatum (which is a core 
region involved in this task) were missing due to artefacts.  
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Figure S 4. Description of sample sizes and drop outs at each stage of the analysis procedure. HC = 
Healthy controls, ABS = Abstainers, REL = Relapsers. 
 
B.4 First level analysis of the functional imaging analysis 
We computed RPEMF and RPEΔMB for all subjects. These reward-prediction errors are 
non-zero at two time points: 1) second-stage onsets and 2) outcome presentation. Prediction-
errors at second-stage onset compare values of first- and second-stage stimuli and therefore 
depend on the weighting parameter (ω), which indicates the balance between model-based 
and model-free decision making. As mentioned in the main text, the two regressors of interest 
were RPEMF and RPEΔMB. Just like Daw et al. (2011), the time point of reward delivery was 
additionally included as a separate regressor and the design-matrix also included first-stage 
onsets with two parametric modulators, the softmax probability for choosing one of the two 
first-stage probabilities as well as its partial derivative with respect to ω. The six movement 
parameters from the realignment were included in the model as nuisance regressors.  
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B.5 Voxel-based morphometry 
Each individual’s anatomical T1-weighted image was segmented into three different 
tissue classes by using the unified segmentation approach, as implemented in SPM 8. Grey 
matter images were then smoothed by using an isotropic Gaussian kernel (8 mm full-width at 
half-maximum). Smoothed images were then subjected to a random-effects model containing 
site and intracranial volume as covariates. We conducted a one-way analysis of variance on 
smoothed structural images with group as factor (healthy controls, abstainers, relapsers) and 
site and total intracranial volume as covariates. Mirroring our functional analyses, we 
performed this analysis by using small volume correction with a mask containing all voxels 
showing a significant effect for RPEMF and RPEΔMB combining all three groups (Figure 9 and 
Table S 13). This analysis indicated a main effect of group on the mPFC (x = 3, y = 48, z = -
9, kE = 374, z = 4.42, pFWE_SVC = .002). Further post-hoc t-tests indicated that group effects in 
the mPFC were driven by higher grey matter density in control participants compared to 
relapsers (pFWE_SVC = .002), whereas there was no significant difference between control 
participants and abstainers or abstainers and relapsers. Performing an additional one-way 
ANOVA on extracted grey matter densities of the region where we had observed the 
functional model-based between group differences in the mPFC (peak voxel, x = -16, y = 42, 
z = -8) again revealed a main effect of group (p = .009). Post-hoc tests indicated larger grey 
matter densities in control participants compared to abstainers (p = .03) and relapsers (p = 
.003) whereas there were no differences between abstainers and relapsers (p = .53). Adding 
these extracted grey matter densities to our functional analyses did not change our observed 
effects. 
 
Table S 13. Whole brain effects of group on grey matter density at the statistical threshold p < .001, uncorrected that survive 
FWE correction at the cluster level  
Anatomical region x y z Peak 
z-value 
Cluster 
(FWE-corr) 
Cluster 
size 
Right medial frontal cortex 3 48 -9 4.42 <.0001 2099 
Right middle frontal gyrus 5 54 -2 4.29 .022 882 
Right middle cingulate gyrus 5 -15 46 4.09 .009 1104 
 
 
B.6 Drinking Motives Questionnaire 
For exploratory purposes, we correlated individual alcohol expectancies with drinking 
motives, as assessed with the Drinking Motives Questionnaire (Kuntsche et al., 2006), which 
assesses individual alcohol consumption motives on four scales (Social, Coping, 
Enhancement, Social pressure/conformity). Across all subjects, each subscale was 
significantly correlated with the sum score of alcohol expectancies (Social (δ = .5, p < .0001), 
Coping (δ = .7, p < .0001), Enhancement (δ = .6, p < .0001), Social pressure/conformity (δ = 
.3, p < .001)), suggesting that each drinking motive was positively associated with alcohol 
expectancies.  
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Figure S 5. Association between all four subscales of the Drinking Motives Questionnaire and the sum score of the AEQ.  
 
Similar to the AEQ Score, we found an interaction between group, model-based control 
and the sum score of drinking motives (p < .0001). This time, the association between model-
based control and DMQ-scores was absent in control participants (p = .33), marginally 
positive in abstainers (δ = .31, p = .07) and again negative in relapsers (δ = -.3, p = .03). 
 
 
 
Figure S 6. A model-based strategy usage as a function of drinking motives: Subsequent relapsers showed a negative 
relationship between Drinking Motives and model-based control. This negative association was not apparent in HCs and 
marginally positive in abstainers. 
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Table S 14. Regions that survived the statistical threshold (p < .0001, uncorrected) of the conjunction analysis.  
Anatomical region x y z Peak 
t-value 
Peak 
(FWE-corr) 
Cluster 
size 
Right ventral striatum 12 12 -8 6.38 <.0001 323 
Left ventral striatum -16 8 -10 6.27 <.0001 309 
Left medial prefrontal cortex -8 32 -8 4.85 .017 172 
Right inferior occipital gyrus 36 -86 4 4.24 .164 28 
Right hippocampus 30 -26 -10 4.03 .312 12 
Right anterior cingulate gyrus 2 30 -12 4.03 .314 12 
 
 
B.7 Model-free comparisons 
We additionally asked whether relapsers would show increased correlates of model-free 
signatures in the mPFC (x = -16, y = 42, z = -8), where we found decreased model-based 
signatures. However, there were no between group effects neither in whole brain analysis nor 
by applying a priori region of interest, indicating that group differences were specifically 
present with respect to model-based decision-making. 
 
 
 
Figure S 7. Model-free estimates from the mPFC (x = -16, y = 42, z = -8) across all three groups. There 
were no significant between group differences.  
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B.8 Association with time to relapse 
For exploratory purposes, we also assessed whether time to relapse could be predicted 
from our behavioral data, namely from the interaction between alcohol expectancies and 
model-based control. More precisely, we assumed that the interaction between AEQ and 
model-based control in relapsers would show differences with regard to time to relapse. Most 
patients relapsed within the first three months (Mdn = 63 days). Because of non-normal 
distribution of the time to relapse variable, we assigned subjects to an early vs. late relapse 
group (early: within three months (n=30), late: beyond three months (n=19)). Logistic 
regression, where relapse (early vs. late) was predicted from the interaction between alcohol 
expectancies and model-based control (analogue to what we conducted with model 2a and 
2b), revealed no significant relationship between AEQ and model-based scores (p = .24) for 
subjects grouped according to early vs. late relapse within the group of relapsers.  
 
B.9 Number of detoxifications and model-based control: behavioral and neuroimaging 
analyses 
As relapsers had reported significantly higher number of previous detoxifications 
treatments compared to abstainers, we aimed to investigate the association between model-
based control and its neural correlates and number of detoxifications in the patient group. 
Correlational analyses revealed a negative correlation between model-based control and 
number of detoxifications in the patient group, which closely failed to reach significance (ρ = 
-.19, p = .07). There was no significant age difference between relapsers and abstainers 
(abstainers: M = 45.7 years, SD = 12.0, relapsers: M = 45.2, SD = 9.9, p = .82, see Table 4). 
However, number of detoxifications can be confounded by age. Indeed, in our sample, 
number of detoxifications was correlated with age (ρ = .29, p = .008). Thus, younger patients 
had comparably fewer previous detoxification treatments compared to older patients. When 
we corrected the number of detoxifications for this confounding factor, the previously 
observed negative correlation with model-based control was far from significant (ρ = -.13, p = 
.22). On a neural level, we also explored the association between number of detoxifications in 
the patient group and model-based neural correlates in the mPFC (see Figure 9C). We 
extracted contrast estimates at the peak level (x = -16, y = 42, z = -8, see Figure 9C), where 
we had observed between group differences in model-based functional activation and 
correlated these values with number of detoxifications in the patient group. This analysis 
revealed no significant association between model-based mPFC activity and number of 
detoxifications (ρ = -.05, p = .73). Correcting number of detoxifications for age effects did not 
change this (ρ = .04, p = .74). 
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C Supplementary Information of Study 3 
 
Figure S 8. Simulation of parameter estimates for the case of delay discounting. (A) Different values of 𝒌𝒍 assuming 
consistent choice behavior 𝜷𝒍 = 𝟏. 𝟔 are precisely estimated over 30 trials. (B) Estimation of 𝒌𝒍 = −𝟑 over different values 
of 𝜷𝒍 = 𝟏. 𝟔; −𝟎. 𝟔𝟗; −𝟓. 𝟑. Every picture represents one simulation and a number of 20 out of 2000 runs are depicted. 
Dashed lines are the original values of the parameters 𝒌𝒍 = log(k). 
 
 
 
Figure S 9. Simulation of parameter estimates for the case of probability discounting of gains (PDG) and losses (PDL) and 
for the mixed gambles task (MG). A-C) Simulation of parameter estimates for PDG, PDL and MG respectively. Different 
values of 𝒌𝒍/ 𝝀𝒍  assuming consistent behavior 𝜷𝒍 = 𝟏. 𝟔. Every picture represents one simulation and a number of 20 out of 
2000 runs are depicted. 
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Figure S 10. Convergence of parameter estimation in participant sample data. The average absolute differences between the 
estimation at each trial and the final estimation for all participants are shown trial by trial by black lines. The gray area 
depicts the on standard deviation distance from the average. The decreasing pattern in black lines is a sign of convergence 
and the same for standard deviations means that this is true for the whole group. The top row depicts |?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?| for DD, PDG, 
and PDL and |?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?| for MG; the bottom row shows |?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?| for the same tasks. 
 
 
C.1 Differences between VBDM version used in this study compared to the VBDM 
version reported in Pooseh et al. (2017) 
 
1. Priors on k and λ: 
a. DD: The priors of the log transformed k parameters were normally distributed in the range 
of  
[-15,10] in the version used in this study and were changed to a Beta distribution in the range 
[-8,2] in Pooseh et al. The range of the prior was shrunk in order to avoid infeasible estimates 
beyond this range due to the limited offer range.  
 
b. PDG, PDL: The priors of the log transformed k parameters were normally distributed in the 
range of [-15,10] in this study and were changed to a Beta distribution in the range [-3,3] in 
Pooseh et al. With this, now the expected value of log(k)=0 (i.e. k=1 as “rational” weighing of 
probabilities) lies in the middle of the prior range as a kind of baseline. 
 
c. MG: The priors of the (log transformed) λ were normally distributed in the range of [-8,2] 
in this study and changed to a Beta distribution in the (not log transformed) range [0,4] in 
Pooseh et al. 
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2. Priors on Beta: 
In this study, priors on β were normally distributed in the range of [-10,10] and were changed 
to a uniform distribution in the range of [-5,5]. Beyond this range, a change in Beta does not 
make a big difference. 
 
3. Random offers 
In this study, random offers were shown in every fourth trial. In Pooseh et al., this was 
changed to a random distribution across all trials. 
 
4. Offer range 
In this study, the amount of the offered gains and losses in DD, PDG, and PDL ranged from 
0.30€ to 10€. In Pooseh et al., the offer range for these three tasks was changed to integers 
from 3€ to 50€. The offer range for MG is the same in both versions of this task battery (1€ - 
40€ for gains and 5€ - 20€ for losses). 
 
5. Feedback 
In the experiment versions used in Pooseh et al., it is possible to show the outcome of every 
trial for PDG, PDL, and MG in terms of winning or losing, so participants get a direct 
feedback of their choices. There is no feedback implemented in the version used in this study 
(as is usual in this kind of tasks). 
 
 
6. Number of trials 
In this study, there were 30 trials for DD, PDG, and PDL and 40 trials for MG, which was 
sufficient to yield stable estimates of the parameters. In Pooseh et al., the number of trials per 
task was set to 50 to reach even more stable parameter estimation by having more trials to 
base the estimation procedure on. 
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C.2 Additional correlational analyses 
 
Table S 15. Correlations between behavioral VBDM estimates with themselves, measures of impulsiveness and other 
personality traits, and alcohol consumption at baseline and the difference to the 12-months follow up in Sample 1. 
Measure    VBDM   
  DDa   PDGa   PDLa   MGb 
  ρ p   ρ p   ρ p   ρ p 
                            
V
B
D
M
 PDGa   -.010 .887                   
PDLa   -.127 .079   .000 .998             
MGb   .003 .971   .166 .022   -.231 .001       
                            
B
IS
-1
5 
 
A   .070 .337   -.131 .076   -.067 .360   -.124 .090 
M   .104 .152   -.001 .993   -.117 .107   -.073 .307 
NP   .216 .003   -.154 .035   .021 .773   -.164 .025 
SUM   .189 .008  
-.121 .096 
 
-.104 .148 
 
-.142 .055 
              
S
U
R
P
S 
AS   -.089 .220   .101 .167   .072 .318   -.020 .789 
HO   .091 .216   -.044 .542   -.001 .993   .160 .027 
IMP   .128 .081   .017 .819   -.061 .405   -.096 .185 
SS   .021 .778   .122 .097   .021 .763   -.203 .004 
                            
B
as
el
in
e 
Age of 1st drink   -.052 .464   .072 .324   -.002 .980   .108 .133 
Age of 1st time drunk   -.073 .320   .155 .036   .079 .271   .099 .191 
Age of 1st binge-drinking event   -.021 .807   -.081 .347   .079 .359   .028 .745 
Est. alcohol consumption in 
past year (g alc/day)   
.038 .595   -.005 .944   .006 .938   -.012 .863 
Alcohol consumption in past 
year (g alc/drinking occasion)   
.050 .487   -.038 .610   -.036 .616   -.002 .980 
Number of binge-drinking 
events lifetime   
.135 .067   -.035 .640   .020 .793   -.047 .528 
Alcohol intake per binge-
drinking event (g alc)   .205 .004 
  -.001 .982   -.007 .927   -.102 .163 
DrinkscoreBL   .144 .043   .005 .949   .011 .882   -.042 .562 
                            
Δ
 F
U
1
2
-B
L 
ΔEst. alcohol consumption in 
past year (g alc/day) 
  -.072 .379   .015 .857   .077 .342   -.008 .919 
ΔEst. alcohol consumption in 
past year (g alc/day) 
  -.072 .379   .015 .857   .077 .342   -.008 .919 
ΔNumber of binge-drinking 
events past year 
  -.015 .856   .117 .160   -.143 .082   -.057 .505 
ΔAlcohol intake per binge-
drinking event (g alc) 
  -.128 .120   -.054 .505   -.115 .158   .076 .353 
ΔDrinkscore   -.088 .293   -.009 .913   -.065 .428   .032 .690 
Note. All reported correlations are Spearman's ρ. P-values are computed using Monte Carlo sampling. Bold printed values survive 
Benjamini-Hochberg FDR correction. BIS-15 = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, short form, A = Attentional, M = Motor, NP = Non Planning, 
Sum = Sum score; DD = Delay discounting; MG = Mixed gambles; PDG = probability discounting for gains; PDL = probability discounting 
for losses; SURPS = Substance Use Risk Profile Scale, AS = anxiety sensitivity, HO = hopelessness, IMP = impulsivity, SS = sensation 
seeking; VBDM = value-based decision making. 
a discounting parameter kl 
b loss aversion parameter λl 
c Δ refers to the difference between FU12 and BL data. 
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Table S 16. Correlations between behavioral VBDM estimates with themselves, sociodemographic data, measures of impulsiveness, and alcohol consumption at 
baseline in the patients and matched controls of Sample 2.  
Measure  
  Alcohol-dependent patients (n=114)   Healthy controls (n=98) 
  VBDM   VBDM 
  DDa   PDGa   PDLa   MGb   DDa   PDGa   PDLa   MGb 
  ρ/r p   ρ/r p   ρ/r p   ρ/r p   ρ/r p   ρ/r p   ρ/r p   ρ/r p 
                                                    SES   -.107 .250 
 
.062 .504 
 
.039 .674 
 
.046 .619 
 
-.023 .833 
 
.088 .413 
 
-.027 .803 
 
-.012 .919 
Smoking status   .143 .128 
 
-.240 .009 
 
.063 .493 
 
-.072 .436 
 
.136 .194 
 
-.003 .978 
 
.022 .830 
 
-.052 .626 
                             
V
B
D
M
 PDGa   -.093 .332 
          
-.123 .232 
         
PDLa   -.092 .335 
 
.143 .130 
       
.013 .898 
 
-.173 .096 
      
MGb   -.203 .031 
 
.031 .740 
 
-.036 .702 
    
-.080 .453 
 .455 .000  
-.162 .115 
   
                             
B
IS
-1
5 
A   .068 .488 
 
-.218 .024 
 
-.008 .934 
 
.002 .984 
 
.021 .830 
 
-.090 .380 
 
-.021 .837 
 
.027 .790 
M   -.021 .822 
 -.215 .023  
.047 .628 
 
.055 .573 
 
.136 .193 
 
-.134 .202 
 
-.070 .495 
 
-.017 .872 
NP   .065 .502 
 -.262 .007  
-.104 .282 
 
-.058 .554 
 
-.021 .839 
 
.010 .928 
 
.070 .493 
 
.038 .493 
Sum   .060 .537 
 -.296 .002  
-.034 .734 
 
.024 .809 
 
.080 .432 
 
-.084 .406 
 
-.003 .975 
 
.039 .701 
  
                                                  
B
as
el
in
e 
Est. alcohol consumption in past year (g 
alc/day) 
  .180 .054 
 
-.082 .381 
 
.019 .840 
 
-.077 .408 
 
.037 .726 
 
-.010 .922 
 
.079 .439 
 
.014 .895 
Alcohol consumption in past year (g 
alc/drinking occasion) 
  .135 .152 
 
-.168 .074 
 
.012 .896 
 
-.046 .623 
 
.152 .141 
 
.019 .855 
 
.051 .617 
 
.003 .980 
Number of binge-drinking events 
lifetime 
  .042 .659 
 
.135 .174 
 
-.185 .060 
 
.027 .782 
 
.092 .377 
 
-.127 .224 
 
.141 .178 
 
-.071 .499 
Alcohol intake per binge-drinking event 
in past year (g) 
  .105 .273 
 
-.187 .044 
 
.017 .854 
 
.034 .714 
 
.110 .285 
 
-.090 .382 
 
.140 .179 
 
-.006 .954 
Cumulated lifetime alcohol intake (kg)   .016 .861 
 
.023 .801 
 
-.214 .020 
 
-.070 .452 
 
-.018 .866 
 
-.140 .172 
 
-.046 .657 
 
-.015 .885 
ADS sum score   -.050 .594 
 
-.141 .130 
 
.043 .645 
 
-.049 .602 
 
.085 .415 
 
-.075 .472 
 
.022 .035 
 
-.130 .212 
OCDS-G total score   .026 .789 
 
-.019 .840 
 
-.093 .334 
 
-.172 .070 
 
.017 .876 
 
-.046 .662 
 
.006 .949 
 
.039 .709 
Note. All reported correlations are Spearman's ρ except for correlations with dichotomous smoking status, which are point biserial correlations r. P-values are computed using Monte Carlo sampling. Bold printed values 
survive Benjamini-Hochberg FDR correction. ADS = Alcohol Dependence Scale; BIS-15 = Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, short form, A = Attentional, M = Motor, NP = Non Planning, Sum = Sum score; DD = Delay 
discounting; MG = Mixed gambles task; OCDS-G = Obsessive Compulsive Drinking Scale, German version; PDG = probability discounting for gains; PDL = probability discounting for losses; SES = socioeconomic 
status; VBDM = value-based decision making. 
a discounting parameter kl 
b loss aversion parameter λl
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D Supplementary Information for additional analyses 
I have performed additional analyses that were not part of the published worked, but aid 
in answering the research questions presented in this thesis. For that purpose, I first analyzed 
the one-year predictability of drinking trajectories in our sample of young adult social 
drinkers (Sample 1) with Two-Step task behavior equivalently to the prediction of drinking 
trajectories with choice biases towards delays, risks, and valence in Study 3. These analyses 
revealed no significant results. Baseline model-free control was not associated with the level 
of general drinking behavior at the 12-month follow-up assessment (MFscore x DrinkscoreFU12: 
Spearman’s ρ = -.130, p = .114) or the change of drinking from baseline to follow up (MFscore 
x ΔDrinkscore: Spearman’s ρ = -.080, p = .334), and neither were model-based control (MBscore 
x DrinkscoreFU12: Spearman’s ρ = .069, p = .401; MBscore x ΔDrinkscore: Spearman’s ρ = -.003, p 
= .975) nor the computational parameter indicating the balance between model-free and 
model- based control (ωlog x DrinkscoreFU12: Spearman’s ρ = .080, p = .336; ωlog x ΔDrinkscore: 
Spearman’s ρ = .094, p = .257). These results complement the previous findings and complete 
the investigation of goal-directed and habitual control with current and future drinking 
behavior in social drinkers and AUD patients.  
Second, I examined the correlations between model-free and model-based control in the 
Tw-Step task (Study 1) with the four VBDM parameters (Study 3) in the young-adult sample. 
None of these correlations reached significance (Table S 17).  
 
 
Table S 17. Correlation between measures of model-free and model-based control and VBDM parameters. 
    VBDM 
    DD log(k) PDG log(k)  PDL log(k) MG log(λ) 
MFscore Spearman's ρ .004 .066 -.069 -.104 
p .960 .373 .345 .165 
MBscore  Spearman's ρ -.142 .016 .092 .030 
p .061 .825 .211 .687 
Note. P-values were computed with Monte Carlo simulations of 10,000 samples. 
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